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ABSTRACT
Incentive payment systems became more widely used by companies 
in the 1980s; their acceptance was supported by the 
predictions of theorists in disciplines such as economics and 
social psychology. These theoretical traditions have for the 
most part proceeded separately, but we argue, there is 
potential for combining these insights of different traditions 
to improve the predictive power of models of incentive pay. 
To this end, this study demonstrates the potential of an 
interdisciplinary approach to modelling incentive pay.
Closer inspection of current models finds that they are 
founded on assumptions of rational economic man, including 
calculative individualism. In practice, however, these 
assumptions often do not hold. We hypothesize that explicitly 
specifying individualistic values among employees as a 
boundary condition for the successful operation of incentive 
pay systems can improve models' predictive power.
Our hypotheses are tested by reference to a data set of the 
opinions of 1240 employees in 14 companies across England and 
Wales. An incentive pay model was found to have greater 
predictive power among relatively individualistic employees 
than among those of relatively collectivistic value sets. In 
addition, the incidence of an incentive pay system was 
associated with more effort being supplied among 
individualistic employees, but there was no significant 
difference in the effort supplied by collectivistic employees 
whether or not they are covered by an incentive pay system.
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This thesis argues that incentive payment systems, which 
enjoyed a renaissance in Britain during the 1980s, have been 
analysed by an academic literature whose conclusions have been 
ambiguous. We argue that improving incentive models' 
predictive power favours an interdisciplinary approach. We 
further contend that models proposed should pay explicit 
attention to when and where their predictions are applicable - 
that is, to their own boundary conditions. These arguments 
are formalised as testable hypotheses and exposed to attempts 
at falsification by empirical evidence.
1.2 Increased Incidence of Incentive Pay
Since the late 1970s in Britain, there has been a 
proliferation in the number of companies practising means of 
paying employees which differ from traditional collective 
bargaining, (Smith, 198 6). Schemes such as performance- 
related bonuses, profit-related pay and employee share 
ownership all provide a link between the income (or wealth) of 
employees and their performance at work. The directness of 
the link between pay and performance can vary widely depending 
on the system operated, but in general the increasing 
incidence of such schemes can be said to constitute an 
increase in the incentive element of the pay package, ceteris
12
paribus. Thus, the extent to which employees are materially 
rewarded for working harder is enhanced.
Evidence as to the extent of incentive pay in Britain, and to 
the scale of its extension in the last decade is difficult to 
report, because, with the exception of schemes requiring 
Inland Revenue approval to quality for tax relief^, firms are 
not required to disclose publicly their means of paying 
employees. What figures are available, however, broadly 
support the anecdotal evidence of widespread and increasing 
use of incentive pay. The first Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (WIRS), carried out in 1980 among 
approximately 2000 establishments in the UK, found that 13 per 
cent of private sector workplaces operated some form of 
employee-share ownership scheme, (Daniel and Millward (1983)). 
By 1984 the second WIRS survey reported that this figure had 
almost doubled, to 23 per cent. Rises from 19 to 34 per cent 
incidence were recorded in the retail distribution sector, and 
from 16 to 3 2 per cent among electrical and instrument 
engineering establishments (Millward & Stevens (1986)). Smith
' Since 1978 a variety of legislation has provided tax relief 
for designated payment systems. The Finance Act (1978) accorded 
relief to schemes which distributed free registered shares to all 
employees of five or more years standing. The Finance Act (1980) 
extended tax relief to Save As You Earn-funded share option 
schemes applicable to the whole work force. The Finance Act 
(1984) introduced tax concessions for discretionary share-option 
schemes. The Finance Act (1989) extended tax relief on
designated Employee Share Ownership programmes to corporation 
tax. The Finance Act (1987) provided tax relief to registered 
profit-related pay (PRP) programmes in which at least 5 per cent 
of total pay varied with company profits. The Finance Act (1989) 
abolished this rate and increased the upper limit on tax free PRP 
to 74 000. The Finance Act (1991) increased the proportion of 
PRP which was tax exempt from 50 per cent to 100 per cent.
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(1986) estimated that by 1985 41 per cent of publicly quoted 
companies in Britain operated at least one form of all 
employee cash or share-based profit sharing scheme. Following 
the 1987 Finance Act which introduced tax concessions for 
designated profit-related pay schemes, officially registered 
Profit Related Pay schemes grew in number from 145 in October 
1987 to 1245 in February 1991, (House of Commons (1991)). One 
dissenting voice is IDS (1991) who suggest that payment by 
results schemes for manual workers have declined in incidence 
since the mid 1980s. Smith (1986) in a survey of 1125 
companies, for the Department of Employment, found that for 
most respondents incentivating greater productivity from 
employees was indeed an objective of introducing both cash and 
share-based profit-sharing schemes.
1.3 Objectives of Thesis
The growing popularity of incentive pay systems has been 
supported by, and has given rise to, a burgeoning academic 
literature on incentive payment systems. This literature 
includes models of the effects of incentives on employee 
behaviour, and empirical tests of their hypothesised effects.
Despite the volume of academic literature, the effect of 
incentives on worker effort has yet to be conclusively 
established. We argue that one important reason for this is 
that research in the area of incentive pay has been undertaken 
by academics of different disciplines (principally economics
14
and social psychology) whose work has proceeded separately 
without reference to each other's tradition. This thesis aims 
to show that to a large extent economic and social 
psychological models of incentive pay are complementary rather 
than mutually exclusive, and that mining this complementarity 
provides greater scope for positive testing of the 
hypothesised effects of incentive pay. The more
comprehensively these hypothesised effects are tested and 
found to be robust, the more confidence we can have in the 
predictions and prescriptions drawn from incentive pay models. 
Accordingly our first objective is to demonstrate the 
complementarity of economics and social psychological models 
of incentive pay. To do so we open up the 'black box' of 
causality in economics by specifying a hypothesised 
motivational process which is consistent with it, and testing 
empirically the resulting model.
A key dimension of the complementarity of economic and social 
psychological models of incentive pay is, we argue, their 
sharing a common set of assumptions concerning human decision 
making. Although rarely explicitly stated, both traditions 
base their models on assumptions of man as being engaged in 
the maximisation of his individual self interest. These 
assumptions have been variously called those of rational 
economic man^ (Hollis and Nell (1975)), or more generally 
those of neoclassical theory. We argue, however, that the
 ^ 'Man', in this standard term, imports both the masculine 
and the feminine.
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extent varies to which these assumptions are met in practice. 
At different times, and among different people, values which 
guide decision making vary between being individualistic (and 
therefore more consistent with the 'rational economic man' 
assumptions), and collectivistic (in which case the assumed 
rationality is not such an accurate assumption). The 
predictions of models founded on assumptions of rational 
economic man are valid insofar as the assumptions are met in 
practice: where they are not, predictive power is not to be 
expected.
Despite the mutability of their assumptions, incentive pay 
models are typically presented as if ahistorically and 
universally applicable. This, we argue, undercuts their 
predictive power and leads them to be misapplied in certain 
circumstances.
Accordingly our second objective is to investigate this 
potential boundary condition of incentive pay models of 
behaviour. This has theoretical and practical importance. 
Firstly given the growing imperialism of economics in the 
social sciences (Harcourt (1981)), we aim to delineate the 
domain of models founded on assumptions of rational economic 
man. Secondly, by narrowing the conditions under which 
incentive pay can be confidently said to increase employee 
effort, practitioners can better focus their payment systems 
for greatest effect.
16
The question of boundary conditions for incentive models has 
been raised recently in the Decision Sciences literature (e.g. 
Miller & Crush (1988)), but research remains at a basic, 
pathbreaking level. Our objective is to develop positive 
hypotheses which formalise the contention, and to test them 
empirically using as broad a sample as possible.
1.4 Organisation of Thesis
The chapter which follows depicts and analyses the context in 
which the increasing incidence of incentive pay is set. Part 
of this context is argued to be a recent growth in 
individualistic values among British people, at the expense of 
collectivistic values. Given our hypothesis that incentive 
payment systems are most suitably applied to agents of 
individualistic value sets this context has important 
implications for our analysis.
Section Two sets out and develops theoretical perspectives on
incentive pay. Two broad approaches are analyzed: that of
efficient contracts in the economics tradition, and that of
expectancy theory in the social psychological tradition. The 
indeterminacy of empirical tests of these models is 
established, and their potential complementarity emphasised as 
a means of improving their ability to be rigorously tested. 
Further, the two approaches are argued to share common 
methodological assumptions of calculative individualism. We
17
argue that people's values reflect to what extent these 
assumptions are met, and that since values can be demonstrated 
to vary over time and across people, incentive pay models 
should not be thought of as being universally applicable.
Section Three operationalises this body of theory into 
testable hypotheses. The hypotheses summarise a model of the 
motivational process which is consistent with economic models, 
as well as the projected boundary conditions of its 
applicability; that is, the presence of individualistic 
values.
Section Four specifies a data sample suited to the purpose of 
testing the hypotheses developed in section three. Empirical 
proxies are defined to represent the variables contained in 
our hypotheses, and these hypotheses are tested with reference 
to the data sample.
Section Five summarises the conclusions which our analysis has 
led us to, discusses their generalisability and, in the light 
of these, outlines the implications they have for theory and 
practice.
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CHAPTER TWO- THE GROWTH OF INCENTIVE PAY IN CONTEXT
2.1 Introduction
Chapter One referred to evidence which pointed to an increased 
incidence of incentive pay. Why should the last decade have 
seen, in Britain at least, a proliferation in incentive pay 
systems? To answer this question requires that we outline the 
context in which the debate - if and how incentive pay motivates 
effort - is set.
If we think of an industrial relations system as one whose 
output is the set of customs and practices which govern the 
conduct of employment relationships, then it is clear that the 
ways in which people are paid is an important element of that 
set of 'customs and practices'. Accordingly, the context to be 
outlined is that of changes in the system of industrial 
relations which has given rise to incentive pay.
Some writers (eg Bassett (1986)) have argued that a major 
structural shift has taken place in the British industrial 
relations system over the last decade, to result in a New 
Industrial Relations. Others (eg Kelly & Kelly (1990)) have 
argued that change has been less fundamental.
To place this rise in incentive pay in context, then, we depict
19.
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the tendencies for change in the system which produces it.
2.2 Change in the Industrial Relations System
A variety of frameworks have been proposed for analysing change 
in the industrial relations system. Dunlop (1958) argued that 
three groups of actors are involved in such a system: workers 
and their representative organisations, managers and their 
representative organisations, and the agencies of government 
concerned with work. Significant change in the system 
(resulting in new rules and customs at work) could be thought to 
stem from a significant change in either technology, the market 
context faced by actors, or the ideology prevailing within the 
system.
Chandler (1962) emphasised the importance of strategic choices 
made by actors in response to the environmental conditions which 
they face. He argued that these choices shape the structure of 
the industrial relations system. Chandler thus saw the 
influence of exogenous factors, whilst important, as acting 
through the medium of organisational responses.
Applications of Talcott Parsons (1951) analysis of social 
systems to industrial relations stress the endogenous pressures 
within a system, as well as exogenous pressures acting on it, in 
bringing about change. Change can be a result of variations in
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the external environment, placing pressures on the adaptation 
function of the system to transmit the need for change 
throughout the system. Alternatively, the pressure for change 
may stem from strains within the system associated with internal 
misalignments. A crucial feature of Parsonian analysis of 
social systems is that exogenous and endogenous pressures in 
themselves will not necessarily bring about change in the
system. Sometimes such pressures are present yet no changes
occur. This is because the forces for change in the system 
remain weaker than the forces maintaining equilibrium. Such a 
framework is useful in explaining why incentive pay increased 
from the late 197 0s but not before. The Parsonian framework 
also emphasises the interaction of the industrial relations 
system with other sub-systems of society, for example, the 
political system and the economic system.
Each of these three contributions offers useful analytical 
devices in depicting the industrial relations context in which 
incentive pay systems have proliferated. Parsons causes us to 
pay close attention to imports from other sub-systems of
society. Chandler's view leads us to examine changes in the
potential for organisations to make strategic responses. 
Dunlop focuses explicit attention on the key environmental 
influences of the market constraint and the mode of technology. 
Accordingly, to investigate the context of the increased 
incidence of incentive pay we identify the chief external and
21
internal pressures for change in the industrial relations system 
in the early 1980s. To this end we assess market pressures 
(product and labour), technological change, and changes in 
public policy and the values of actors. In so doing we assess 
the implications of each of these pressures for organisational 
responses.
2.3 The Market Constraint: Product Markets
Employment relationships exist, for the most part, to facilitate 
the production of some good or service which is eventually sold 
in product markets. It is clear, then, that changes in product 
market conditions will have implications for employment 
relationships: Brown (1987, plO) points to "the relatively
greater importance of the product market than the labour market" 
in prompting changes in employment relations which aim for 
greater efficiency. Since product markets are in a continuous 
state of flux, so there will be pressures and opportunities 
which arise from these machinations which affect organisations' 
decisions regarding employment relationships: decisions which 
may lead to changes in the institutional structure of industrial 
relations.
Although its extent has varied from sector to sector, increased 
competition appears to be the leitmotif of product market 
conditions in recent years. We categorise this into three
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sources: i) greater international economic integration, ii) the
recession of 1980-82, and iii) increased domestic competition.
2.3a International Economic Integration
Increased product market competition derives from two sources: 
an increase in supply for any given demand, and/or a fall in 
demand for any given supply. This and the next subsection deal 
with the former.
Since 1982 world trade has increased markedly faster than the 
growth of output of the world economy. This implies that there 
has been a greater international interpenetration of markets, 
which suggests that the typical market has experienced a 
proliferation of competitors within it; that is, an increase in 
competitive pressures on incumbent firms. Such international 
economic integration stems from trade liberalization, through 
such treaties as GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade) and European Community policies, as well as the rise of 
multinational corporations and the entry onto the world stage of 
the newly industrializing countries. Between 1980 and 1985 the 
volume of world trade increased by an annual average rate of 0.6 
per cent faster than world output; this figure rose to 0.9 per 
cent between 1982 and 1986. The United Kingdom was particularly 
exposed to this growth of world trade. Between 1983 and 1988 
the growth of visible imports exceeded the rate of increase of
23
real consumers' expenditure by a full 3.3 per cent. This
implies increasing overseas competition in the United Kingdom's 
product markets.
This is not to say, however, that increasing international
competition is an unprecedented phenomenon. Indeed, since 1960 
it has been the typical case that the rate of growth of world 
trade should exceed that of production. It did so by an average 
of 5.9 per cent a year between 1965 and 1970, so that the growth 
of the recent past has not been at a rate which even approaches 
its historic performance. But whilst we should be aware that 
there has been no radical break with the past in the experience 
of global competition, this does not necessitate its exclusion 
as a force acting to determine a new system of industrial 
relations. International competition has increased
cumulatively: it is possible that recent years have been exposed
to a critical degree of competition for the first time which 
exhausted the capacity of firms to respond in such a way as to 
leave the industrial relations system intact. Alternatively it 
could be that it was the coincidence of this increasing 
international competition with the other factors which we will 




Within UK domestic industry there appears to have been a 
relative proliferation of suppliers in recent years. 
Competition within an economy has traditionally been measured by 
analysing concentration statistics. However imperfect, it is 
generally held that a rising concentration ratio within an 
industry, and to a lesser extent the aggregate concentration 
ratio of the economy, can be taken to imply a tendency to 
lessening competitive pressures.
Aggregate and industrial concentration ratios both experienced 
sharp increases during the 1950s and 1960s. By the mid 1970s 
this upward drift had slowed, and evidence suggests that from 
the late 1970s the ratios actually fell. Hart (1985) calculates 
that between 1979 and 1981 the share of the 100 largest firms by 
output in manufacturing fell from 42.2 per cent to 40.6 pwe 
cent. In terms of employment this fall was from 37.3 per cent 
to 3 6.4 per cent. This tendency also holds true for average 
industrial concentration in manufacturing industry. Hart found 
that over 1980-81 the modal change in the 5 firm employment 
concentration ratio of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
3 digit groups (excluding those groups experiencing a change of 
less than 2 per cent) was -3 per cent.
For the divisional SIC groups 1-4, the arithmetic mean
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employment five firm concentration ratio changed, between 1979 
and 1981 by:
Division 1 Energy & water supply +0.5 per cent
Division 2 Metal manufacture etc. -1.34 per cent
Division 3 Metal goods, engineering -1.3 per cent
Division 4 Other manufacturing -0.9 per cent
This is clear evidence that the aggregate concentration, 4 digit 
industry concentration and 3 digit industry group concentration 
declined after 1979. Set against the rising trend during most 
of the post-war period, this implies an increase in product 
market competition in the UK from 1979.
These results are supported by data on company registrations. 
New companies being formed are an important potential source of 
increased competition for incumbent producers. Between 1979 and 
1986 the number of British registered companies has increased at 
an annual average rate of 8.5% compared with 2.7% between 1972 
and 1979. Figures for VAT registrations reveal increases of 
registrations less deregistrations of 22% for all industries 
between 1980 and 1988, with above average increases in most 
services categories, as well as in the production and 
construction industries. This increase in the number of 
businesses has been attributed to the decentralisation and 
contracting out by large firms of activities previously carried
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out in house. If true this supports, rather than diminishes, 
our contention that product market conditions have become more 
competitive in recent years: if a company sells off its
distribution division, say, that division is now in direct
competition with incumbent firms in the distribution industry, 
increasing effective competition there.
Another way in which effective product market competition has 
increased within the UK is as a result of declining
unionisation. If all firms in an industry are unionised then it 
would seem likely that the objectives of collective bargaining, 
pay and working conditions, will have a greater tendency to 
uniformity than an industry in which some firms are unionised 
and others union free. This will be particularly true where the 
same union is dominant in every firm in the industry, eg
National Union of Seamen (now merged into the Rail, Maritime and
Transport Union). Now if non-unionised firms enter such an 
industry they will not be bound by the pay and practices common 
to the other firms, and hence may vary them in order to achieve 
a competitive advantage over incumbent firms. As such non-union 
firms enter a previously unionised industry in increasing 
numbers, pay and practices, formerly a given, become sources of 
competition between firms. It follows from this that declining 
unionisation in an industry may be taken to imply increasing 
competition there.
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New firms have, since 1979, shown themselves to be less likely 
to be unionised than existing firms. This makes for^a tendency 
for the unionisation of industries to fall over time, implying 
this increase in domestic competition which we have described.
2.3c The 1980-82 Recession
At a time when, as we have seen, overseas and domestic suppliers 
were competing with increasing intensity for British custom, the 
demand for goods and services collapsed in the recession which 
hit the global economy at the beginning of the 1980s. The 
causes of the recession does not concern us here. It may have 
been policy-induced, or a symptom of an endogenous cyclical 
mechanism, or a combination of a number of different factors. 
What is incontrovertible is that between 1979 and 1981 demand in 
Britain fell by a real 3.3 per cent. Firms in the British 
economy therefore faced a sudden increase in product market 
competition as more potential suppliers chased this shrinking 
demand.
Across the sectors of the economy experience was uneven: the
well-established accelerator principle could be applied to 
predict that the capital goods supply industry would be
particularly badly hit, and income-inelastic products such as
foodstuffs may be expected to have been more resilient. For
this 3.3 per cent fall in demand between 1979 and 1981 the
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output of British manufacturing industry fell by 14 per cent. 
Amongst the worst hit sectors were textiles (recording a 29 per 
cent fall over this period) , motor vehicles (26 per cent) and 
mechanical engineering (16 per cent).
Many British firms were driven to the wall during the recession, 
entailing an overall shrinkage of British industrial capacity. 
This may be argued to have constituted a force for diminishing 
competitive pressures, in that potential future supply was 
declining; constrained capacity during the subsequent upswing 
may well have lessened the exposure of firms to product market 
competition. What is clear, however, is that at the time of the 
recession British firms felt the force of competition very 
strongly. For many firms the choice between making radical 
responses or inertia was the choice between survival and 
bankruptcy.
2.3d Implications for Organisational Responses
We have suggested that British industry has, since 1979, been 
subject to increasing competition in product markets. Some of 
this is new and some represents the continuation of past trends. 
Particular sectors of industry have been more exposed than 
others. What implications, then, does this have for
organisational responses? We categorise them into two: 
pressures for organisations to respond in certain ways, and
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greater opportunity to make responses.
To be viable in the context of increasing competition firms must 
strive to be price competitive, to offer acceptable quality of 
service and to be able to respond quickly and efficiently to 
changing conditions. The environmental conditions, after 
Chandler (1962), will therefore place pressures on firms to make 
strategic responses which accommodate these requirements. Now 
whilst it would be naive to expect labour to be the sole focus 
of firms' responses to increased competition, it remains the 
case that labour is an important cost in production processes. 
Hence we would expect organisational responses to include 
changes in the use of labour: insofar as this breaks previous 
norms and establishes new ones, it brings about changes in the 
industrial relations system.
Organisational responses which we can expect to be made, 
therefore, include pressure to cut the unit cost of labour, 
which may be done by holding down wages or introducing ways to 
improve productivity. As we discuss in the chapters which 
follow, incentive pay is widely advanced as a means of 
increasing the productivity of employees. Hence innovations in 
incentive pay are prominent in the responses called for by 
increasing product market competition. In addition, measures 
may be taken to improve product quality by altering work 
practices as in the introduction of new technology. Firms may
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employ strategies designed to introduce greater flexibility both 
in the functions of labour (occupational flexibility) and its 
use (employment flexibility).
The opportunity presented for firms to introduce strategies 
which change the industrial relations structure in ways which 
were previously infeasible stems from the effects of competition 
on the workforce. As workers and unions recognise that 
competition is such that failure to accede to institutional 
change is liable to result in a firm's contraction or 
bankruptcy, with the consequent loss of jobs, then bargaining 
power shifts significantly to firms at the expense of unions. 
This has the effect of making it easier to enact changes which 
employers may have felt desirable for some time.
Thus we expect that product market competition will result, 
ceteris paribus, in organisational responses which are 
associated with a change in the industrial relations system, and 
which, in particular, provide a facilitating context for 
innovations in pay systems.
2.4 The Market Constraint: The Labour Market
The changing conditions of the labour market constitute one of 
the principal pressures on organisations: the availability of 
labour can influence whether a production process is capital or
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labour intensive, and what types of labour are used; decisions 
which have important ramifications for the industrial relations 
system.
We can view the labour market conditions from two positions: 
supply and demand-side factors. However we must recognise that 
these two categories are not independent; for example, high 
labour demand can bring forth its own supply by raising 
participation rates.
On the supply side the demographics of the labour force 
determine the supply of labour available at any time. In recent 
years there have been two important developments here which 
imply pressure for change. The first is narrowly demographic: 
the baby boom generation of 1960s births began to join the 
labour force during the 1970s and peaked in the early 1980s. As 
Ermisch (1983) notes, "the average annual increment to the 
labour force arising from demographic sources during the first 
half of the 1980s is the largest experienced since the last 
war". The implications of this are important: i) the labour
force was growing rapidly, implying, ceteris paribus more 
competition for a given number of jobs, and ii) a 'youthening' 
of the labour force, in which the importance of the cohort with 
few skills and little experience, but equally with fewer 
preconceptions about industrial relations practices, increased 
relative to that of experienced workers.
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The second phenomenon on the labour supply side was the increase 
in the participation of women in the labour force. Although 
this was a phenomenon which had been present throughout the 
post-war period, unlike the essentially ephemeral baby boom, the 
cumulative pressure built up throughout: women were increasingly 
a source of labour amenable to part-time working. This afforded 
an important competitive opportunity for employers: there had
been a secular decline in the hourly earnings of part-time 
female workers, relative to full-time men and women (Ermisch 
(1983), pl44), and in addition the indirect costs were lower,
with provision for paid holidays, paid sick leave and pensions 
generally lower for part-timers. Moreover, part-time workers' 
lack of rights to redundancy payments provides an important 
opportunity to exploit the flexibility of increasing numbers of 
women willing to work part-time. Brown (1987) records the 
proportion of part-time employees in the UK labour force 
increasing from 9 per cent in 1961 to 23 per cent in 1987.
At the same time as these phenomena in labour supply were being 
manifested, so important changes in demand were coming about. 
The severe recession, preceded by a slower contraction in labour 
demand from 1979, caused unemployment to rise. The combined 
effect of the recession and the demographic trends made for a 
level of unemployment which was the highest since the 1930s.
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2.4a Implications for Organisational Responses
What implications do these changes have for organisational 
responses? The rise in unemployment generally greatly increased 
the bargaining power of firms with respect to unions, whose 
members had cause to fear redundancy. This provided an 
opportunity for firms to make radical responses to pressures 
they had felt, but had felt unable previously to force by 
unions. Rising proportions of young, part time and women 
workers made for an increasing section of the labour force in 
which unionisation was low, and the flexible nature of their 
employment made it difficult for unions to establish a 
continuing presence amongst them. This made collective 
bargaining increasingly difficult, and made union-sponsored 
occupational rigidities difficult to maintain. Equally, as new 
entrants to the labour force these groups of workers did not 
carry with them the baggage of years of involvement in 
industrial relations precedents, and could therefore be expected 
to be more responsive to new employer initiatives, including 
incentive pay.
2.5 Technological Change
"We are currently experiencing a technological revolution which 
is no less fundamental in its ramifications for the occupational 
structure in Britain than the advent of industry itself in the
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latter part of the 18th century", (Poole et al. (1984, p49)
Technology is the way work is organised in order to transform a 
material from one state to another. It is therefore no more 
than a truism to say that technological change affects work. 
Since an industrial relations system comprises the institutions 
and practices which govern work, there is a clear link between 
technological change and pressures to make organisational 
responses which will change the system of industrial relations. 
If for each mode of technology, ceteris paribus, there is an 
optimum system of industrial relations which allows its fullest 
exploitation, it follows that to achieve the full competitive 
advantage which new technology can offer requires making
accommodating changes in the system. In addition new technology 
can be potentially labour-saving, a factor which can give
greater bargaining power to employers thereby making
organisational responses which alter the 1RS easier to
implement.
In the classic industrial sociological view (eg Batstone at al. 
(1987)) there are three stages of industrial development:
i) craft production
ii) mass production
iii) fully automated/ process enterprises
It is argued that in recent years, with the microelectronic
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revolution, we have been experiencing a transition from stage
ii) to stage iii) .
Stage ii) is characterised by the 'Fordist' mode of production 
which makes use of mass production, assembly line techniques. 
The opportunity to exploit this technology gave rise to 
facilitating organisational responses, which can be 
characterised as a view of the organisation as a machine with 
personnel as a mechanical component part being controlled by 
other parts of the machine. Drawing on the work of F W Taylor, 
workers' functions were minutely refined and defined. 
Accommodating responses which determined the industrial 
relations system were predicated on the need for collectivism, 
the individuality of workers having been submerged. Trade Union 
representation and collective bargaining became the dominant 
form of organisation. The narrow definitions of occupations 
became settled, and as workers organised in trade unions along 
these occupational lines a wage hierarchy developed between 
these various occupations. The role of the worker as an 
anonymous tool in the industrial machine meant that substitution 
of workers was straightforward so that little effort needed to 
be devoted to gaining employee commitment. Similarly the lack 
of discretion required on the part of the worker resulted in 
very little role for autonomy. The combination of this lack of 
involvement in company thinking on the part of the shopfloor 
worker and the qualitative dichotomy between the largely manual
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tasks of the shopfloorworker and the essentially cerebral 
activities of management entailed little interaction between the 
two groups.
However the increasing application of new microelectronic 
technology since the late 1970s has brought us to stage iii) of 
the progression. Routine functions can now be increasingly 
automated, be it the production-line construction of 
automobiles, or banks' dispensing of cash. One of the effects 
of this trend is that work becomes less demanding physically and 
more so mentally. In addition computer-aided technology has 
made short production runs feasible, as well as more 
individually tailored product designs. With this new technology 
there is a tendency for the employee to be less the tool of a 
machine, and more a regulator of machines; monitoring, 
diagnosing and adjusting them. As such, the activities of 
workers are increasingly made in response to stochastic rather 
than deterministic conditions.
This new technology does not sit easily with the type of 
industrial relations system which emerged in response to the 
last mode of technology. The increased importance of individual 
discretion and judgement is not matched by industrial relations 
structures which emphasize worker homogeneity and collectivism. 
The need to respond stochastically requiring a large repertoire 
of responses means that rigid job demarcation lines are an
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obstacle to the optimal exploitation of this new technology, and 
single occupation trade unions, the reinforcers of these lines, 
doubly so. As workers' jobs increasingly resemble those of 
supervisors and managers, and as their monitoring role brings 
ordinary workers into day-to-day contact with higher grades, so 
the 'us and them' dichotomy implicit in the old system of 
industrial relations becomes less appropriate.
As the individual's skills and judgement become increasingly 
important so the value of talented and experienced individuals 
increases. Hence structures based on the easy replacement of 
employees constitute a drain on the firm, and gaining the most 
from employees becomes important but is frustrated by blanket 
collective bargaining.
In short the system of Industrial Relations which was set up in 
response to the Fordist mode of technology can be argued to 
block firms exploiting fully the competitive advantage of the 
new technology. This will lead to pressures on organisational 
responses to be such as to accommodate the new technology. What 
form are these changes likely to take?
2.5a Implications for Organisational Responses
A key strand which runs through the changes in technology of 
recent years is the increasing importance of the individual.
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Logically, this would imply that employment practices should be 
under pressure to allow more room for individual decision­
making. Equally, introducing policies aimed at generating the 
commitment and productivity of individual employees will be an 
accommodating set of organisational responses. As the principal 
collective agency in the workplace, an opportunity is presented 
by new technology to erode the control of workers voices by 
trade unions.
The greater is the extent of incentive pay in the employment 
contract, the smaller is the proportion of pay covered by 
collective bargaining, which is geared to fixing a 'rate for the 
job' for groups of workers. Even policies such as profit- 
sharing and team bonuses, although they refer to groups, 
represent a greater licence for individual decision-making 
within the groups (including, for example, peer group 
monitoring) relative to collective bargaining, in which 
individuals' decision-making is delegated to trade union 
officials.
Where work becomes more easily attributable to the individual, 
individual incentive schemes become both appropriate and 
feasible responses to changing technology.
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2.6 Public Policy
Acts of Parliament passed and repealed since the middle of the 
last century have played an important role in shaping the 
industrial relations system. Some pieces of legislation will 
change an aspect of the institutional structure directly and 
deliberately, and these and others will have further 
repercussions on the industrial relations system through ways in 
which organisations react to changes in the law. As in the case 
of the other changes in environmental conditions, legislative 
changes cause organisations to react in two ways: i) by imposing 
new pressures and requirements on organisations, or altering 
existing ones, and ii) by creating opportunities for 
organisations to react for the first time, or in different ways, 
to pressures which were already present.
The present Government has targeted industrial relations as a 
major recipient of its legislative attention. The most 
pertinent aspects of the legislation are briefly summarised:
In July 197 9 orders were made which extended the minimum 
qualifying period for employees to have worked in order to be 
able to initiate unfair dismissal proceedings. In addition the 
minimum period during which employers were bound to delay for 
consideration redundancies of 10-99 employees was reduced.
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The 1980 Employment Act introduced into the procedure for 
hearing unfair dismissal cases consideration of the firm's size 
and its financial position. It limited the strength of closed 
shop agreements, banned much secondary picketing and provided 
state funds for secret ballots and elections.
The 1982 Employment Act went further. Secondary picketing was 
further curtailed and restricted to issues 'wholly or mainly' 
related to the narrow issue of terms and conditions of 
employment. Trade unions' immunity from court action for 
damages was restricted. Clauses in commercial contracts 
specifying the employment of only union labour were made void, 
and closed shops could be maintained only if an overwhelming 
majority of the workforce voted in favour at regular intervals. 
Larger companies were required to state annually in their 
Directors' Report what the firm was doing to further employee 
involvement.
The 1984 Trade Union Act focused on trade union democracy. It 
introduced a requirement that unions' governing bodies be 
elected by secret ballot. If unions were to retain their 
immunity against damages following a strike call, the call had 
to be preceded by a secret ballot. In order for unions to 
establish or maintain a political fund their members must vote 
in favour each ten years.
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The Employment Act 1988 extends the requirement that union 
representatives be elected, and enabled any union member to 
force a pre-strike ballot through the courts. Unions were 
forbidden from disciplining members for non-compliance with a 
strike call and all dismissals of workers for non-membership of 
a trade union were outlawed. Trade unions were precluded from 
using their fund to indemnify individuals against court fines or 
damages.
In addition, mention has also been made in section 1.2, of the 
specific legislative encouragement of incentive pay systems such 
as employee share ownership and profit-related pay.
2.6a Implications for Organisational Responses
One of the principal effects of public policy was to improve the 
ability of firms to make responses which unions were likely to 
oppose. Indeed the legislation was widely seen as a reaction to 
unions' having allegedly usurped management power during the 
197 0s; a move to redress the balance.
More specifically among forces for change unleashed were a major 
impetus against collectivism and in favour of individualism. 
The progressive erosion of the legitimacy of the closed shop has 
reduced the extent to which firms can deal with union officials 
only as the representatives of its workforce. They had to take,
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therefore, a more individualistic view of their staff both in 
terms of detecting their concerns and responding accordingly. 
The reduction in the authority of union leaders in strikes has 
made it important for the firm to communicate directly with its 
workforce: with the requirement of one man-one vote secret
ballots, and workers free to ignore strike calls or return to 
work at any time without sanction, employers have a strong 
incentive to influence workers as individuals in order to 
prevent or break strikes. To be successful in this, firms need 
to foster a commitment to the company and its management before 
strikes, and to familiarise workers with the commercial 
imperatives facing the firm. This constitutes a pressure, then, 
to inform and involve workers more in the company's commercial 
position, often another aim of incentive pay systems such as 
profit-sharing and employee share ownership. Such pressure was 
heightened by the tax advantages of profit-related pay and 
employee share ownership, and by the new requirement to report 
annually on communication with, and involvement of, employees. 
In addition the measures related to strikes , insofar as they 
made strikes less likely, made it easier for firms to introduce 
new technology and policies such as incentive pay, which unions 




Both Parsons and Dunlop stress the importance of the values or 
ideology binding together the actors within a system, and 
underpinning the institutions which result from it. The exact 
place of values within an analysis of changing industrial
relations is difficult to pin down, however, with much feedback 
and interdependency between values and other variables. For 
example, the values of the electorate may be expected to
influence the direction of public policy. Yet at the same time, 
environmental circumstances, including government action, can 
mould the values of actors. But if such relationships make for 
an entangled knot, it is possible nevertheless to discern, since 
the late 1970s, a rise in values associated with individualism 
at the expense of those associated with collectivism.
The prevailing values of collectivism until the late 1970s are 
reflected, for example, in rising levels of trade unionisation. 
Unions came to be recognised as a vehicle for social progress 
(in a way reminiscent of Roosevelt's New Deal in the US), and 
were accordingly incorporated into the decision-making process 
of government during the 1960s and 70s. The predilection for
collective provision saw the construction and extension of the
welfare state and the periodic nationalisation of sections of 
British industry. The growth of government both as a provider 
of goods and services, and as an arbiter of the functioning of
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an increasing number of aspects of the economy, told of a trust 
in its collective role.
The breakdown of the potential post-war consensus was 
undoubtedly encouraged by the perceived failure of collective 
institutions to contribute to economic success by the mid 1970s. 
The behaviour of trade unions in that decade, in particular, led 
to them being viewed more as defenders of narrow interests than 
as a power for social good. The economic crisis of stagflation 
in the 197 0s undermined confidence in the model answers supplied 
by the consensus.
The emergence of a greater individualism in the last decade no 
doubt is fostered by environmental conditions such as the 
changing nature of technology introducing a growing mismatch 
between the values of collectivism and behaviour at work: a
response to which could be a shift in values to be more 
consistent with behaviour. Trade unionisation has fallen, and 
through legislative programmes such as privatisation and the 
sale of council houses to individual tenants, not only has the 
desirability of collective control of the economy been 
increasingly questioned, but the experience of private, as 
opposed to common, ownership has been extended to a greater 
proportion of the population. This is exemplified by the fact 
that privatisation seen in the early 1980s as a controversial 
and radical policy is now often viewed with equanimity by the
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electorate*. Whereas once trade union leaders could count on 
support from their members for strike calls even when the issue 
in dispute affected another group of workers (reflecting the 
value of the collective as an end in itself) , the 1980s 
increasingly saw union leaders not obeyed, with individual 
workers feeling no compunction in crossing picket lines and not 
supporting workers outside their own situation. The major 
exception to this has been the public sector, with its turbulent 
record of strike activity during the 1980s, reflecting, perhaps 
its vunerability in a climate in which government determined to 
rein back public provision, as well as the greater 
collectivistic values associated with those whose career has 
been in collective provision.
In many ways an increasing tendency to favour individualistic 
values over those of collectivism^ can be characterised as a 
paradigm shift (Kuhn (1962)). One of the conditions which Kuhn 
described as being necessary for a paradigm shift to take place 
as being a perceived failure of the old paradigm to deal with 
current problems.
"Nature itself must undermine professional security by making
* with the exception of certain enterprises, such as the water 
companies.
^such an increased propensity is not without its sticking 
points: witness the continuing support for the National Health
Service in public opinion polls.
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prior achievements seem problematic.” (Kuhn (1962), pl68)
The new paradigm, against collectivism, may be said to have 
arisen with the eventual demise of those people associated with 
it. Annan (1990) has argued that the generation of the British 
post-war political and intellectual establishment was steeped in 
a similar set of traditions and assumptions. These were 
inspired by the failure of laissez-faire policies in the inter­
war years and the contrasting economic success of common 
provision during the second world war and the surge of 
enthusiasm for social progress brought about by victory as well 
as the comparative success of the collectivist policies in the 
1950s and 1960s. Annan went on to argue that by the late 1970s 
this generation came to vacate the positions of power: their 
place was taken by a new generation whose intellectual loyalties 
to collectivism were less obvious. This view ties in with 
Planck's (1949) analysis of paradigm shifts: he claimed that a 
new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its 
opponents but because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up that is familiar with it.
2.7a Implications for Organisational Responses
A rise in individualism at the expense of collectivism will tend 
to give licence to firms to innovate by introducing policies 
which are predicated on a greater individualism, in the belief
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that new values will be more tolerant of such policies than was 
the case in the past. Incentive payment systems, representing 
an erosion of collective bargaining and a greater requirement 
for active individual decision-making (whether atomistically or 
in the context of a group) are particularly consistent with such 
value change. Indeed, this thesis argues that prevailing 
individualism is a precondition for incentive pay systems to be 
successful in motivating effort among employees.
2.8 Conclusion
We have illustrated in this chapter that the background to the 
rise in the incidence of incentive pay policies is one of 
significant change in British industrial relations. Moreover, 
the pressure on organisational responses which can be discerned 
from this picture of flux seems to be supportive of policies 
such as incentive pay playing a growing role in employment 
relationships. How long-lasting the presence of these 
conditions will be is a question which remains, and if there is 
a causality between industrial relations change and the 
incidence of incentive pay, the answer to the question will 
dictate the longevity of this proliferation. Having laid out 
the context behind them, it is to models of the functioning of 




CHAPTER THREE- THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INCENTIVE PAY
3.1 Introduction
Incentive payment systems are not the direct fruit of academic 
analysis. Forms of incentive pay, such as sharecropping in 
which agricultural labourers receive a fraction of the harvest 
as payment for their work, have operated long before formal 
research suggested them. The economist Alfred Marshall (1906) 
conceded that the theoretical case for incentive pay, when it 
came to be made, represented a formalization of existing 
practices. Yet incentive pay is an area which has been 
subject to a great deal of academic theorizing: economists and 
psychologists in particular have attempted to construct 
frameworks for analysis in which the underlying conventional 
wisdom of incentive pay (Jevons (1983) called it an 
"apparently obvious invention") could be subjected to rigorous 
investigation which would lead to hypotheses which went beyond 
the immediately intuitive.
That incentive pay has attracted the interest of academic 
theorists is not surprising. Economics, concerned with the 
efficient allocation of factors of production, could not 
ignore for long how labour is remunerated most effectively, 
given that it accounts for at least 7 0 per cent of the total 
costs of the typical firm (Blinder (1990), p.2). Incentive 
pay falls clearly within the ambit of psychologists too: 
motivation is one of the key issues addressed by that
(so
discipline. The theoretical frameworks which have resulted 
have tended to serve the narrower focuses of each discipline 
rather than mine the overlap of interest: economics, in
recent years, has stressed an external contractual framework
with the optimal design of the contract to be determined;
psychology has paid attention to the internal evaluations and 
judgements which spur productive activity. As Nalbantian 
(1987, pB) has pointed out, "the research cited in these two 
disciplines has proceeded independently; for the most part 
there has been little cross referencing involved, and few 
attempts to provide a synthesis of research findings".
In the two following chapters we argue that it is possible to 
regard economic and psychological frameworks as complementary 
rather than competing or incommensurable. In particular we 
show that opening up the economists' 'black box' of causality 
to psychological insights can increase the confidence we can 
have in its prescriptions. Thus the internal and the external 
can be synthesised.
One test of successful theorising is predictive and 
explanatory performance; its reward to influence practice 
through prescriptive implications. The predictive success of 
both economic and psychological models of incentive pay has
been present but limited. We propose means of improving
predictive power and deriving prescriptions which are lent 
confidence by having survived empirical testing.
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CHAPTER FOUR- THE CONTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICS
4.1 Introduction
Economists have been leading advocates of incentive-based 
payment systems. Both Marshall (1906) and Keynes (1928) 
issued exhortations to firms to introduce pay for performance 
structures. Such prescriptions were, and continue to be, 
advanced on theoretical grounds. Indeed the neo-classical 
economics approach to payment systems offers a very clear 
organizing framework from which prescriptions and predictions 
are easily derived. Recent attention in economics has 
concentrated on designing an optimal contractual structure for 
pay, based on an assumption that rational actors will respond 
to the structure in a predictable way.
Econometric evidence on the effects of incentive contracts 
however, is difficult to interpret. While results are broadly 
consistent with those hypothesised, superior performance which 
is on the face of it, associated with incentive pay, may be 
determined by other factors such as superior management which 
may be correlated with the incidence of incentive pay systems.
We therefore argue that the predictive power of economic 
models can be investigated with greater rigour by isolating 
the role of the contract-design from other determinants of 
performance. This can be achieved by specifying and testing 
a theory of how a contractual structure motivates individuals.
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Supplying such a theory of motivation calls for opening up the 
economists' black box of causality to insights from
psychology.
4.2 Economics and Contracts
Assume that firms in an economy are characterised by a 
production function in which output is a function of effort, 
supplied by employees in return for pay. Effort, in this
context, refers to the cognitive state under the control of
agents which is expected to result in behaviour which 
contributes to the firm's productivity. Thus behavioral 
consequences of effort include, inter alia, working
intensively, maintaining high quality output, and reducing 
waste.
Assume also that employees maximise a utility function which 
consists of pay and leisure (the reciprocal of effort). Firms 
seek to maximise effort and minimise pay, while employees seek 
to maximise pay and minimise effort. The payment system is, 
then, a contract^ which joins the self-interest of firms and 
employees. An economics approach to the analysis of the 
payment system is to determine the optimal design of the 
contract. To do so, two questions must be answered: what is 
contracted over? and who are the parties to the contract? The 
answers to both questions are shaped by the monitoring costs
Contract refers broadly to agreements and understandings between workers
and firms, and not simply to contracts in the legalistic sense.
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incurred in making the contracts deliverable.
4.3 What is contracted over?
From the above, it would seem apparent that the optimal 
employment contract would be over effort and pay, since these 
are the two quantities which are in the objective functions of 
both firms and employees.
However, under our definition effort is an internal cognitive 
state. It cannot therefore be measured objectively. 
Subjective measurements (self-reports of effort supplied) are 
not acceptable substitutes in a contract, because they cannot 
be verified. That is say, monitoring costs are infinite.
If the firm's production function is known, however, the 
effort input of employees will have a predictable relationship 
with output. If follows that effort may be inferred from 
observed output levels; if no production took place it would
be clear that no effort had been supplied. More generally, if
there is a known and stable relationship between effort and 
some particular performance, measuring that performance and 
including it in the employment contract is quite as efficient 
a structure as rewarding effort directly. Typically, then, 
performance will form the basis of an efficient contract.
For the other component there would seem to be no major 
obstacles to money being part of the employment contract. It
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is a commodity which is meaningful both to firm and employee, 
and hence attracts no monitoring costs.
An efficient employment contract, therefore, will be over 
performance and money, according to the above assumptions.
4.4 Who is the contract with?
Since it is firms and individuals who determine their own 
behaviour according to their respective objective functions,
it would seem apparent that contracts should be concluded
between the two, involving money for performance. However, 
modern production processes can make individual performace 
difficult to monitor, and therefore individual pay for
performance contracts costly to administer.
4.4a Individuals
Many pay for individual performance contracts exist in
practice, including forms such as promoting high performing 
individuals and piece-rate systems. Higher-ranking jobs in 
organisations typically carry higher salaries. By basing 
entry to such jobs on contribution rather than, say age or 
tenure, it provides a means of trying pay to individual 
performance, and so to make for an efficient contract. Hence 
the more meritocratic the firm the more effort will be
55
supplied by its e m p l o y e e s . ^
Piece-rates which include no fixed element in pay are perhaps 
the oldest and most direct means of tying pay to individual 
performance.
While individual pay for performance contracts are common, 
their extent may be circumscribed by the monitoring costs 
incurred in operating such contracts. Typically modern 
production processes dictate a production function for the 
firm which is non-separable into component functions for 
individual employees. With team production it is difficult to 
define, still less to monitor, each individual's contribution 
to the output of co-operating inputs. In such circumstances 
it may be efficient to enter into a contract with the team 
rather than individuals, on the basis of pay for performance.
4.4b Teams
If teams behave in a similar way to individuals faced with a 
pay for performance contract, contracting with teams is 
efficient for the previous reasons. Contracting with teams.
‘Efficiency wage theorists (eg Akerlof & Yellen (1982)) argue that there 
is a second way in which effort is increased by operating a pay-for- 
performance contract. Assuming that available workers are heterogeneous in 
the degree of effort which they are capable of supplying, individuals who can 
supply high levels of effort will be drawn to firms who, by operating a pay- 
for-performance system, fully reward them for the effort which they supply. 
Hence such firms could cream the most capable members of the labour force. 
Lazear (1986) confirms empirically that a separating equilibrium exists 
whereby high quality workers choose to work for firms which operate 
performance-related pay, and low quality workers choose firms which pay a 
fixed wage.
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however, begs the question of whether they are capable of 
delivering optimal effort. Economists disagree on this 
question. Property rights economists such as Jensen & 
Heckling (1979) stress the potential for free-riding by 
participants in a pay-for-team performance contract. The team 
will be composed of individuals who determine their behaviour 
individually to maximise their individual utility (a function 
of pay and leisure).
Samuelson (1977) demonstrates that if a team of n workers each 
receives a fraction 1/n of the output of the team, then each 
individual will receive 1/n of the marginal product of his own 
effort. Assuming that his preference for leisure is 
unchanged, each worker will rationally substitute leisure for 
effort until his marginal rate of substitution between income 
and leisure is unity. Since this same incentive applies to 
each team member, the aggregate effort of the team is 
suboptimal. Team-related pay encourages workers to shirk (ie 
take leisure on the job) . This result corresponds to the Nash 
equilibrium in a Prisoner's Dilemma model. For example, for 
two team workers, 1 and 2, who have the choice of working hard 
(H) or shirking (S), a payoff matrix might be:
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Table 4.1
Team Performance Contract: The Prisoner's Dilemma
Worker 1 
H S
H (2, 2) {6, -4)
Worker 2
S (-4, 6) (0, 0)
It is always in the interest of each individual worker to 
shirk, regardless of the behaviour of other team members. If 
Worker 1 works hard, then Worker 2 can obtain a payoff of 6 by 
shirking, but only 2 by working hard; if Worker 1 shirks, then 
Worker 2's payoff is 0 to shirking, which is higher than the - 
4 payoff he would obtain if he worked hard. Each Worker will 
rationally attempt to free-ride on his colleague's efforts by 
shirking. Due to free-riding, then, it is claimed that a pay 
contract which delivers optimal effort cannot be concluded 
with a team.
Alchian & Demsetz (1972) argue that this fact provides the 
raison d'être of the capitalist firm. Since efficient 
contracts cannot be made with teams, the effectiveness of the 
pay contract made by the firm will depend on its ability to 
monitor individual performance contracts most efficiently. 
This requires a specialised 'central monitor' which is 
motivated to carry out its function efficiently by being 
entitled to receive the residual output of the production
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process (i.e. once other factor payments have been made). The 
owners of the capitalist firm are the typical central monitor. 
Team performance related pay such as profit-sharing can 
transfer some of the rights to the residual from the central 
monitor workforce, which reduces the incentive for the central 
monitor to perform its function efficiently. Hence firms 
should not contract with teams, but rather confine themselves 
to the most feasible monitoring of individual contracts.
Other economists argue that contracting with teams can deliver 
efficient levels of effort because team members will be free 
to contract with each other over performance. Team- 
performance contracting in table 4.1 was modelled as a single­
period game. Since employment relationships typically 
continue over time, however, it will be more appropriate to 
use a repeated-game model. In these circumstances, team 
members will have the opportunity to punish their colleagues, 
should they shirk, by withdrawing their own effort in the next 
period. Knowing this, players may value the long-run payoff 
expected from following a co-operative strategy more than the 
short-run payoff to be expected from breaking ranks and 
pursuing a strategy of shirking. Hence, with common knowledge 
of each other's motives, team-performance contracting may 
yield an efficient level of effort for the firm and still be 
consistent with rational behaviour on the part of individual 
employees.
Moreover, Cable & Fitzroy (1980) maintain that contracts
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within teams brings into play horizontal monitoring by team- 
members of each other, backed with sanctions such as social 
ostracisation. This may be a less costly form of individual 
performance monitoring than the central monitor could devise, 
and result in team-performance contracting being a more 
efficient structure than contracting with individuals. Kanter 
(1989, p2 64) reports that at the Lincoln Electric Company,
where a team performance bonus results in pay that is twice
the average factory wage "Peer pressure can be so high that 
the first two years of employment are called 'purgatory'."
What can be drawn out from the debate is that the question of 
whether efficient contracts can be made with teams rests on an 
assessment of whether teams can behave in a similar way to an 
individual. This in turn depends on how costly it is for team 
members to make and monitor contracts with each other. Since 
the costs of horizontal monitoring are likely to increase with 
the size of the team (it is easy to vet one's partner's 
performance; more difficult to do so for twenty individuals) 
and the efficacy of applying social sanctions personally to 
decline with size, team size is an important factor which
governs the answer to the question. Differences among
economists may be said to be focused on the team size 
sufficient to allow efficient team contracting: Jensen &
Heckling (1979) and Alchian & Demsetz (1972) are sceptical 
that anything but the smallest team size can be contracted 
with efficiently. Cable & Fitzroy (1980) are confident that 
even large groups will structure themselves to be effective
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parties to a contract. The size of teams consistent with 
efficient levels of effort being supplied thus becomes an 
empirical question.
4.5 Risk Issues
We have assumed so far a predictable relationship between 
effort and the monitored performance of either the individual 
or team. In practice, however, performance will be influenced 
by factors outside the control of parties to the contract. 
These factors may be impossible or costly to monitor in order 
to take account of in the contract. As a result actual 
performance-related pay will typically entail a stochastic 
element. If employees are more risk-averse than the firm 
which employs them (because of their inferior access to 
capital markets, for example), then a pay contract which 
shares the stochastic element equally between workers and the 
firm will not be efficient. Workers would supply the same 
effort at a lower rate of pay if they were protected from the 
unpredictable variability in their performance. This 
introduces an essential trade off in the optimal structure of 
the contract to maximise effort relative to pay. A fixed wage 
will provide the work force with incentives to shirk, since 
marginal effort is not rewarded (and marginal reductions in 
effort go unpunished). However a wage which varies beyond the 
control of the employee requires a premium to compensate him 
for the risk. What this means in practice is that the typical 
efficient contract will include both a fixed and performance-
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contingent element which reflect the relative importance of 
employee risk-aversion and prospective losses from shirking. 
It is a second-best solution (Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)), 
optimal given imperfect knowledge of future states of the 
world.
It also means that a pay contract which comprises a fixed wage 
only will be a special case, optimal only where employee risk 
aversion is infinite. Hence the clear prescription of 
economics is that for optimal effort to be generated in the 
firm a contractual structure should be laid down in which pay 
is linked to performance to some extent. The stronger the 
link, the greater the effort supplied. The more direct the 
link, the greater will be effort supplied, although it is left 
to empirical analysis to indicate what typically will be the 
maximum team size for team-performance based pay to provide 
for significantly higher effort than would be forthcoming in 
its absence.
In the contract theory approach concern is focused on the 
optimal design of the contract which, applied to rational 
actors, will result in optimal effort being supplied. No 
explicit consideration is given to how a pay contract can 
bring about effort. The motivational and productivity effects 
are conceptual presumptions the causality of which is subsumed 
into a 'black box' into which economists do not inquire.
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4.6 Econometric Evidence
The 'black box' treatment of how incentive pay contracts bring 
about higher effort presents methodological difficulties in 
testing rigorously the positive hypothesis that incentive pay 
does increase effort at work. It is difficult, in practice, 
to isolate the effects of the payment system on the effort- 
correlate which is hypothesised to be influenced by it.
Econometric studies typically assess the performance of a 
particular system (i.e. contract design) by reference to its 
measurable outputs. Thus, for example, the labour
productivity (Kruse (1988), Estrin & Wilson (1986)), 
profitability (Fitzroy & Kraft (1987), Hanson & Watson (1990)) 
or share price performance (Richardson & Nejad (1986)) of 
particular firms are correlated with the payment-system which 
they operate.
Three important factors undercut the contribution of 
econometric evidence. The first is that the sample of firms 
with pay-for-performance systems may be self-selecting: 
'better' firms may introduce profit-sharing, so that the 
causality of an apparent relationship between profit-sharing 
and productivity may be bogus. The second source of ambiguity 
in economic empirical studies is that many of them examine the 
productivity effects of employee ownership as part of the 
debate on the co-operative organisational form which has taken 
place in recent years (cf Bradley & Gelb (1983), Defourny,
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Estrin & Jones (1985)). The effects of co-operative ownership 
are hypothesised to flow from both incentive effects and 
participation effects, making it difficult to isolate the 
former, our concern here. A third methodological issue is 
concerned with the behaviourial assumptions which underlie the 
economics approach, namely that actors faced with a certain 
incentive structure will maximise rationally their individual 
self interest. Econometric studies cannot assess the validity 
of both the underlying assumptions of economic rationality and 
the hypothesis that a particular contract design will bring 
about a particular output.
However, what empirical evidence there is tends at least not 
to reject the conceptual presumption that incentive pay 
contracts raise effort and thereby performance. The 
confidence that can be placed in this evidence, though, is 
undercut by the methodological difficulties of the approach 
and by the patchiness of the results of what is still a 
surprisingly small body of econometric studies.
Weitzman & Kruse (1990) pointed out the limited number of 
econometric studies carried out: they found in the published 
literature only seven econometric studies of the effects of 
profit-sharing in capitalist firms (i.e. excluding co­
operatives) . Of this body of evidence (the first seven 
reported in table 4.2) Weitzman & Kruse argued that while no 
single study could be regarded as constituting convincing 
evidence for a causal link between profit-sharing and
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performance, taken together the broad consistency of direction 
of the results did lend support to economics inspired 
incentive contracts.
However, Guzzo et al (1985, p.114) summarised the evidence as 
demonstrating a large, positive mean association between 
financial incentives and productivity but with an association 
so variable that it was not significantly different from zero. 
They commented:
"In some of the experiments financial incentives had 
a pronounced positive effect on the productivity of 
employees in an organisation, but in other cases 
there was evidence of negligible or unwanted 
negative effects."
The results of these and other empirical studies are 
summarised in table 4.2, along with the dependent variable 
used and the country in which the investigation was performed. 
Table 4.2 shows that what evidence there is surrounding the 
economics approach to the analysis of payment systems suggests 
that pay-for-performance structures, of a variety of forms, 
tend to be associated with high performance relative to other 
firms. This conclusion can be drawn more robustly from the 
experience of US firms than the UK practitioners, according to 
the evidence surveyed.
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Table 4.2: Incentive Pay: Econometric Evidence
Study Country Pay System  ^ Productiyity Measure Significant at 95?%
Cable & Fitzroy (1980) West Germany
Fitzroy & Kraft (1986, 1987) West Germany
Wadhwani & Wall (1988) UK









Estrin & Wilson (1986) UK
Richardson & Nejad (1986) UK



















Return on investments Yes
Value added Yes
Value added No




Return on sales Yes
Return on equity 
Increase in sales
Key:
PS = Profit Sharing
ESOP = Employee Share Ownership Programme
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However, because of the methodological problems discussed, we 
are unable to conclude firmly that incentive-pay structures do 
yield high performance. As Richardson & Nejad (1986, p24) 
observe of their own study (reported in table 4.2)
"the use of financial participation might be an 
excellent index of improved management^ but not the 
sole cause, or even an important contributor to 
improved performance."
4.7 Conclusion; Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach
The new economics of contracts offers a framework for the 
analysis of payment systems which is exceptionally clear and 
parsimonious. However, empirical results are not so robust as 
to obviate attempts to improve its predictive power. Adopting 
an interdisciplinary approach to incentive pay can go some way 
towards achieving this, we argue. Neo-classical economics 
links inputs (labour) to outputs (productivity) through an 
assumed, but unspecified, 'black box' of causality. The 
process by which a certain payment structure brings about a 
given level of performance from given inputs is not 
investigated. Thus a finding that firms with incentive-based 
payment systems are associated with high levels of 
productivity is taken as empirical confirmation of the effects 
of the contractual structure. Leibenstein (1966) points out, 
however, that "there is more to the determination of output 
than the obviously observable inputs." He specifies the 
nature of firms' management, and the environment in which they 
operate as shaping performance as well as structural factors 
including labour contracts. As evidence of this, Liebenstein
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points to the wide variation in output in practice, for 
similar amounts of capital and labour and for similar 
techniques.
Allowing this introduces ambiguity over the interpretation of 
the empirical evidence since superior performance by 
incentive-pay-firms may reflect the contribution of superior 
management rather than follow from the contractual structure. 
Hence empirical investigation of the effects of pay-for- 
performance must isolate that factor from others within the 
'black box' which may be hypothesised as the process by which 
a certain contractual structure brings about a certain level 
of performance. As Williamson (1964, p7) points out,
"if economists are to respond to this challenge and 
to specifically inquire into the process by which 
firms are operated, obviously there is a need for 
fundamental organisational insights."
If a complementary model of motivation were specified 
alongside an efficient contract model, the power of incentive 
pay per se to increase effort could be demonstrated if both 
the effects and the process hypothesised to cause them were 
consistent with empirical evidence.
Since motivation is a field of inquiry much investigated in 
psychology, the two disciplines of economics and social 
psychology may be profitably treated in a complementary way to 
build a model which is more robust to empirical testing. The 
greater the robustness of the incentive-pay model, the more 
confidence we can have in prescriptions derived from it.
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Accordingly chapter five assesses the contribution of 
psychology to an interdisciplinary model of incentive-based 
payment systems.
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CHAPTER FIVE - THE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY
5.1 Introduction
To build an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of 
incentive pay we seek to specify a model of how incentive pay 
motivates effort. This should complement, rather than 
conflict with, the contract theory approach. In addition, to 
provide the means to generate confidence in its implications, 
the model should be empirically testable.
5.2 Motivation
Psychologists have traditionally been the academic analysts of 
motivation, which we define, after Jones (1955, pvii) as that 
which, in responses to antecedent conditions "starts, 
energizes, sustains, directs and stops" behaviour in an 
individual. Under a strict behaviouristic interpretation 
motivation is a hypothetical construct (albeit a potentially 
useful one): a definition given in terms of antecedent 
conditions and consequent behaviour. A non-behaviourist 
could interpret motivation as being an internal cognitive 
state which is determined by antecedent conditions and which 
itself gives rise to behaviour.
Theories of motivation have their roots in the principles of 
hedonism. In claiming that all human actions are motivated by 
the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain, Hobbes (1651)
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proposed, in effect, a theory of psychological hedonism. In 
so doing Hobbes turned what was previously a normative ethical 
principle into a positive theory of motivation. A principal 
shortcoming of hedonism, however, is that it does not specify 
what constitutes pleasure and pain. Thus it risks being 
tautological: behaviour is defined as having pleasurable
consequences by the fact that it is carried out. To be useful 
for our purposes a theory of how humans are motivated must be 
supplemented with a theory of what motivates them. In the 
case of incentive-pay systems money is advanced as a 
motivator. We must consider, therefore, the grounds for 
hypothesising that money is a source of motivation for 
individuals.
5.3 Pay as a Motivator
To think of incentive pay as a motivational device is to 
assume that pay is something which is typically valued by 
individuals, and will therefore serve to motivate them. Pay, 
in other words, is associated with pleasure and not pain.
The assumption that pay is a valued reward may be thought self 
evident. It is, however, supported by a body of empirical 
evidence (eg Bradley and Gelb (1983)) and can be shown to be 
consistent with theoretical traditions. Vroom (1964) has 
stressed the instrumental role of money in attaining a wide 
variety of satisfactions. For example, in Maslow's (1954) 
Hierarchy of Needs, which is postulated to represent sources
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of motivation of all individuals, pay may be argued to be 
instrumental in satisfying needs throughout the hierarchy;
Table 5.1 






In modern society money is, of course, virtually a 
prerequisite in satisfying the lowest rung of the hierarchy, 
that of physiological imperatives (food, shelter, clothing). 
The role of money as a store of value can be instrumental in 
meeting individuals' safety needs, by providing insurance 
against unforseen circumstances. Katz and Kahn (1952) argue 
that pay will motivate individuals at work because in the
community at large money brings prestige to its owner and has
a positive association with status. In Maslow's hierarchy 
this can be taken to mean that money satisfies esteem needs. 
Katz and Kuhn (1952) also argue that higher pay is an aid to 
social mobility. Thus pay can be regarded as tending to 
satisfy the need for self actualization.
Maslow argued that once the needs denoted by one level in his 
hypothesised hierarchy have been largely satisfied, it no
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longer acts as a motivator of behaviour. Since the 
instrumental role of money can be identified with satisfying 
needs throughout the hierarchy, positing money as a general 
motivator is consistent with Maslow's theory.
However, it is reasonable to concede that pay is more 
instrumental in satisfying lower order satisfactions than 
those at the top of the hierarchy: Brayfield and Crockett
(1955, p417) observe that there are other ways to status in 
the community than financial affluence. As such, it is 
possible to maintain that pay is a general motivator whilst 
allowing that it is subject to diminishing marginal utility. 
Neither does such an assumption imply that pay is the only 
reward which can motivate behaviour at work. Our assumption, 
and the assumption of incentive pay systems, is simply that 
the representative individual will always prefer more pay to 
less.
5.4 The Motivational Process
We hypothesise, therefore, that pay is capable of motivating 
individuals,and now turn to consider how people are motivated. 
In the class of process theories of motivation there are two 
main traditions, the drive theory and expectancy theory 
approaches. In this section we provide a brief summary of the 
central tenets of each.
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5.4a Drive Theory
Drive theory was developed in the first half of the twentieth 
century by psychologists strongly influenced by the 
experiments of Pavlov and Thorndike which demonstrated that 
animals' responses which had in the past been accompanied or 
closely followed by satisfaction were more likely to recur 
than those followed by discomfort. Thorndike's analysis of 
trial-and-error learning fashioned the view that historic 
reinforcement determined an individual's 'drive', and that a 
multiplicative combination of this concept and force of habit 
determined individuals' behaviour. The backward-looking 
orientation of drive theory led Allport (1937) to characterise 
it as 'the hedonism of the past.'
Hull (1943) specified the key hypothesized relationships of 
drive theory. Importantly, drive is derived from individuals' 
physiological needs and deprivations (eg hunger). Habit- 
strength results from previous stimulus-response connections. 
While the causes of motivated behaviour under drive theory 
have physiological roots, the resulting behaviour need to be 
neither cognitive nor selectively instrumental to satisfying 
the deprivations. Indeed Atkinson (1964) describes drive as 




Since the publication of Vroom's book Work and Motivation in 
1964, expectancy theory has been the leading theory of 
motivation in organizational psychology. It hypothesises 
that it is the anticipated satisfaction of valued goals which 
brings about behaviour which is perceived by the individual to 
be instrumental in attaining them. Thus if drive theory is to 
be characterised as the hedonism of the past, the expectancy 
theory may be fairly dubbed the hedonism of the future.
Lawler (1973, p4 5) summarised the theory as stating that "the 
strength of a tendency to act in a certain way depends on the 
strength of an expectancy that the act will be followed by a 
given consequence (or outcome) and on the value or 
attractiveness of that consequence (or outcome) to the actor." 
Whilst the popularity of expectancy theory is comparatively 
recent, it draws on the tradition of an individualistic 
rational calculus of expected satisfaction determining 
behaviour which is associated with the British utilitarians.
Since it is the subjective perceptions of consequences which 
motivates behaviour under expectancy theory, the approach is 
clearly a cognitive view of motivation. In contrast to drive 
theory, motivated behaviour is both selective and purposive 
aimed at the attainment of valued goals. This is not to say 
that expectancy theory brooks no element of reinforcement in 
determining behaviour. Rather, reinforcement can be
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introduced via learning. The difference between this approach 
and that of drive theory is that reinforcement is not a 
necessary condition for learning to take place. Finally, as 
a cognitive theory the expectancy approach is not anchored to 
physiological needs: psychological factors can determine
motivational force.
5,5 Which Approach to Adopt?
Although descriptive properties of human decision processes 
are claimed by advocates of each theoretical tradition, 
empirical tests of the predictions from each have failed to
confirm either as predictively the more powerful. Atkinson
(1964) has claimed that the predictions of each theory have 
proved similar in almost every empirical circumstance. In the 
light of this, the choice of theoretical framework should be 
that which facilitates best the theoretical model which we 
mean to construct. Using this criterion we find the
expectancy approach the more useful. There are three 
principal reasons for this choice.
The contribution of contract theory surveyed in the previous 
chapter is predicated on a similar set of methodological 
assumptions to those of expectancy theory, namely that 
individuals engage in a rational calculus of their individual 
self-interest. The congruence of these assumptions assists us 
in seeking to specify a theory of how incentive pay can 
motivate effort which is consistent with the economics
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approach.
In Chapter Four we defined effort as being a particular class 
of behaviour whose essential characteristic is that the 
subject is cognisant of his own behaviour and that the 
behaviour is purposive towards increasing productivity. Since 
the subject of our analysis is behaviour which is cognitive 
and purposive, from the above expectancy theory is more 
consistent with our analysis than is drive theory.
Finally, expectancy theory has been the dominant school in the 
theoretical and empirical research of the last twenty-five 
years, resulting in a pool of findings and applications. For 
a methodology which includes empirical testing of hypotheses 
this body of evidence provides for a wider basis for criticism 
and comparison than is the case for drive-theoretic 
approaches.
5.6 An Expectancy Theory Approach
Vroom's 1964 book Work and Motivation stimulated a flurry of 
research interest in the expectancy theoretic approach to 
motivation. Vroom himself, however, drew on a tradition which 
can be traced back to Bernoulli in the early 18th Century. 
Vroom's basis postulate that behaviour results from a 
subjective calculus of expected utility is similar to that 
applied by Bernoulli to the analysis of gambling. In this 
century expectancy models can be seen to be in the tradition
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of the psychologists Tolman (1932) and Lewin (1938), early 
advocates of cognitive theories of behaviour who held that 
individuals' behaviour is governed by expectations concerning 
future events.
Georgopoulos, Mahoney and Jones (1957) were the most immediate 
precursors of expectancy theory with their 'path-goal' 
approach to the motivation for productive performance at work. 
The path-goal hypothesis stated that "if a worker sees high 
productivity as a path leading to the attainment of one or 
more of his personal goals, he will tend to be a high 
producer. Conversely if he sees low productivity as a path to 
the achievement of his goals he will tend to be a low 
producer," (p346). The cognitive, forward-looking, purposive 
and subjective conceptions of motivated behaviour are all 
common to expectancy theories.
Vroom hypothesised that the force on an individual to perform 
a certain act is a monotonically increasing sum of the 
products of
(i) the subjective expectation, or expectancy, that 
performing the act will result in the attainment of 
a valued outcome.
and
(ii) the subjectively anticipated satisfaction, or 
valence, associated with that outcome.
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Formally, the Force Model is
V, = f l  (VJjJ
k=l
where
Vj = the valence of outcome j
= the perceived instrumentality of 
outcome j for the attainment of outcome 
k
= valence of outcome k 
n = the number of outcomes 
Vroom supplemented the Force Model with a model of the 
determination of the valence of a particular outcome. This is 
conceived as being a monotonically increasing function of the 
sum of the products of :
(i) the valence of all other outcomes, and
(ii) the perceived instrumentality of the outcome in 
question for the attainment of these other outcomes.
Symbolically,
Fj — E (EjjVj)
J=i
where
Fj = the force on the individual to
perform act i
Ejj = the expectancy that act i will be
followed by outcome j
Vj = the valence of outcome j
n = the number of outcomes
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The model is explicitly universal in both its applicability 
and its content. As a model of the forces on the human
decision making process it applies to rational individuals at 
all times and in all situations. Our purpose, however, is to 
develop a model for a particular inquiry, namely how incentive 
pay contracts can bring about higher levels of effort than 
fixed wage contracts. Accordingly we must specify a form of 
the expectancy model which is suitable for such an analysis 
and to derive a set of hypotheses which summarises its 
implications.
To do so we make use of Galbraith & Cummings (1967) synthesis 
of Vroom's Force and Valence models, and apply it to incentive 
pay; accordingly effort is the dependent variable, performance 
the first level outcome, and pay the second level outcome. 
Thus
W = E I V 3
where
W = effort
E = the expectancy that effort leads to
performance
I = the instrumentality of performance for the
attainment of pay
V = the valence of pay
Equation 3 states that an individual's effort supplied will be 
a multiplicative combination of:
(i) the subjective perception that effort will result in
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performance
(ii) the subjective perception that performance will be 
materially rewarded
(iii) the satisfaction anticipated from pay.
In practice, if an individual sees it as being clear that 
extra effort will bring about more pay, and he expects to 
derive great satisfaction from that pay, then effort is more 
likely to be supplied then if the relationship between effort 
and performance, or performance and rewards is thought to be 
slight or uncertain. Equally, if prospective pay is very 
highly valued, but the chances of the employee being able to 
supply enough effort to attain it are deemed small, the 
rational individual will supply a low amount of effort.
Porter & Lawler (1968) and Lawler (1970) postulated an 
expectancy model similar to that of Vroom but which differs in 
terminology and how the variables are combined. However, as 
Heneman & Schwab (197 2) point out, in the case of only one 
second level outcome being considered (as is the case in our 
study of pay) the Vroom and Porter & Lawler models are 
identical. Although subject to a great deal of empirical 
investigation and theoretical inquiry, the expectancy 
theoretic approach to the determination of effort under 
incentive pay has remained essentially of the form described.
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5.7 Expectancy Theory and Economics
In addition to sharing common methodological underpinnings of 
universality and ahistoricity, based on a conception of man as 
a maximiser of his individual self interest, the components of 
expectancy models and of the economic analysis of efficient 
contracts are analogous.
Expectancy, the perceived relationship between individual 
effort and measured performance, can be seen to be related to 
the free-riding issue in efficient contracting: the smaller 
the link between individual effort and measured performance, 
the greater is the return to shirking for the individual. A 
one-to-one link between individual effort and measured 
performance removes this incentive to shirk. While economics 
considers the contractual structure, (that is, the objective 
relationship between effort and performance), in determining 
how much effort is supplied in response to an incentive 
contract, expectancy theory focuses on the subjective 
perception of the objective relationship. The essential 
difference between the two approaches is their standpoint: 
economics taking the objective view, and psychology the 
subjective.
Similarly, instrumentality, the perceived relationship between 
measured performance and pay, mirrors the extent of 
performance-related pay in the employment contract. Risk 
issues aside, any departure from 100 per cent performance-
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related pay in the contract is claimed, in the efficient 
contracts approach, to result in a sub-optimal level of effort 
being supplied. Expectancy theory stresses the subjective 
perception of the performance-pay relationship as being the 
determinant of the decision by an individual to supply effort.
Table 5.2 summarises these correspondences
Table 5.2




Potential for free-riding Expectancy
Extent of performance-related Instrumentality 
pay in contract
Magnitude of incentive Valence
element
Since the four variables of the expectancy model are open to 
measurement by psychometric means, the hypothesized 
motivational process is testable. If the four variables can 
be shown empirically to be linked in the form hypothesised by 
equation 3, and it can be demonstrated that incentive pay, 
that is the objective contractual structure, affects 
expectancy and instrumentality perceptions, we can be 
confident that incentive pay does bring about higher effort 
levels among employees, as presumed conceptually by neo­
83
classical economics. Moreover the empirical demonstration 
will have short-circuited the methodological difficulties of 
basing tests purely on econometric analyses (the possibility 
that unspecified covariates of the incidence of incentive pay 
determine any revealed superior performance of companies 
operating incentive contracts).
5.8 Conclusion
In expectancy theory social psychology provides a hypothesized 
motivational process which is not inconsistent with an 
economic, contract-based model of the effects of incentive 
pay. As such it provides an alternative means of testing the 
hypothesized effects of incentive pay and avoiding 
methodological difficulties incurred in econometric testing. 
If psychometric tests demonstrates the robustness of the 
expectancy model, and show that its key variables are governed 
by the contractual arrangements which subjects face, we can 
have confidence in predicting that efficient contracts qua 
contracts will cause high levels of effort to be supplied, as 
well as confidence in the prescriptions derived from both 
models.
However, one aspect of the compatibility of economic and 
psychological approaches to incentive pay is, we argue, a 
source of limitation of the predictive power of each. In 
Chapter Six we argue that the theory of human rationality
84
implicit in both approaches is very particular and frequently 
departed from in practice. People are often unable or 
unwilling to engage in the calculus of their individual 
utility which is assumed by the models which we have 
discussed. Thus we contend that the ambit of these models 
should be limited to where their underlying assumptions are 
borne out. This will have the effect of rendering the models 
more powerful as predictive tools since their domain will be 
properly respected.
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CHAPTER SIX - LIMITATIONS OF RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN: 
OPTIMIZATION
6.1 Introduction
The economic and social psychological approaches to the 
analysis of incentive pay share a broadly similar set of 
underlying assumptions. Although rarely stated explicitly 
they include a conception of man as being engaged in the 
maximisation of his own, individualistic utility. The models 
founded on these assumptions are presented as being ahistoric 
and universal. According to Becker (1976, p5) the decision­
making preferences "are assumed not to change substantially 
over time, nor to be very different between wealthy and poor 
persons, or even between persons in different societies and 
cultures."
This set of methodological assumptions has been characterised 
as that of rational economic man by some writers' (eg Hollis 
and Nell (1975), and as the assumptions of neo-classical 
rationality by others (Etzioni (1988)). More commonly in the 
literature of models founded on them, this set of assumptions 
is referred to as simply rationality: as Leibenstein (1976,
'This is not to say that this conception of rationality is 
adopted by every theorist. Rather we argue that it is the
dominance of these assumptions which is the basis of our 
characterisation. That this is so is supported by the experience 
of Scitovsky (1976) in investigating the rationality assumptions 
of economics: "economists are deeply divided into the
Establishment and its radical-left critics, but they were like 
a harmonious and happy family in their unanimous hostility to my 
ideas".
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p7 6) observes, "economists use the word rationality as a 
synonym for maximisation or optimisation."
However, this is not the only possible conception of 
rationality, and more maverick writers in both Economics and 
Psychology are recognising the limitations of rational 
economic man assumptions for predictively powerful theorising. 
As Etzioni (1988, pix) observes, perhaps a little prematurely, 
"we are now in the middle of a paradigmic struggle. 
Challenged is the entrenched utilitarian, rationalistic neo­
classical paradigm which is applied not merely to the economy 
but also, increasingly, to the full array of social 
relations."
6.2 The Methodology of Rationality
The assumptions subsumed under rational economic man have no 
objective validity. They are analytic truths: assumed true by 
convention to provide a foundation for theory building. They 
have no factual content: how can we know that economic
behaviour is motivated by the desire to maximise the 
satisfaction on one's desires?
The assumptions can be regarded as comprising a normative view 
of how behaviour ought to be: what Luce and Raiffa (1958) call 
a rationality to which we should aspire. More often, however, 
models built on the assumptions (such as those considered in 
chapters four and five) purport to be positive theories of
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behaviour. In this case, while simplifying assumptions are 
always necessary if manageable theories are to be constructed, 
it is important not to lose sight of the fact that such models 
apply only where the assumptions are met. Prescriptions 
derived from theoretical models, too, are valid as long as the 
assumptions are accurate. Accordingly the boundary conditions 
of theories, the domain in which their predictions and 
prescriptions are meaningful, are an important, if frequently 
overlooked, area of investigation. In the case of incentive 
pay, the insights offered by economics and expectancy theory 
are meaningful as long as the underlying assumptions of 
economic rationality hold: where they do not, there is no
theoretical basis for expecting the models' implications to 
hold.
6.3 Criticisms of Rational Economic Man
A growing body of theory and evidence is suggesting that human 
decision-making does not approximate to that assumed under 
rational economic man at all times and in all places. Two 
sets of arguments contribute to this critique of the 
universality of rational economic man.
First, the process of optimization which rational economic man 
assumes can be shown to be beyond the cognitive powers of 
individuals. On behavioral grounds Simon (1957) has advanced 
other models of decision-making as being more accurate than 
strict optimization. Leibenstein (1976, p73) observed that
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"outside circles of economists... individuals normally dislike 
tight calculation activity".
Secondly, the role of values, which guide people's conception 
of appropriate behaviour, influences to what extent they are 
calculative and individualistic, as assumed in rational 
economic man, or less calculative and more concerned with the 
welfare of others. The economist Solow (1980) has questioned 
the limits of economic models in this way, asserting that 
labour markets are not smoothly self-clearing because workers 
pay attention to "principles of appropriate behaviour whose 
source is not entirely individualistic", (p3). To the extent 
that values consistent with rational economic man vary across 
people and over time, the applicability of models based on the 
assumptions which comprise it will be defined by this 
consistency as a boundary condition.
In this chapter we consider the implications of the 
optimization postulate, and in Chapter Seven address the role 
of values as a boundary condition in payment systems.
6.4 The Optimization Postulate
Simon (1957) argued that the cognitive powers of reasoning 
required to carry out the optimization assumed under rational 
economic man are not within the capability of man generally. 
In most real-world situations the individual is faced with a 
complex set of choices and contingencies, with many thousands
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of variables and constraints to negotiate. It can be easily 
demonstrated that optimization over even a modest subset of 
these variables involves complicated mathematics. It can 
equally be demonstrated that the typical human has difficulty 
in multiplying even two large numbers without the aid of 
pencil and paper.
On behavioral grounds Simon (1956) advanced a theory of 
'satisficing' which he argued characterises human decision­
making better than optimization. Faced with a situation in 
which genuine optima cannot be computed within feasible limits 
of effort, the decision maker will look for a satisfactory 
rather than an optimal alternative.^
A closely allied model of non-optimizing decision making is 
that of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality stems from 
both the computational limits of the decision-maker, and his 
limited knowledge of available alternatives and how they 
relate to each other. Accordingly, the agent is held to make 
choices over a narrow range of choices at any one time, which 
may be inconsistent with choices made at other times, and 
which do not reflect all alternatives.
To be meaningful, optimization relies on the assumption that
^The immediate objection to such a theory is that it can 
always be broken down to reveal the operation of an optimizing 
process by, for example, taking into account information 
gathering costs in determining which option is chosen. Since, 
however, this calculation would be quite as complicated as 
straightforward optimization it can be argued that satisficing 
does constitute a genuine breach of the optimization principle.
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human decision-making is transitive. That is, the preference 
orderings which individuals attach to outcomes are consistent. 
If X is preferred to Y on one occasion, but Y is chosen over 
X on another it is impossible to say which outcome represents 
optimal utility. The possibility that inconsistent choices 
characterise human decision-making is therefore a challenge to 
the principle of optimization on which rational economic man 
is founded.
Liddell and Solomon (1977), in placing expectancy models in 
the class of subjective expected utility (SEU) models of 
decision-making, invoked the decision theory literature to 
demonstrate that intransitivities are endemic to actual 
choices made, although the extent varies. Other empirical 
evidence supports criticism which argues that optimization is 
not an accurate representation of human decision-making. 
Simon (1987, p244) showed that "it is easier to reconcile a 
satisficing than an optimizing theory of economic decision 
making with what is known empirically of actual choice 
behaviour." Feldman et al. (1976), in a series of 
experimental tests of the postulates of expectancy theory, 
reported that subjects' behaviour was typically non-optimizing 
in the context of outcomes presented to them. Mitchell 
(1982), in a survey of expectancy tests, considered that 
expectancy theory, with its requirement that expectancies and 
instrumentalities are estimated, multiplied together and their 
products summed, over-intellectualises the decision-making 
process, and that the empirical results reflect these
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inadequacies.
6.5 Implications for models of incentive pay
The strict assumption of optimization, given that it does not 
accurately reflect individual decision-making, reduces, we 
hypothesise, the predictive power of models which incorporate 
it when they are applied in practice. Accordingly a less 
rigid assumption may improve the predictive accuracy of 
hypotheses drawn from models of incentive pay.
If predictive power is the criterion for establishing the 
usefulness of a theoretical model, it is at least possible 
that replacing the economic rationality assumption of utility 
maximisation with a less rigid replacement may improve the 
empirical success of the economic and expectancy models. In 
particular the specification of a strict multiplicative 
expectancy model, such as that of equation 3 (see Chapter 
Five) may be relaxed to allow other, less computationally 
taxing, combinations of the variables to be made in practice. 
Also, since behaviourial choices may be made on consideration 
of only a subset of relevant variables, the strict inclusion 
of all the variables specified may be relaxed if evidence 
suggests that certain of them are ignored or overlooked in 
practice.
Departing from the optimization assumption involves allowing 
for different specifications of the structure of the models of
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incentive pay which are provided by economics and expectancy 
theory. This is in keeping with Popper (1959) : in the last 
analysis a choice between the alternative assumptions will be 
made whether departing from rational economic man improves the 
predictive accuracy and effectiveness of the incentive-pay 
models.
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CHAPTER SEVEN - THE LIMITS OF RATIONAL ECONOMIC MAN: VALUES
7.1 Introduction
Leibenstein's (1976) observation that individuals dislike 
tight calculation activity is a crucial departure from 
rational economic man in that it introduces decision-making 
techniques as a choice variable.
Presented with a given set of alternatives, different people 
may employ different means of deciding which choices to make. 
Some may calculate tightly their individual payoffs, others 
may be less precise and more concerned about the general 
welfare. The behaviour which results will be heavily 
dependent on the type of decision-making system used to choose 
between alternatives. In the Prisoner's Dilemma framework, 
for example, if some individuals take into account the general 
interest in their decision-making, predicting their choices by 
assuming that they behave as rational egoists will prove a 
model of their behaviour which has poor predictive power.
7.2 Values and decision-making
For some people taking account purely of one's own self- 
interest is unacceptable. As Argyris (1964, p24) observes
"society may have norms that tend to prescribe how much self 
awareness is permissable". Society's norms shaping
individuals' values affect the way in which they choose their
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behaviours. After Schwartz and Bilsky (1987), values refer to 
concepts of desirable behaviours which transcend specific 
situations and guide the selection or evaluation of behaviour. 
Values differ from the preferences of rational economic man 
because they concern behaviour as well as outcomes. They 
represent standards which individuals must live up to: doing 
so could even mean forgoing opportunities for satisfaction.
People's values, governing their decision-making, can be 
consistent with the assumed calculative individualism of 
rational economic man, or they can depart from it. We argue 
that values affect behaviour in that a particular type of 
behaviour is more likely to be made the more consistent it is 
with the individual's value set. Behaviour which violates 
passionately held values will be less likely to be observed 
than behaviour which is consistent with them. Yet as Feather 
(1982, p265) points out "textbooks in social psychology have 
had little to say about values".
The sources of personal values may be thought of as being 
twofold. A set of values may be held to be intuitively 
present in an individual, acquired either at birth or during 
the person's early development. The similarity between the 
conceptions of values and personal morality permit this to be 
seen as akin to the intuitivist conception of morality. The 
second source of personal values, which can be regarded as 
either an alternative to or augmentation of the first, is to 
conceive of them as being socially given and hence, in the
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individual, internalised conceptions of social standards and 
norms taken from the outside environment each a person faces. 
This ties in closely with Freud's view that the human 
superego, man's moral conscience, comprises the 
internalisation of societal norms. Such a view can also be 
seen as implicit in Weber's writings, with the current 
teachings of religious institutions moulding individuals' 
value rationality,
7.3 Values affect behaviour
Two principal theoretic routes describe how values affect 
behaviour. Bandura (1986) has summarised the role of values 
in behaviour by conceiving of the individual as being 
motivated by his expected internal reaction to this actions, 
with the internal reaction being positive insofar as the 
action is consistent with his value set. Values act, then, as 
an internal evaluative screening device for possible 
behaviours. A second conduit for the ability of values to 
affect behaviour is the 'social commitments' view adopted by 
some sociologists (Goffman (1961), Stebbins (1971)). In this 
context the argument can be taken to imply that from a 
person's previous behaviour society at large imputes certain 
principles or values which it expects to see adhered to. 
Hence past behaviour creates expectations which future 
behaviour must meet if the person is not to risk social 
penalization. These two approaches are synthesised in 
Rokeach's (1973, p47) assertion that behaviour is made with
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reference to values in order "to make it possible to regard 
ourselves and to be regarded by others as having satisfied 
socially and institutionally originating definitions of 
morality and competence."
Weber (1930) held that the lack of conformity between the 
value-system which was dominant in medieval Europe, and the 
behaviour inherent in capitalist organisations was the 
principal obstacle to the development of capitalism. Through 
the prohibition of usury the Christian Churches inculcated a 
set of values which amounted to avoiding the calculation of 
gains from loans reflecting an attitude to enterprise which 
held that individuals should not seek for personal gain but to 
make a living. The rise of protestantism in Northern Europe, 
Weber wrote, imparted a set of values which departed radically 
from the traditionalist outlook. Stressing the importance of 
personal industry, yet deprecating consumption, puritanism 
promoted the desire to seek profit for its own sake. This 
emergence of a set of values which Robertson (1933) has called 
economic individualism brought into conformity the values of 
certain peoples with those necessary for a capitalist take 
off.
The historian R.H. Tawney (1926), while rejecting Weber's view 
of the role of Protestantism, agreed with the proposition that 
an incompatible set of values could prevent the behaviour 
implied in capitalism. He differed from Weber in regarding 
the accessory accommodating change in values as the
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contraction of the territory within which the writ of religion 
was conceived to run.
That values compatible with certain types of behaviour are 
necessary to be present for that behaviour to take place need 
not be taken to imply that values are always most 
appropriately formed. At the heart of the Marxist notion of 
false consciousness is the view that revolutionary behaviour 
demands as a precondition that workers are possessed of a 
revolutionary consciousness. That such a value set is not 
typically held means that revolutionary behaviour does not 
arise: as Moorhouse and Chamberlain (1974, p388) lament, "the 
masses will remain entrapped by economism," the value-set of 
false consciousness undercuts their position.
We have suggested in previous chapters that the rational 
economic man assumptions which underlie models of the effects 
of incentive payment systems assume a view of human nature 
which is individualistic, calculative and maximising. As 
particular means to ends these assumptions correspond to 
certain of the possible values which an individual may have, 
under our conception. It
follows from this that the behaviour will result as expected 
from such models to the extent that the values of the 
individuals in practice are consistent with those implied in 
the models' assumptions. The closer the actual values 
conform to those assumed in the models, (for example the more 
calculative the individual), and the greater is the intensity
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with which the values are held, the more confident we can be 
in expecting the behaviour predicted by the models to result 
in practice.
7.4 Values and universality
Cross cultural research has demonstrated that the 
compatibility of people's value sets with those implied by 
models of incentive pay varies substantially. Indeed the 
value set implied (calculative individualism), forms a nexus 
by which different nations can be classified.
Such distinctions hark back to Tonnies' (1922) division of the 
individualist dimension into Gemeinschaft (a collectivistic 
orientation) and Gesellschaft (a tendency to greater 
individualism and self-reliance). Parsons & Shils (1951) 
identify the axis of self-orientation versus collective- 
orientation as one of the five pattern variables which 
determine human action.
Hofstede (1980) finds that the axis can be used to categorise 
nations effectively and the resultant division has substantial 
predicting the economic system of the country. For example, 
he finds the United States characterised by a very 
individualistic value system. With this value pattern 
Americans typically have a relationship between the individual 
and the organisation which is calculative, and based on 
enlightened self-interest. He cites the presence of this
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value system as explaining the popularity in the United States 
of expectancy theories of motivation. Etzioni (1975) found 
that an individualistic value set on the part of an employee 
went hand in hand with a more calculative involvement at work.
The incidence of a value set of this sort varies across the 
world. Scandinavian countries are classified as being less 
individualistic and calculative in Hofstede's survey. 
Macoby's (198 6) study of Swedish values supports this. He 
refers to the local concept of lagom, which deems valuable 
behaviour which is subject to limits; to balance and 
restraint. "Limits on accumulating wealth are strengthened 
by the shared feelings about what is right, rooted in 
childhood admonitions that putting too much on one's place is 
not lagom," (p83). Macoby contrasts this with the greater
"American urge to unbridle greed, to shoot the moon," (p83). 
Models of motivation based on rational economic man 
assumptions of calculative egotism are thus less consistent 
with Swedish society than is the case for the US, and can 
therefore be expected to be less powerful in predicting 
behaviour there.
In a major study of the differences of work values systems 
across the world, Drago et al (1989) highlight a marked 
contrast between the individualistic and competitive 
disposition of the American workforce and Australian concern 
for equality and "mateship".
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7.5 Changing Values
It is not only across people that values, and hence the 
behavioral responses to payment systems, will vary. As soon 
as we accept that individuals' value sets can be, partially at 
least, internalised from the wider environment we repeal the 
assumption that the market economy can be treated as a 
separate system, basically self contained. We replace it with 
an assumption that the economy is a sub-system of a more 
encompassing society, polity and culture.
The values of individuals become linked to the wider social 
system, and hence are subject to change with that system - 
this is in keeping with the Lewin (1938) view of human 
behaviour as being determined by a combination of the personal 
and the situational. Himmelweit et al (1985) used the term 
political socialization to express the influence of an 
individual's contact with, and membership of, significant 
groups both in childhood and adulthood, on another dimension 
of decision making: casting a vote.
In a social world much of the interaction is with other social 
objects. However, allowing a place for the internalisation of 
values given by the social system does not inject a 
fundamental randomness into our analysis: for the social
system to exist, some predictability and some stability are 
present. As Parsons has observed it is the fact that a shared 
language of norms and values exists between people which
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explains and makes possible the very existence of human 
society.
How then can values in individuals change and vary across 
people and times? Parsons' Action theory proposes a systemic 
analysis. To maintain itself as a system there must be some 
interaction between the elements of a social system. In 
Parsons' analysis change within a sub-system arises from two 
sources; changes in the external environment, such as 
technological change or variations in the cultural universe 
given by other systems, and from endogenous sources - strains 
within the system itself, which may be an internal response to 
exogenous change. Such pressures for change need not 
necessarily result in values change: forces exist within a
social system for the maintenance of equilibrium, which must 
be overcome, hence the relative stability of a system.
Values internalised from society are subject to change, 
therefore, in keeping with the principle of evolution that a 
system should have the capacity for generalised adaptation. 
Since the adaptation is to the dynamism of the whole social 
system this justifies the Weberian view that economics, as a 
section of society, should be analysed as such.
That values do change over time has important implications for 
behaviour which models must take account of if they are to 
retain their predictive power. The value system of parts of 
medieval Europe changes in response to changing external 
conditions, according to Tawney, resulting in new behaviour
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identifiable as capitalistic. Likewise, certain American 
writers (eg Ravlin and Meglino (1987)) detect an erosion of 
the individualistic value system in American society which 
they fear will cause changes in behaviour which will damage US 
economic progress. Himmelweit et al (1985) argued for the 
importance of the Zeitgeist in causing shifts in individuals' 
evaluations of institutions in society which affect their 
political decision-making. In Chapter Two we discussed the 
view that a fundamental shift towards more individualistic 
values has taken place in Britain since the late 1970s.
In the context of pay systems, changes in the value system of 
workers (in response to the external environment) towards 
greater or lesser compatibility with the assumptions of human 
nature included in the design of the system, will be 
responsible for a given method of paying people being more 
successful at some times than others.
7.6 Values as a boundary condition for incentive pay models
Values consistent with calculative individualism, then, are 
not universal. Rather they vary between people and over time. 
Since we hypothesise that behaviour will be more likely to be 
observed if it is consistent with people's values than if it 
violates them, it follows that models of incentive pay founded 
on the rational economic man assumption that man is a 
calculative egotist will have greater predictive power among 
calculative egoists than among those who are more
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collectivistic* and (after Etzioni (1975)) therefore less 
calculative in their value orientations.
Thus employees' individualism is a boundary condition for neo­
classical models of incentive pay.
The relevance of this boundary condition and the transience of 
the assumptions of rational economic man are beginning to be 
recognised. Mitchell (1987), for example, observes that the 
pertinent question in models of motivation is shifting from 
being does expectancy theory work? to where does it work? 
Miller and Crush (1988, pl07) note that "personal expectancies 
will determine the behaviour of some individuals and 
perceptions of social norms will determine the behaviour of 
others". The economist Arrow (1985) has acknowledged the 
transience of the underlying assumptions of neo-classical 
economics: in a contribution which has raised controversy
among orthodox economists, he suggested that the laws of 
economics may not be true for all time, as in the natural 
sciences, but historically determined.
Hofstede (1980, p373) has noted the practical consequences of 
failing to pay proper attention to the boundary conditions of 
incentive models: "the silent assumption of universal validity 
of culturally restricted findings is frequent. The empirical 
basis for American management theories is American
*After Deutsch (1973) 'collectivistic' refers to a 
motivational orientation which emphasises the welfare of others.
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organisations, and we should not assume without proof that 
they apply elsewhere."
Outside the domain of individualism other theories of effort 
at work should be constructed and used. Shamir (1990), for 
example, has made a start in this direction by developing a 
'collectivistic model of work motivation'.
Our hypothesis that individualism is a boundary condition of 
the incentive pay models discussed is in keeping with Popper 
(1959): specifying more closely the domain of models is an
important means to increase their predictive power and 
therefore their usefulness.
7.7 The causality of values and behaviour
The systematic view of social action which we considered above 
implies a two way relationship between values and the 
environment. The adaptation function of Parsonian theory 
gives to the environment as it receives from it, to maintain 
the continuance of the system. Bem (197 0) observes that one 
of the most effective ways of changing mental programmes of 
individuals is to change behaviour first.
If an individual's value set is one of the determinants of the 
behaviour which he would choose out of his own volition, the 
presence of power relations at work raises the possibility 
that people can be obliged to behave in a way which is
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inconsistent with their value sets.
Within the system three responses are possible to such a 
situation. First the discrepancy between behaviour and values 
could contribute to a build up of tension in the system, but 
not to an extent which is sufficient to overcome the forces 
for stability (integration), so that no change takes place. 
Second, if the strain is stronger than the forces for 
stability the tension could have its issue in a change in 
behaviour which acts to reduce the misalignment of behaviour 
and values in the system. A third possibility, however, is 
that values themselves may adapt to achieve the maintenance of 
the system; that is values may follow behaviour, through the 
theoretical route of dissonance reduction.
Argyris (1954) has made this point, claiming that faced with 
a situation in which their required behaviour is at odds with 
their value system, workers will resolve the initial 
discrepancy in individual psychological terms.
Hofstede (1980, p27) regards changing first the behaviour of 
individuals as one of the most effective ways of changing 
value systems: he contends "that value change has to precede 
behaviour change is an idealistic assumption which neglects 
the contribution of the situation to actual behaviour.
To accept that behaviour affects values is to be consistent 
with a Marxist approach to the analysis of social action, and
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indeed to the views of Marx himself. Marx held that 
revolutionary consciousness is a phenomenon that develops in 
response to the direct and practical experience by the 
proletariat of the contradictions inherent in the relations in 
which they are engaged. Direct evidence for this relation 
between behaviour and values can be found in the case of 
strikes. In the Belgian general strike of 1960-1, Bolte de 
Bel (1961) found that individuals previously identified as 
being moderates of low class consciousness, during the strike 
exhibited profound changes in class consciousness and
political and ideological growth. Mann (1973, p73) claims 
that typically "during a strike a new form of rationality 
emerges, one not based on the summation of individual 
calculations but on collectivism as an end in itself."
The response of values to behaviour need not be made in this
direction, however - it is plausible to suppose that values 
could change to become more consistent with those implied by 
the behaviour. Moorhouse and Chamberlain (1974) argue "to the 
extent that men are not committed to the values which underpin 
the way their society is organised, they must be,
prospectively, more likely to be attracted to values, and to 
act on values, which seem more congruent with their social 
experience." Hence employees who work under a particular 
system of production will develop values congruent with that 
system: a modern capitalist system brings about 'privatised' 
workers who are commodity conscious, materialistic and
private.
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This theoretical possibility that values can follow behaviour, 
and hence that a system of organisation can bring about a 
value system which is congruent with it carries major 
implications. Without diminishing the role of values as a 
boundary condition for incentive pay it raises the possibility 
that causality could be reversed. Rather than an appropriate 
value system being a precondition for the successful 
functioning of a particular form of organisation, the value 
system could emerge in response to it. In the case of 
incentive-based pay we have the possibility that the 
introduction of a scheme could bring about the values of 
calculative self-interest which underlie its conception.
Several writers have investigated the possibility that new 
management techniques can bring about changes in the values of 
workers: changes which can be considered indicative of a New
Industrial Relations. Kelly & Kelly (1990) detect in the New 
Industrial Relations literature one common theme: "this is the 
idea that organizational changes subsumed under the rubric of 
New Industrial Relations (including profit-related pay) will 
not only lead to changes in worker behaviour, but more 
importantly to enduring changes in underlying attitudes."
Admitting the role of values in incentive-based payment 
systems therefore includes not only an investigation of 
whether a value set of sufficient calculative individualism is 
necessary for success. It raises the question of causality - 
can incentive pay itself engender the value set required for
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its success?
Hence two propositions follow from introducing individualistic 
values as a boundary condition of neo-classical models of 
incentive pay. The first is that the predictive power of 
these models will be greater among employees who are 
characterised by an individualistic value set than among those 
of greater collectivistic orientations. The second is the 
possibility that incentive pay, being predicated on 
calculative individualism, can give rise to a compatible value 
set among employees to whom it is applied.
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SECTION III OPERATIONALISING THEORY
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CHAPTER EIGHT - HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
8.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have provided us with three broad 
propositions to be tested by exposing them to the possibility 
of empirical refutation.
First, we argued that an expectancy-type model of the 
motivational process, which has been shown to be complementary 
to the economic approach, is a predictively powerful model, 
and therefore its implications can confidently be used in the 
design of incentive contracts.
Second, we argued that the predictive power of such a model 
can be enhanced by relaxing the behaviorally inaccurate 
underlying assumption of strict optimization.
Third, we postulated that respecting a boundary condition, 
defined by individualistic values, will enhance the model's 
predictive usefulness. In addition we raised the possibility 
that introducing an incentive pay contract could bring about 
the value conditions necessary for its success.
In this chapter we present a set of testable hypotheses which 
summarise these three propositions.
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8.2 A basic expectancy model
In Chapter Five we presented a basic expectancy-type model of 
effort and pay, based on Galbraith and Cummings (1967). It 
was summarised symbolically as equation 3:
W = E.l.V 3
where
W = effort
E = the expectancy that effort leads to performance
1 = the instrumentality of performance for the 
attainment of pay
V = the valence of pay
Expectancy, instrumentality and valence are combined 
multiplicatively to determine how much effort an individual 
decided rationally to supply.
To advance such a model as a useful depiction of the 
motivational process is to hypothesise that:
HI: Expectancy, instrumentality and valence predict a
significant proportion of effort
H2: The interaction of expectancy, instrumentality and
valence explains a significant proportion of effort 
supplied.
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8.3 Structural modifications to the basic model
We propose two modifications to the structure of the basic 
expectancy model represented by hypothesis HI. The first is 
based on the requirement that our hypothesis be open to 
empirical testing: we argue that as it stands, it is not
possible to test positively HI because the valence component 
cannot be meaningfully operationalised. The second draws from 
the contribution of Chapter Six in arguing that the 
optimization postulate should be relaxed. Hence the 
multiplicative form of the basic model is more apporiately 
replaced by a form which is less computationally rigorous.
8.3a Model Structure: ex ante and measurable valence
The model summarised above is forward-looking. By knowing the 
expectancy, instrumentality and valence perceptions which an 
individual holds at period zero the theory predicts effort 
supplied at period one. However, it is impractical to test 
the theory in this way: in field tests a payment system is
already in place, so that period zero has long since passed. 
Testing the theory must rely on imputing values for 
expectancy, instrumentality and valence to period zero. This 
is typically done by assuming that the perceptions are 
constant between the periods, so that expectancy perceptions 
recorded in period one are a reasonable estimate of those held 
ex ante (in period zero).
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Such an assumption, however, leads to a flaw in the standard 
operationalisations of the expectancy model for testing in the 
field. While, ceteris paribus, there is no reason to suppose 
that expectancy and instrumentality perceptions will change 
between periods, given that these are determined by the 
objective situation (ie the pay contract, assumed unchanged) 
and the individual's subjective reaction to it (also assumed 
unchanged) , this is not the case for valence. Even under a 
ceteris paribus assumption there is strong reason to expect 
that valence reports, recorded in period one will not be 
suitable to estimate ex ante (period zero) valence. This 
important possibility is rarely acknowledged by empirical 
researchers, despite the ambiguous role measured valence has 
been found to have in field tests of expectancy-type models.
Valence is defined by Vroom (1964) as the anticipated 
satisfaction attached to an outcome. In field tests employees 
are usually asked to report (i) the importance (ii) the 
desirability or (iii) the attractiveness of pay to them. The 
responses are used as empirical proxies for valence. Since 
they cannot be applied at period zero, such instruments record 
anticipated satisfaction of pay at period one, in which 
employees are already receiving pay.
These ex post reports of pay's valence would be valid 
estimates of pay's valence at period zero if the valence of 
pay were constant for all amounts of pay. This would be to 
assume that individuals' returns to pay, in terms of
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anticipated satisfaction, were constant.
We argue that this is not the typical case. In section 5.3 we 
allowed that money was less instrumental in attaining 
satisfaction of the higher rungs of Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs than the lower rungs: accordingly the anticipated
satisfaction conveyed by money would decline the more an 
individual accumulated (and thus satisfied the lower needs). 
The anticipated satisfaction associated with money would 
therefore be subject to diminishing returns. Assuming that 
the valence of money in period one (in which the employee has 
been paid) is the same as that in period zero (when no money 
has been earned) conflicts with one of our fundamental 
assumptions concerning money as a motivator.
The view that ex post measures of valence differ in their 
behaviour from the ex ante measures required by the model 
implies a set of hypotheses of the behaviour expected which is 
different to hypotheses HI and H2.
Valence in Field Tests: An Economic Approach
Valence and Expectancy/Instrumentality
In Chapter Three we presented a model of pay and effort in 
which employees found disutility in supplying effort (a 
diminution of leisure), but positive utility in pay, which was
determined by effort supplied. The employee faced with such
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a situation would choose to supply effort at a level at which 
the marginal rate of substitution between income and leisure 
(and all other goods) was equal to unity.
An employee whose ex ante anticipated satisfaction from pay 
(ie its valence) was unusually high would choose a bundle of 
effort and pay to be delivered in period one which contained 
an unusually great amount of effort, and therefore pay. This 
is in keeping with Vroom's model. Having chosen this bundle, 
the employee's anticipated satisfaction associated with pay 
would, when measured at period one, be by definition equal to 
that attached to leisure and all other goods. In a field 
test, which measures valence at period one, such an employee 
would therefore not report a high valence for pay relative to 
other outcomes.
Consider, however, a payment system which substitutes a fixed 
wage for effort-determined pay. Again, an employee's ex ante 
valence of pay will determine the composition of the effort- 
pay bundle which he would optimally choose for period one. 
However, the fixed wage forces on the employee a particular 
level of pay at period one which cannot be changed. If this 
amount is below what he would have chosen for himself the 
employee's anticipated satisfaction from pay (its valence) at 
period one will still be greater than unity relative to all 
other goods. In the context of such a system valence recorded 
at period one would be relatively high.
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In short, period one valence is determined by the amount of 
money paid, relative to what amount would be chosen. Since 
the payment system determines the extent to which an employee 
is allowed to realise his chosen level of pay, the payment 
system determines period one valence, the valence recorded in 
field tests.
If the payment system is perceived to offer a strong 
relationship between effort and pay (ie expectancy and 
instrumentality are both high) then individuals can realise 
their chosen level of pay, with the result that period one 
valence will be low.
If the payment system does not allow employees to realise 
their chosen level of pay (ie expectancy and instrumentality 
are both low), but the wage paid in period one is higher than 
the level of pay which would optimally have been chosen, then 
period one valence will again be low.
However, if the pay system does not allow employees to realise 
their target pay in period one and the wage paid to them is 
lower than that target, period one valence will be high.
Far from being independent, as assumed in the usual 
operationalisations of the expectancy model (reflected in 
hypothesis HI), valence when measured at period one is 
determined by expectancy and instrumentality. Hence if our 
argument is to be shown to be correct the alternative set of
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hypotheses which must survive falsification in empirical field 
tests are:
H3 : Measurable valence will be high when expectancy and
instrumentality are perceived as low and pay is 
perceived as low.
H4: Measurable valence will be low when pay is perceived
as high.
H5: Measurable valence will be low when expectancy and
instrumentality are perceived as low.
Valence and Effort
The implication of the economic analysis of Chapter 3 was that 
a fixed wage system will tend to depress the level of effort 
supplied. Marginal increases in effort are unrewarded, and 
marginal decreases go unpunished, causing Rational Economic 
Man to take more leisure at work than he would under an 
incentive-pay regime. We have argued above that the 
perception that pay is genuinely determined by effort (ie high 
expectancy and instrumentality perceptions) determines the 
measured valence of pay. That is, the same factor which 
causes measured valence to be low also causes a high level of 
effort to be supplied. Thus, effort and measured valence are 
covariates: both a function (one positive, one negative) of 
expectancy and instrumentality perceptions. Accordingly we 
predict that field tests of expectancy theory will find a 
negative association between effort and the measured valence 
of pay. This prediction contrasts with the positive, causal
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relationship predicted by conventional operationalisations of 
the expectancy model for field tests. As such, for our 
argument to be supported a new hypothesis H6 must be preferred 
to H2:
H6: Effort and Measured Valence will be negatively
associated.
Implications
Hypotheses HI and H2 summarise the conventional conception of 
the behaviour of measured valence in field tests of expectancy 
theory. They are founded on an implicit assumption that the 
valence of pay is constant whenever measured. Hence measuring 
valence during the operation of a pay system is a valid means 
of imputing the ex ante valence of the Vroomian model.
The competing set of hypotheses H3, H4, H5 and H6, summarises 
an alternative conception of measured valence. It posits that 
the valence of pay diminishes as pay is accumulated, so that 
measuring valence when pay has been received is not a suitable 
empirical proxy for the ex ante valence necessitated by the 
Vroomian model. This alternative is in keeping with our 
psychological assumptions made in Chapter Five concerning the 
motivating potential of money.
If our alternative set of hypotheses is preferred empirically 
to HI and H2, then empirical tests of expectancy theory which
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mix ex ante with ex post introduce distortions which can 
undercut the predictive power ascribed to the theory. A model 
which should be no less powerful and more parsimonious would 
be advanced by omitting the misspecified variable.
8.3b Model structure: the optimization postulate
The hypotheses which summarise the claims made for the 
orthodox expectancy approach are
H7: Expectancy and instrumentality predict a
significant proportion of effort
H8: the interaction of expectancy and
instrumentality is a significant predictor of 
effort
H7 summarises the content of the model and H8 its structure, 
H8 implying a multiplicative combination of expectancy and 
instrumentality.
In Chapter Seven we argued that expectancy theory shares with 
neoclassical economics a set of assumptions about human 
nature, which we characterised as those of Rational Economic 
Man. One particular such assumption was that agents 
determined their behaviour by optimizing over a set of 
possible outcomes, so as to maximise their utility. The 
behaviourists' criticisms of this assumption were considered.
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They argued that in most instances strict maximisation is 
beyond the computational abilities of agents, and that a less 
rigorous consideration of relevant variables is more 
representative of actual human decision making. The 
multiplicative interaction of expectancy and instrumentality 
posited in hypothesis H8, in the light of these criticisms, 
appears to be in keeping with the optimization assumption but 
overly restrictive from a behaviourist's point of view. In 
the view of Mitchell (1982) , for example, it over 
intellectualises the motivational process. Accordingly, an 
alternative specification of the model, one in which a strict 
multiplicative combination of expectancy and instrumentality 
was departed from, may increase the realism and thereby the 
predictive power of the model.
Allowing a different structure for the expectancy model 
requires proposing an alternative hypothesis to H8, which 
summarises the orthodox structure. Accordingly hypothesis H9 
makes testable the possibility that a functional form 
departing from strict global rationality predicts effort 
better :
H9: Non-multiplicative combinations of expectancy and
instrumentality predict a greater proportion of 
effort than does a multiplicative combination.
Empirical testing for hypotheses H7, H8 and H9 will indicate 
the predictive power of the expectancy model, and distinguish
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between alternative specifications of it.
8.4 Boundary Condition of the models
We have argued that the neo-classical economic and expectancy 
theoretic models of effort and incentive pay are based on an 
assumption that agents' decision-making is calculative and 
individualistic. We have also suggested that people's value 
sets include dimensions such as their relative individualism, 
and that these vary between people. Accordingly when neo­
classical models are applied to people whose values depart 
from those assumed, the models are misapplied and substantial 
predictive power is not to be expected from them. Here we 
derive hypotheses which represent this view.
We hypothesise that the model will be a more accurate means of 
representing the motivational process among employees of 
individualistic values then among workers of relatively 
collectivistic values. This implies hypothesis HIO:
HIO : The predictive power of the model will be greater 
among employees of relatively individualistic value 
sets than among employees of relatively 
collectivistic value sets.
In section 7.4 we discussed the implications of the 
possibility that behaviour can shape values as well as values 
governing the choice of behaviour. Several writers (eg
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Moorhouse & Chamberlain (1974)) have made the argument that 
changing the behaviour of individuals can bring about value 
changes which make the two congruent. Such a hypothesis is in 
keeping with the Parsonian view that its outlet in value 
change which tends to assure the maintenance of the system.
Applied to incentive pay, the argument states that introducing 
an incentive contract predicated on calculative individualism 
can bring about in employees to whom it is applied, these 
critical values. This implies that, ceteris paribus, 
employees covered by a cash bonus system, or employees who own 
shares in their company, will be more likely to display 
individualistic value sets than employees who are not included 
in such schemes. We should therefore test empirically 
hypothesis H12:
H12: Employees covered by an incentive-based contract 
will display greater individualism than those not 
included.
8.5 Incentive Pay and Effort
If it is demonstrated that the expectancy model of incentive 
pay and effort have predictive power, and that it is more 
powerful among employees of relatively individualistic value 
sets, then a set of hypotheses concerning the motivating 
effects of incentive contracts follows. Since incentive 
contracts (such as performance-related bonuses and employee
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shareholdings) objectively increase the performance-extrinsic 
rewards relationship it will be expected that the 
instrumentality perceptions of those covered by these 
contracts will be enhanced, relative to employees not included 
in the schemes. Under the model presented this would imply 
that employees covered by an incentive contract will supply 
more effort than those of their colleagues who are not 
included in such a contract.
However, having argued that the model is applicable only to 
employees of relatively individualistic value sets, it follows 
that the model's prediction holds only for this type of 
employee. That is to say we expect an incentive contract to 
result in relatively high effort among individualistic 
subjects, but to have no significant effect on employees 
characterised by a relatively collectivistic value set. This 
can be summarised in two hypotheses:
H13: employees (i) covered by an incentive pay contract 
and (ii) who hold a relatively individualistic value 
set will supply relatively high levels of effort,
H14: employees (i) covered by an incentive pay contract 
and (ii) who hold a relatively collectivistic value 
set will supply no more effort than employees not 
covered by incentive pay.
These hypotheses constitute a positive theory of effort,
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values and pay. The confidence we can place in the theory 
will be established by the ability of the hypotheses to 
withstand attempts at falsification by subjecting them to 
empirical scrutiny. To do so requires us to specify empirical 
proxies for the conceptual variables included in our 
hypotheses. To this end the following chapter establishes an 
empirical sample in which to test hypotheses HI to H14, and 
derives empirical proxies to operationalise the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER NINE - EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
9.1 Introduction
The model which we have constructed claims that incentive pay 
will motivate effort most effectively among employees who are 
characterised by an individualistic value set. It will be 
comparatively less successful among collectivistic workers. 
Friedman maintained that many apparently intractable 
theoretical disputes can be settled by empirical evidence. To 
this end Chapter Eight has supplied a set of hypotheses which 
summarise the implications of the model, and which are in 
principle suited to empirical testing. After Popper (1959), 
the greater the demonstrated ability of the hypotheses to 
withstand attempts at empirical falsification, the more 
dependable is our model and hence the greater is our 
confidence in the inferences and prescriptions which we deduce 
from it.
Testing our model empirically requires choosing an appropriate 
research strategy. We must specify suitable empirical 
equivalents or proxies for the variables contained in 
hypotheses HI to H14: in order to do this we must determine
what type of data will form the sample, where it is collected 
and by what means. A sizeable array of choices presents 
itself to the researcher in building a research strategy: at 
least five major decisions must be taken. These are:
i) whether data should be collected by means of a
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controlled experiment or by obtaining observations 
of actuality;
ii) whether the data collected should be of an objective 
or subjective nature;
iii) whether the data aim to be representative of 
generality, or case-specific;
iv) whether the data should be time series or cross 
sectional;
v) which instruments should be used to collect the 
data.
An ideal research strategy consists of choices within this set 
which are shaped by the nature of the model to be tested, and 
its associated hypotheses. In the light of the model and 
hypotheses which we have expounded we discuss what would 
constitute an ideal research strategy for our analysis. 
Having done so we assess a practical research strategy against 
this ideal.
9.2 An ideal research strategy
9.2a The Research Setting: Experimental or Observational
An experimental strategy for collecting data would typically 
consist of obtaining a group of subjects' responses to 
controlled variations in conditions, or to hypothetical 
situations presented to them for consideration. The great 
advantage of such a strategy is that it removes from the 
analysis the 'noise' elements which are inherent in empirical 
research which draws evidence from actuality. As such the 
researcher can confine his analysis to the particular
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relations which interest him.
However, it is not an ideal strategy for our purposes, for 
several reasons. First, our analysis concerns behaviour at 
work, and the opportunity to experiment with the systems and 
the workforce of a functioning organisation (that is, to 
deliberately alter conditions at work in order to assess the 
results) is unlikely to be feasible: organisations have
commercial and other objectives to meet which such 
experimentation could interfere with.
One response would be to conduct research under an 
experimental strategy outside the firm and in a laboratory 
setting. However, by design, conditions which prevail in the 
laboratory are not those which prevail at work. Our model 
explicitly considers behaviour at work. Many of the 
conditions present at work may influence responses made to the 
working environment (for example 'team spirit' built up over 
the years) . It will be difficult for the researcher to 
identify these conditions, to assess whether they are 
pertinent to the analysis and if so, to replicate them in a 
laboratory setting. For example, we argued in Chapter Seven 
after Moorhouse (1976) that subjects' cognitive recognition of 
their behaviour may emerge gradually as they practise it. The 
implication of this is that in laboratory conditions, where 
the situation is, by design, abstracted from everyday 
experience, we will be unable to pick up the cognitive aspects 
of behaviour in the working environment which have become
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revealed to subjects over time.
An ideal research strategy for our model will be based on 
collecting data 'from life' rather than through laboratory 
experiment.
9.2b Type of Data: Objective or Subjective
Data collected to test our hypotheses can be objective (based 
on externally observed phenomena associated with the subject, 
such as his output per day, or externally rated intensity of 
work) or subjective (capturing the subject's own perceptions 
of his behaviour, for example the effort which he supplies).
Economic models of incentive pay have typically adopted a 
research strategy based on collecting and analyzing objective 
data*. In Chapter Four we argued that limiting their analysis 
to such a strategy had the result that the robustness of the 
incentive model could not be established with confidence. The 
presence of incentive pay in a company (an objective piece of 
data) could not rigorously explain relatively high 
productivity in that company (another objective piece of data) 
because the incidence of incentive pay could either be a 
benign covariate of another variable (eg superior management), 
or be subject to reverse causality (high productivity may
See Table 3.2
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provide leeway for cash to be distributed through bonuses).
This is not to deny the value of a research strategy based on 
the collection of objective data: rather, as we argued in
Chapter Four, we believe that further studies of this type 
will be less valuable to the progress of the debate at this 
stage than studies which seek to open up the black box of 
causality in economic models by specifying a complementary 
motivational process. Our model represents such a process, 
and since its components are cognitive, subjective reports are 
required to test the model: perceived expectancy, for example, 
cannot be objectively observed. Effort too is open to 
subjective testing since it is a type of behaviour of which 
the subject is cognizant".
Objective observation as an empirical strategy denies us the 
opportunity of testing the cognitive perceptions which we 
postulate form a chain linking behaviour with certain 
antecedent conditions. Subjective reports must therefore be 
obtained in order to test our model.
9.2c General or Case Study
Having decided that a 'real world' research strategy is best 
suited to our purposes we are faced with a choice between a 
case study approach, which would take the form of a detailed
^For a discussion of the possibility of obtaining subjective 
reports of effort see Guest (1990).
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examination of the operation and effects of incentive pay in 
a particular company, or an empirical exercise which aims to 
reflect generality to some degree.
Much of the research to date in the field of incentive pay has 
been carried out under a case study strategy. Given the 
comparatively isolated incidence of companies practising 
formal incentive programmes, it is not surprising that 
particular firms are analyzed as 'showcase examples' (for 
example the John Lewis Partnership, studied by Bradley and 
Taylor (1992)). The case study approach typically benefits 
from a detailed picture of the contextual background, with 
opportunity for the sensitive consideration of qualitative 
aspects of the system and its effects.
The principal drawback of a case study strategy is 
methodological: with what justification can the findings of 
case study research be claimed to have a general 
applicability? If conclusions are drawn from the analysis of 
a specific case, prescriptive inductions are strictly valid in 
the context of that case only. This is limiting for testing 
a model such as ours which is explicitly general in its 
approach, delineating a boundary condition for traditional 
neoclassical models. Whilst it is true to say that particular 
case studies may achieve generality for their implications by 
feeding into a larger literature of other individual cases, in 
the analysis of values and their role in incentive pay no such 
body of evidence exists. To be able to claim general
1 3 1
applicability for our hypotheses, therefore, they must 
withstand falsification by data which is as reflective as 
possible of generality. Accordingly a survey approach is to 
be preferred to a case study at this stage in the research of 
the issue.
9.2d Time Series or Cross Sectional
A longitudinal (time-series) dataset which covered both the 
period before the introduction of an incentive payment system 
among employees and the period in which it operated would, on 
the face of it, be a suitable means for testing hypotheses HI 
to H14. The effects on effort of introducing more incentive 
pay could be clearly compared for those groups of employees 
who hold collectivistic values, and those who are more 
individualistic. In addition the change in values of subjects 
could be analyzed in response to the introduction of an 
incentive system. The major advantage of a time-series 
dataset is that the effects of a new system are made highly 
visible because they can be set against a benchmark of 
relevant behaviour associated with the previous system.
Compiling a time-series dataset presents difficulties to the 
researcher, however. Firstly collecting data on successive 
occasions imposes logistical and financial burdens: the number 
of companies which are about to introduce an incentive scheme 
at a particular time is likely to be fewer than the number 
currently practising such systems. In addition, identifying
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and securing access to these companies in advance is 
constrained by information and resources.
A second drawback of a time series-based strategy is the 
difficulty in determining whether any changes which are found 
to have taken place are a result of a change in the regime 
rather than the new system per se. An examination of 
employees' values and perceptions in the context of a mature 
payment system may be more dependable than one based on a 
context which is in flux. This is especially important in the 
context of Moorhouse's (197 6) view that it may take time for 
subjects to become cognizant of the values and motives which 
govern their behaviour in response to their environment. These 
factors combine to make it likely that a longitudinal survey 
of employees before and after the introduction of incentive 
pay will be confined to a very much smaller number of 
employees than would be possible if incentive pay systems were 
examined in situ by means of a cross-sectional strategy. 
Accordingly a time-series survey would tend towards a case- 
study type at the cost of the more representative analysis 
which we aim for.
A cross-sectional analysis takes a single picture of a sample 
of subjects as a basis for testing hypotheses. In doing so it 
runs the risk of attributing causal importance to conditions 
present in the snapshot picture which a cross-sectional sample 
provides, but which in truth are no more than stochastic 
phenomena. To counteract this problem, the size of a cross­
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sectional sample should be large in order to be able to 
minimise stochastic variability in observations.
A large, multi-period time series sample would seem to be the 
Ideal choice in a research strategy suited to testing our set 
of hypotheses. However, a more practical strategy would be a 
large, cross-sectional body of data.
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9.2e Research Instruments
Having determined that data collected to test our hypotheses 
should ideally be based on the subjective reports of actual 
employees on their behaviour at work, values and perceptions 
of performance-reward contingencies, we must specify a 
suitable research instrument to obtain these reports. Two 
principal options are available for this: an interview-based 
strategy and a questionnaire-based strategy.
There are many variants of an interview-type strategy, which 
range from the unstructured to the tightly structured. Given 
that we have certain clearly identified relationships which we 
wish to test, any interview strategy which we were to adopt 
would tend towards the structured. However, qualitative data 
which results from interviews is difficult to pool and derive 
the robust statistical inferences from which are appropriate 
to making defensible general statements. Indeed, the more one 
attempts to achieve commensurability of responses, the more 
one loses the richness of the qualitative nature of interview 
data. Drawing out general associations from a large set of 
interview data is a difficult task, since each case needs to 
be considered independently, and can contain inconsistencies 
deriving from the lack of complete replicability of 
interviews. For our purposes the interview is a tool which is 
unsuited to testing our model. In addition, in order to 
obtain a sample form which general inferences may be drawn, a 
large number of functions, firms, positions and geographical
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locations would need to be considered, with statistically 
significant numbers of observations in each category. This 
being the case, the resource cost of interviews, coupled with 
their unwieldy nature in the context of our purpose, lead us 
to reject them as the basis for an ideal research strategy.
The type of model which we have proposed, and the ambitions 
for general prediction which we have, make a large scale 
quantitative strategy appropriate. To obtain subjective 
responses from employees a questionnaire survey is the most 
appropriate means to effect it.
This is not to say that a questionnaire approach is without 
its drawbacks. The objectivity of a questionnaire as a 
research instrument is, as in the case of interviews, 
ambiguous. It can be argued to be, however unwittingly, 
'theory laden', so that it reflects the assumptions of its 
compiler. Moreover, the interpretation of questionnaires is 
open to ambiguity. If a person's questionnaire reports of his 
desires and aversions are voluntary responses it may be 
possible to explain them in terms of processes similar to 
those involved in other kinds of voluntary behaviour. That 
is, a statement that X is preferred to Y implies not that X is 
preferred to Y, but that the consequences of saying X outweigh 
those of saying Y. Accordingly, questionnaire instruments 
present an incentive compatibility problem which their design 
must address.
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The reaction to this criticism of questionnaire-based survey 
strategies is to reduce and de-emphasise the consequences 
attached to making responses of whatever sort. One means of 
doing so is to assure (and communicate the assurance of) the 
anonymity of responses.
There are, in addition, a number of reasons why questionnaire 
surveys in particular, and the analysis of subjects' self- 
reports in general, have been criticised as research 
strategies. It can be argued that even where further
consequences are not perceived to exist, subjects will make 
responses which may reflect the social desirability of certain 
answers, boosting the subject's own self-image.
Questionnaires may give rise to cognitive justification for 
actual behaviourial manifestations which may be sub-conscious: 
for example, an employee who exhibits superior performance 
behaviour may cognitively justify this behaviour as being 
effort-caused, whereas it may be due to non-personal factors 
such as available equipment, or non-controllable factors such 
as personal aptitudes. These problems associated with 
questionnaire-based research have not been resolved, and in 
the absence of a widely accepted solution we raise and 
acknowledge them as factors which attenuate the analysis of 
any questionnaire-based strategy.
9.2f An ideal research strategy: summary
The proceeding discussion has identified certain criteria
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which should be met in an ideal research strategy suited to 
testing empirically our hypotheses. Data should ideally be 
collected in a functioning enterprise, in a survey-format 
rather than a specific case-study. It should consist of 
subjects' own reports of their perceptions, values and 
behaviour, and is more usefully gathered by means of a 
questionnaire instrument rather than interviews. Time-series 
data is valuable in assessing the effects of introducing 
incentive pay, but suffers from drawbacks including the 
effects of change per se on responses, and on the greater 
problems of access and resources. Cross-sectional data must 
be collected in substantial quantity to overcome the potential 
for random variation to be accorded causal status.
9.3 An Available Dataset
In November 1988 the London School of Economics Business 
Performance Group conducted a large scale opinion survey among 
the managers and employees of fourteen companies which were 
owned by Expamet International pic. This was part of a joint 
consulting-research project with the company, which sought to 
gauge the opinions of the workforce on a set of issues which 
included job satisfaction, pay and benefits, work 
organisation, working conditions, commitment and trade 
unionism^ The dataset was available as a possible sample to
 ^ The project was funded by the parent group on the basis 
that the Business Performance Group would provide consulting 
reports based on the data, which would be available for use in 
research projects.
1 3 8
use to test empirically hypotheses HI to H14, To determine 
whether a secondary analysis of this data would be a suitable 
research strategy, we examined the characteristics of the 
dataset in the light of the ideal requirements discussed 
above.
Research Setting: The survey was conducted among the
employees of fourteen operating companies. The payment 
systems which prevailed were mature (no major changes having 
been made in the two years proceeding the surveys) and the 
median length of service of employees surveyed was between 4 
and 5 years. Questionnaires were administered to employees at 
their place of work, during working time. These factors 
establish that the objective of a 'real world' research 
setting is met by this sample.
Objective/Subjective: The survey used a questionnaire
instrument to obtain employees' subjective ratings: this is in 
accordance with the ideal strategy which was determined above 
for testing our model.
General survey/case study: The discussion above recommended
that a sample which was as representative as possible of 
companies widely should be used to test our model, which was 
explicitly general in its approach. While the dataset 
available referred to a single group of companies, the 
fourteen companies surveyed were diverse. Each business, had 
its own Chief Executive and management. The companies ranged
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from the very small (18 employees) to the moderately large 
(575 employees), in sectors which included building products, 
security services, metal components and software services. 
The 14 companies surveyed were distributed across England and 
Wales from Hartlepool to Bristol, Merseyside to Kent, as table 
9.1 illustrates.
Table 9.1 
Summary of Companies Surveyed
Company Location N o
Employees
APT Controls Ltd 
BAT Building Products Ltd 
Cash & Security Equipment 
CQR Security Systems Ltd 








Industrial Building Components Cleveland
Maximal Ltd 
Mayor Turnstiles Ltd 
Mitra Plastics Ltd 
Phoenix Controls Ltd 
Signfix Ltd 























The dataset was compiled from a cross-sectional survey: a
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snapshot of employees' opinions in 14 companies in November 
1988. The size of the sample is very large compared to 
previous samples used to test models of payment systems. 1265 
surveys were returned by employees of the 14 companies: a
response rate of 72 per cent of all employees of the 14 
companies.
All sections of the workforce in each company were surveyed, 
including managers, professional staff (eg engineers and 
accountants), clerical staff, salesmen and shop floor 
employees. Six hundred and thirty five employees (50,4 per 
cent) were classified as shop-floor workers; 189 (15 per cent) 
as managers; 206 (16.3 per cent) as supervisors; and 160 (12.7 
per cent) as clerical staff. This represents a more 
comprehensive dataset than many of those used in previous 
tests of models of payment systems, which have consisted of 
data from a single type of employee, usually managers (see, 
for example. Porter and Lawler (1968)).
The median age group of those surveyed was 31-40 with 8.8 per 
cent under the age of 21 and 18 per cent over 51.
Time-series or cross-sectional: In section 9.2d above we
discussed whether a time-series or cross-sectional dataset was 
best suited to testing our hypotheses. We argued that while 
cross sectional data did suffer from being unable to 
facilitate a 'before and after' analysis, it could be used in 
the context of a mature system in an analysis which included
1 4 1
a greater number of companies. For the distortions arising 
from stochastic error to be small, however, in a single 
snapshot sample, a large number of cases would need to be 
included in this survey. The size and breadth of the sample, 
discussed above, lead us to conclude that its cross-sectional 
design is acceptable as a sample for testing our hypotheses.
Survey Instrument: We identified, in section 9.2e above, a
questionnaire instrument as being the most appropriate for 
obtaining a data sample with which to test our hypotheses. 
The Expamet survey was based on administering a common 
questionnaire to the employees of all 14 companies. To ensure 
that responses were as candid as possible the confidentiality 
of responses was emphasised in keeping with the requirements 
of section 9.2e. Before the survey employees received a 
letter on London School of Economics paper emphasising the 
confidentiality of their responses, "No-one at your company 
will therefore see the responses to your questionnaire. We 
also stress that you should not write your name anywhere on 
the survey or envelope. This again will help ensure 
confidentiality to you."
In addition, the first page of the questionnaire included a 
similar assurance, "The questionnaire is completely 
confidential. Your name should not appear on any part. 
Furthermore, the computer at the London School of Economics 
will process all information so that no-one in your company 
will have access to your completed questionnaire." In
1 4 2
addition, employees had been told that the researchers were 
concerned with aggregate data, thus providing a structural 
basis for the assurances of anonymity.
Questions solicited responses on a five point Likert scale for 
most questions, with the scale ranging from 'strongly agree' 
to 'strongly disagree.'* Profiling data (such as sex, length 
of service and position in the company) required a specific 
response.
The questionnaires were administered to employees at their 
workplace, during working time. Questionnaires were
administered between 9 and 28 November 1988 sessions 
supervised by the researchers in the nine largest companies 
surveyed. These accounted for 89 per cent of respondents, and 
also 89 per cent of total employees in the 14 companies. The 
remaining five companies, accounting for 1 1  per cent of 
respondents and employees, were surveyed by providing 
employees with sealed envelopes for each questionnaire and a 
'ballot box' type receptacle at their workplace. These boxes 
were returned, unopened, to the London School of Economics by 
the companies.
The questionnaires contained 253 data points: a size very much 
larger than is usual in surveys of employees. The conditions
" For a discussion of the advantages of a five point Likert 
scale cf Van de Ven & Ferry (1980) . They suggest that a five 
point range is optimal and that it is difficult for respondents 
to differentiate degrees of intending with either a smaller or 
larger range.
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under which the questionnaires were administered, and the 
scale of the survey, made it a potentially extremely valuable 
resource. To replicate such a survey, which met each of our 
ideal criteria for a research strategy, would be extremely 
costly in terms of resources.
9.4 Conclusion
To a considerable extent conducting an analysis of the 
Business Performance Group survey would be consistent with the 
ideal research strategy which we described in section 9.2. 
However, analyzing this dataset in order to test empirically 
our hypotheses is clearly only possible if its content 
included acceptable proxies for the variables in our model. 
A first view of the questions asked suggested that some of 
them could be argued to reflect theoretical concepts in our 
model. In particular, data were obtained on the incidence of 
two dimensions of incentive pay: cash bonuses and employee
share ownership.
Appendix 1 lists the questions included in the survey which 
were thought to be potentially appropriate for testing our 
model. Appendix 2 describes the incentive pay elements in the 
companies surveyed.
Chapter Ten assesses whether these questions provide an 
adequate basis for constructing empirical proxies for the 
variables in our model.
1 4 4
CHAPTER TEN - DEFINING EMPIRICAL PROXIES
10.1 Introduction
Having derived a set of testable hypotheses, and specified a 
data sample which can be used to subject them to empirical 
scrutiny, we now develop empirical proxy variables for the 
variables contained in hypotheses HI to H14. In particular, 
suitable scales must be advanced to denote effort, valence, 
expectancy and instrumentality, and employees' value 
orientations.
10.2 Methodological Considerations
To obtain empirical proxies for the conceptual variables we 
construct a set of scales which comprise a number of questions 
designed to tap the conceptual variable in question.
Constructing such scales is preferred to advancing individual 
questions as empirical proxies in their own right. Gathering 
a number of different items in one scale widens the domain of 
possible scores, making distinctions between high, low and 
medium scores more robust. Furthermore, individual questions 
in the survey do not measure the conceptual variable directly, 
and may reflect the influences of a number of different 
conceptual variables. By constructing a scale of individual 
items these extraneous influences are averaged out, with the 
scale capturing that part of variation in the items which
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moves with the other hypothesised items, i.e. that part
hypothesised to reflect the conceptual variable being studied.
Means must be established to assess the suitability of 
constructs advanced as valid measures of a hypothetical 
variable. Two criteria in particular must be met: the
construct should display internal consistency and external 
consistency.
Internal consistency assesses the degree to which the
components of a construct can be said to reflect an 
overarching concept. For this to be satisfied the components 
must show some signs of varying together across different 
circumstances. In psychometric studies internal consistency 
is most commonly measured by Cronbach's coefficient Alpha (a), 
derived from the strength of correlations between seperate 
items of a construct. Nunnally (1967, p226) recommended that 
alphas of 0.5 and above should be regarded as denoting 
sufficient internal consistency for empirical constructs in 
basic research. Since we are embarking on an empirical 
investigation of psychological processes we adopt this 
convention as the criterion for internal consistency.
External consistency is the second criterion which an
empirical construct must satisfy. It assesses whether the
name of a hypothetical variable can be justifiably given to an 
empirical construct. For example, how can we say that a set
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of empirical items, which demonstrably move together,^ denote 
the concept of instrumentality? The requirement for external 
consistency can be thought to be satisfied in various ways. 
First, it can be demonstrated that a construct behaves 
similarly to other constructs purporting to measure a 
particular concept. Secondly, if the individual items of a 
construct can be shown to relate directly to the theoretical 
definition of the concept, the requirement for external 
consistency will be satisfied.
10.3 Effort
In Chapter Four we defined effort, for the purposes of 
investigating the effects of incentive pay, as a class of 
behaviour, cognitively and purposively supplied by 
individuals, which is expected to contribute positively to 
production. Since we argue that an essential characteristic 
of effort is that the agent is cognizant of his own behaviour 
in this respect, it follows that if the individual will report 
accurately on questions pertaining to his own effort, then an 
instrument of this type can be a practical means of obtaining 
empirical measures of effort. By taking effort-reports 
directly from the subject we can bypass the host of 
uncontrollable factors which, outside the laboratory, makes 
inferring effort from objectively observable, secondary 
phenomena (such as output per unit time), notoriously 
difficult. Against using agents' self-reports as an empirical
Thereby displaying internal consistency.
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proxy for effort, however, there exists the possibility that 
subjects will supply untruthful responses. This would 
introduce bias into the effort measure.
Insofar as supplying more effort is considered to be a 
desirable act - either personally, socially or professionally 
- subjects may tend to exaggerate upwards their responses to 
items which seek to represent their effort supplied; so-called 
'halo effects.' Two possibilities explain this. First, 
subjects may consider that their responses will be seen by 
someone who knows them it will be advantageous to exaggerate 
their responses since this could lead to professional 
advancement or social approval. In other words, the expected 
benefit of claiming to supply high levels of effort is 
positive. This possibility, however, is limited by the 
research conditions under which the survey was conducted. The 
name of the respondent did not appear on the questionnaire, 
company personnel were not involved in administering the 
questionnaire, and the confidentiality of the responses was 
explicitly emphasised. This would tend to lead to more 
truthful responses.
The second possible explanation for upward exaggeration of 
self-reported effort is that such behaviour boosts subjects' 
own self-image. However, if exaggeration is a general 
tendency on the part of respondents then we would expect, 
ceteris paribus, that the mean self-effort rating would be 
increased by a constant over its 'true' value. If we use
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effort reports as an indicator of relative effort rather than 
an absolute measure effort such a step increase in the mean of 
reports does not disturb our analysis.
In Chapter Four, we accepted the contribution of economic 
theory which emphasised the intractable interdependence of 
employees' behaviour in joint production companies and the 
productive benefits of peer group monitoring. To be in 
keeping with this contribution our empirical construct for 
effort, behaviour which contributes positively to production, 
should include items which reflect interaction between 
employees.
Five questions in the survey were designed to reflect employee 
effort: these are listed in table 10.1. Responses to the
items were obtained on a five-point Likert scale.^
1  = strongly agree
2 = tend to agree
3 = neither agree nor disagree
4 = tend to disagree





EFFi I am willing to put myself out to
help my company.
EFF2 I help and encourage fellow workers
in my team.
EFF3 It is important for employees to do
all they can to increase company 
profits.
EFF4 It is none of my business if workers
in my team sometimes take it easy on
the job.
EFF5 It is none of my business if workers
in my department sometimes take it
easy on the job
The correlation matrix of these five items shows that each 
item is correlated with the remaining items in the expected 
direction. Pearson's coefficient of correlation for each is 
significant at above the 99 per cent level. This matrix is 
reproduced as table 1 0 . 2
Table 10.2 
Effort Items: Correlation Matrix
Item 1 2 3 4 5
EFFi 1.0**
EFF2 0.2995** 1.0**
EFF3 0.2615** 0.3971** 1.0**
EFF4 -0.2769** -0.3203** -0.2670** 1.0**
EFF3 -0.3438** -0.3906** -0.3132** 0.6235** 1.0**
** significant at >99 per cent
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A principal components analysis of the five items demonstrated 
that a single common factor explained 48.3 per cent of the 
variation between the items. Table 10.3 reports the loading 
coefficients onto this factor.
Table 10.3 







Regression method factor scores were obtained, and used to 
construct a scale consisting of the five items. The scale, 
henceforth EFFORT, varies with a standard deviation of one 
about a mean of zero. Excluding cases which contained a 
missing value for one or more of the component items, 998 
cases had an EFFORT value computed. Coefficient Alpha for the 
scale was 0.72, comfortably exceeding the 0.5 accepted as the 
criterion for acceptable reliability.
10.4 Expectancy and Instrumentality
In Chapter Four we argued that the confidence placed in neo­
classical economic hypotheses of incentive pay could be 
increased by opening up the economists' black box of causality 
and specifying a complementary process of how incentive pay
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3could bring about effort. Expectancy theory provided the 
basis for this specification. It emphasised the role of 
subjectively held perceptions of the relationship between 
effort and extrinsic rewards^ in determining effort. Testing 
the model and the hypotheses derived requires us to obtain 
measurements of the relationship subjects perceive to exist 
between effort and extrinsic rewards (pay and recognition). 
Eight items contained in the questionnare were designed with 
the intention of capturing dimensions of expectancy and 
instrumentality. These questions are listed in table 10.4.





The success of my workplace
depends on a special effort EXPi
from its employees.
As an individual I can really
make a difference to the EXP2
success of my work team.
The way I do my job is very
important for the quality of EXP3
the work done in my work
team.
As an individual I can really
make a difference to the EXP
success of my department.
When I do a good job it gets EXP5
noticed.
My company has an effective
system to identify people for EXP^
promotion.
The amount of the annual cash 
bonus depends a lot on how EXP?
much effort employees put 
into their work.
The value of a share in Expamet 
depends a lot on the work
effort of employees. EXPg
Many previous empirical studies have conflated dimensions of 
the perceived effort-reward link to form a single expectancy 
measure. Testing hypotheses HI to H14, however, to determine 
the optional structure of the model imposes a requirement for 
empirical proxies for both the expectancy (effort-performance) 
and instrumentality (performance-reward) dimensions of the 
relationship. Table 10.5 summarises the a priori division of
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the items into expectancy or instrumentality dimensions, on 









To inyestigate the appropriateness of this a priori division 
the items, with the exception of EXP? and EXP/, were subjected 
to a principal components analysis. This showed that two 
common factors explained 60.4 per cent of the variance between 
the six variables. After a VARIMAX rotation, the variable 
loaded onto the two factors with the coefficients reported in 
table 10.6. By inspection, the pattern of these factor
loadings corresponds with the a priori expected scheme of
table 10.5.
The reason for excluding EXP? and EXPg are discussed below.
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Table 10.6 
Expectancy Items; Factor Loadings
Item Loadina Coefficient







Items within these two divisions were closely intercorrelated 
with the mean Pearson's r equal to 0.38 among items the a 
priori 'expectancy' group, and 0.4 6  for the 'instrumentality' 
group. In contrast the mean r was 0.17 between the items in 
both groups.
In the light of the correspondence between the behaviour of 
the items and the a priori scheme based on the questions' 
content, and supported by the strong intercorrelations of 
items within each group, regression-method factor scores were 
used to establish scales for factors 1 and 2, labelled E and 
Ij respectively. Each varied about a mean of zero, with a 
standard deviation of one. Coefficients alpha reflected the 
strong internal consistency of the measures, and the 0.5 
minimum requirement was comfortably exceeded with a. equal to 
0.71 and 0.63 respectively.
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Cash Bonuses & Profit Sharing
While E and Ij measures can be made for all members of the 
sample, items EXP? and EXPg apply only to subsamples: those 
covered by a cash bonus scheme, and employee shareholders 
respectively. The performance-related bonus and employee 
shareholdings increase the objective relationship between 
performance and pay for those employees covered by them. The 
perception that performance affects the size of the bonus or 
the value of shares is therefore an extra dimension of 
instrumentality applicable only to those covered by the 
respective schemes. The greater is the perceived link between 
performance and the size of the bonus or the value of shares, 
the greater is the instrumentality of performance for a 
particular employee. Accordingly EXP? and EXPg were recorded 
to form two possible increments in instrumentality for those 
covered by incentive pay schemes. EXP? was recoded to take the 
value one where the subject is (i) covered by a cash bonus 
scheme and (ii) perceives a positive link between the amount 
of the bonus and the work effort of employees,^ and zero 
otherwise. This variable was labelled Icb. EXPg was recoded to 
take the value one where (i) the employee owned Expamet shares 
and (ii) the employee feels that the value of a share depends 
on a lot on the work effort of employees.* It took the value
 ^ That is if the rating is 1 or 2 on the Likert scale for 
EXP?.
 ^ That is if the rating is 1 or 2 on the Likert scale for 
EXPg.
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zero otherwise. This variable was labelled Iso*
Four empirical proxies, E, I,, Icb and I go are therefore 
available as substitutes for the conceptual expectancy and 
instrumentality variables in the hypotheses to be tested.
10.5 Valence
Chapter Eight made the case that the usual means of 
operationalising valence for field tests of expectancy theory 
misrepresents the conceptual variable of the model. We argued 
that the empirical proxies used were based on an implicit 
assumption that the valence of pay is constant across 
increasing amounts of pay. The assumption was misleading, 
however: in a functioning pay system the anticipated
satisfaction from pay is a marginal concept whose behaviour 
departs radically from the ex ante valence of the model. To 
test the validity of this argument hypotheses H^ , H^ , Hj and 
were advanced as alternatives to the conventional approach. 
They required empirical proxies for the marginal valence of 
pay, and for the perceived level of pay received relative to 
that which would have been chosen.
Two items in the questionnaire corresponded in their content 
to this latter. They are listed as PAY, and PAY; in table 
10.7. Pearson's coefficient or correlation between the two 
items was 0.87, significant at above the 99 per cent level.
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We selected dimensions of valence to reflect its explicitly 
marginal nature in the context of a functioning pay system. 
To this end the importance attached to potential increases in 
pay was gauged. Three items in the questionnaire were thought 
to be at least partly representative of this. They are listed 
as VALENCE;, VALENCE, and VALENCE^ in table 10.7. The mean 
coefficient of correlation between the three items was 0.35, 
significant at above the 99 per cent level.
Table 10.7 
Pay & Marginal Valence Items
Question Label
I am well paid for what I do PAY;
I am satisfied with my basic PAYj
pay
My company should increase VALENCE;
the opportunities for paid
overtime
Training should lead to an VALENCE;
increase in wages
When new equipment is VALENCE,
introduced workers' basic pay 
should be increased
The items were considered using regression-equivalent factor 
scores from a principal components analysis, and formed two 
scales, VALENCE and PAY. Each varied by a standard deviation 
of one about a mean of zero. The alpha coefficients for these 
scales indicated internal consistency of well above that of 




In Chapter Seven we argued that the pretensions to 
universalisa of neo-classical economic and expectancy 
theoretic models of incentive pay ignored the assumptions of 
calculative individualism on which they are predicated. We 
claimed that individualism was part of a value set of people 
which varies between people and overtime. Hofstede (1980) 
suggested that individualistic and collectivistic values were 
poles of a single continuum. Hence, to demonstrate that a 
person is characterised by a relatively collectivistic value 
set is to classify him as holding relatively individualistic 
values. Etzioni (1975) showed that high levels of
individualism import a calculative disposition.
Testing hypotheses HI to H14 requires us to develop an 
individualism-collectivism scale. Five items in the
questionnaire tapped the relative collectivistic orientations 
of respondents, through opinions concerning trade unions, the 
principal agency for collectivism in the workplace, and, less 
specifically, reports of feeling part of an 'us and them' 
attitude. These items are listed as COLLECT; to COLLECT; in 
table 1 0 .8 .
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Table 10.8
Individualism - Collectivism Items
Question^
This is a 'them and us' 
relationship between department 




There is a 'them and us' 
relationship between very senior 
managers and all levels of 
employees.
COLLECT,
Should your company have a trade 
union?
COLLECT,
In.general unions and their 
representatives should have more 
say in decisions affecting the 
company as a whole.
COLLECT.
Local trade unions should have 
more power and influence in my 
company.
COLLECT,
The correlations between each of the items were all 
significant at above the 99 per cent level, and so the five 
were entered into a principal components analysis. A single 
common factor was found to explain 44 per cent of the variance 
between the items. The items loaded onto this factor with the 
loading coefficients reported in table 10.9.
’ All responses are obtained on a 5 point Likert scale where
1 = strongly agree
2 = tend to agree
3 = neither agree nor disagree
4 = tend to disagree
5 = strongly disagree
except COLLECT] where 1 = Yes, 2 = No
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Table 10.9







Regression method factor scores were used to construct a scale 
of the items, hereafter COLLECT, which varied with a standard 
deviation of one about a mean of zero. Coefficient alpha for 
COLLECT is 0.64 indicating that its internal consistency 
comfortably exceeds the minimum of 0.5 specified by Nunnally 
(1967) .
10.7 Conclusion
We have established a set of empirical proxies for the 
conceptual variables in hypotheses HI to H14, The scales 
obtained are based on responses to the questions contained in 
the survey described in Chapter Nine. Nunnally (1967) 
suggested that a coefficient alpha value of 0.5 should be 
regarded as indicating sufficient external consistency for 
basic research. Each scale developed exceeds this, the 
minimum alpha for our set of scales being 0.61, and the mean 
alpha equal to 0.71. Thus we can say that the scales do meet 
the criterion of internal consistency.
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The scales should also have external validity. The questions 
asked were designed in order to tap the particular concepts we 
consider, but another means to ensure external validity is to 
establish the consistency of the measures with others which 
aim to tap the same concepts. In this case a conformity of 
the results of using our empirical variables with those of 
previous operationalisations of expectancy-type models will 
tend to establish further the external consistency of our 
measures. Another means of establishing external consistency 
is the Friedman (1953) route of demonstrating the predictive 
power of the hypothesised measurement instruments. If using 
them permits useful hypotheses to be made which survive 




CHAPTER ELEVEN - RESULTS: MODEL STRUCTURE (VALENCE)
11.1 Introduction
In Chapter Eight we argued that the valence of pay was likely 
to be subject to diminishing returns: the more an employee had 
earned, relative to his target level of pay, the smaller would 
be his anticipated satisfaction from pay. The implication of 
this argument is that conventional tests of expectancy theory 
are mis-specified because they assume that field test 
recordings of valence are suitable empirical proxies for ex 
ante valence. This approach was made testable by the 
specification of hypotheses to compete with those implied by 
the conventional approach. Chapter Ten established scales to 
act as empirical proxies for the variables named in the 
hypotheses.
11.2 Valence and Expectancy/Instrumentality
Conventional tests of expectancy theory assume that measured 
valence and the effort-pay expectancy are independent. We 
have posited a competing set of hypotheses which states that 
the effort-pay expectancy (along with perceptions of pay) 
determine measured valence. Hence:
H3 : Measurable valence will be high when expectancy and
instrumentality are perceived as low and pay is 
perceived as low.
H4 : Measurable valence will be low when pay is perceived
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as high.
H5: Measurable valence will be low when expectancy and
instrumentality are perceived as low.
Hypotheses H3, H4 and H5 predict that measured valence reports 
will fall into two separate groups:
when pay is thought low and the effort-pay expectancy is 
thought low, valence will be high;
otherwise, valence will be low.
Table 11.1 compares mean VALENCE levels for two groups formed 
by dichotomising the variables PAY, E and I at their medians. 
In addition, the second group is further disaggregated into 
its three component sub-groups in table 1 1 .2 .
Table 11.1 
Measured Valence & low pay & expectancy perceptions
Groups
low E or I 
low pay
423








* significant at >95 per cent 
■* significant at >99 per cent
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The mean VALENCE of the low pay expectancy group was indeed 
significantly higher than that of the rest of the sample. We 
can reject with over 99 per cent confidence the proposition 
that in the population VALENCE is the same when expectancy and 
pay are low as for the remaining combinations of expectancy 
and pay perceptions.
What of the homogeneity of the 'rest of the sample' grouping? 
Table 11.2 disaggregates this group into its component parts, 
reporting the mean VALENCE for each. The table shows that the 
differences between the mean VALENCE reports for the three 
sub-groups are much smaller than that between them and the low 
pay - low expectancy group. None is significantly different 
from the remainder of the sample at the 99 per cent level.
Table 11.2 
Rest of Sample: Measured Valence
Groups N mean VALENCE (Std Dev) t‘
high E and I 
high pay
152 -0.1553 (1.071) 0.08
low E or I 266 0.0131 (0.860) -2.60*
high E and I 
low pay









‘ t-statistic refers to difference of mean from mean of 'rest of
sample' (reported in table 11.1)
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Figure 11.1 Measured Valence and Pay Expectancy Perceptions






- 0.2 High Expecloncy Low Expectoncy High Expeeloncy 
High Pay High Pay
Figure 11.1 depicts graphically table 11.1. It confirms that 
when pay is thought to be low and the possibility of attaining 
more pay through higher effort is thought low, then measured 
valence is high. Hence measured valence is not independent of 
expectancy/instrumentality perceptions. This is in keeping 
with hypotheses H3, H4 and H5.
11.3 Valence and Effort
Key to the conventional form of the expectancy model is the 
hypothesis that subject to positive expectancy-instrumentality 
perceptions being held, effort supplied varies positively with 
measured valence. The implication of our economic analysis in 
section 8.3, however, was that effort and measured valence 
were determined independently by factors which included
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expectancy and instrumentality perceptions. According a 
negative association between effort and measured valence was 
predicted; hence hypothesis H6 was advanced:
H6: Effort and measured valence will be negatively
associated
Table 11.3 
Measured Valence & Effort*
Crosstabulation
High VALENCE Low VALENCE
% %
High EFFORT 7.9 10.7
Low EFFORT 4 9.4 32.5
Chi squared =5.52** (N = 243, 1 degree of freedom) 
Correlation
Variables N Pearson's r
VALENCE & 243 -.2484**
EFFORT
** significant at >99 per cent 
* for employees reporting high expectancy
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Table 11.3 reports a marked negative association between 
effort and measured valence, as analyzed by dichotomising 
EFFORT and VALENCE into high and low groups at their 
respective medians. The Chi squared coefficient of 5.52 (with 
one degree of freedom) indicates that the association is 
significant in the direction predicted by hypothesis H6 at a 
level of over 99 per cent. The coefficient of correlation of 
-0.25 between EFFORT and VALENCE, which is again significant 
at the 99 per cent level lends further support to hypothesis 
H6. Measured valence is demonstrably negatively associated 
with effort.
11.4 Other Empirical Studies
Many previous tests of expectancy theory in the field have 
included operationalisations of valence which measured valence 
in the context of an operating pay system and used it as a 
proxy for ex ante valence*. Such tests have revealed, in 
keeping with our suggestions, that valence has proved to be 
the most uncertain variable. Mitchell's (1974) review of the 
empirical literature concluded, "it appears as if weighting 
expectancies or instrumentalities by valences may not markedly 
increase the prediction of job effort. Since no-one has 
proposed formally an expectancy model without valence weights 
it is difficult to call this a competing theory. The issue is 
still without resolution as to the role of these weights."
* cf Peotich & Churchill (1981) for a survey
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Lawler & Suttle (1973) recorded that it was not clear whether 
the negative results [i.e. the insignificant role of valence 
in field tests] were due to problems with the measure or to 
the fact that valence does not influence effort as stated by 
expectancy theory.
The approach developed in Chapter Eight provided an 
explanation, theoretically-based, and which was supported by 
the empirical tests which we have reported above. Other 
empirical studies also provide evidence for the particular 
predictions of this approach.
For example Oliver (1974) in a field study of insurance agents 
working under a bonus system scored the measured valence of 
pay on a six point desirable-undesirable range. He found:
(i) that measured valence was not a significant 
determinant of performance (our H6 posited that it was 
merely a covariate);
(ii) that measured valence was highly correlated with the 
effort-pay expectancy (our H3, H4 and H5 predicted that 
measured valence was partially determined by this 
expectancy).
Oliver's results support precisely the predictions of our 
hypotheses.
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Lawler (1971) observed that "a good deal of evidence shows 
that as one considers higher and higher levels within an 
organization, pay becomes less important." This phenomenon 
Lawler does not explain. It can, however, be seen to support 
our thesis that measured valence is not constant but declines 
as pay is accumulated (subject to the plausible assumption 
that higher positions bring with them more pay) This is 
borne out in our own sample: figure 11.2 shows that the mean 
measured valence of pay declines for higher positions in the 
corporate hierarchy.
Figure 11.2 Measured Valence and Position in Company
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- Managerial positions in the companies surveyed are indeed 
better paid than other levels. Hypothesis H4 predicts that 




Empirical evidence presented here has supported our contention 
that field tests of expectancy theory are mis-specified when 
they include a proxy for valence which is measured in the 
context of the functioning pay system. We have demonstrated 
that the behaviour expected from such an operationalisation 
differs markedly from that implied by the orthodox expectancy 
model. Accordingly, making use of such proxies introduces 
unexplained variation into the model and should be avoided. 
Until an adequate proxy for ex ante valence can be developed, 
cross-sectional field tests should not weight^ expectancies 
and instrumentalities by measured valence.
As Mitchell has pointed out, doing so does not seriously 
disturb predictive power. Accordingly the expectancy model 
will be specified excluding the measured valence variable.
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CHAPTER TWELVE - RESULTS: MODEL STRUCTURE (OPTIMIZATION)
12.1 Introduction
In Chapter Six we argued that the assumption of optimization 
underlying neo-classical economics and expectancy theory was 
over-restrictive. In practice peoples' computational
abilities were insufficient to replicate strict optimization, 
so that less rigorous means of combining relevant variables 
were used. This conjecture made the orthodox postulate, that 
expectancy and instrumentality must be multiplicatively 
combined, questionable in its usefulness: by following the 
Popperian prescription of altering the specification of the 
model to correspond more closely to what is known about the 
decision-making process, we may enhance the predictive power 
of the model. In Chapter Eight we derived a set of hypotheses 
summarising these alternative positions. Chapter Ten compiled 
a set of empirical proxies advanced as being suitable for 
testing the hypotheses. In this chapter we test the 
hypotheses to determine whether the strict multiplicative or 
non-multiplicative specification of the model is more 
appropriate.
In the past only a small number of direct comparisons of 
multiplicative and non-multiplicative forms have been made. 
Yet the form of the model reflects a fundamental theoretical 
assumption of economic rationality. This Chapter will show 
that the non-multiplicative expectancy model carries
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significally greater explanatory power than the orthodox 
approach. This supports our hypothesis that global economic 
rationality does not always characterise human decision­
making. Prescriptive models of incentive pay should recognise 
this in their assumptions made.
12.2 Testing the Multiplicative Specification
The standard expectancy model which we have hypothesised is of 
the form:
W = E. I 4
where W = effort
E = expectancy 
I = instrumentality
Hypothesis H7 and Hypothesis H8 postulated:
H7: Expectancy and instrumentality predict a
significant proportion of effort
H8: The interaction of expectancy and
instrumentality is a significant predictor of 
effort
To test these hypotheses we operationalised equation 4 by 
estimating it as an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
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equation with the empirical proxies for VI, E and I taking the 
place of the conceptual variables. The independent variables 
were dichotomised at their medians to denote 'high' and 'low' 
levels of expectancy and instrumentality.
12.3 Results: Multiplicative Specification
The results of the OLS regression estimation of equation 4 are 
reported in table 12.1. Dummy variables representing high and 
low expectancy and instrumentality explain, when combined 
multiplicatively, around 18 per cent of the variability of 
EFFORT across the sample of 979 employees from whom valid 
responses were obtained. The estimated equation has an F 
statistic of 221.4, indicating that we can reject with over 99 
per cent confidence the possibility that there is no 
relationship between the independent variables and EFFORT in 
the population from which the sample is drawn. The 
interaction of El and II is highly significant, with a t- 
statistic of 14.9, significant at over 99 per cent.
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Table 12.1
Model Specification: The Multiplicative Form 
Dependent Variable: EFFORT
Independent B (Std Error) t
Variable*
El 0.9815 (0.0660) .4296 14.88**
(constant) -0.2425 (0.0334) 7.26**
Adjusted R* = 0.1837 
F (1,978) = 221.4
[^0.01(1,978) ~ 6-70]
** significant at over 99 per cent
Table 12.1 provides empirical support to hypothesis H7: 
expectancy and instrumentality exhibit a significant 
association with effort. The results also offer preliminary 
support for hypothesis H8: the interaction term, El, which 
proxies the multiplicative combination of expectancy and 




El expectancy ('E dichotomised at median)
II instrumentality (1 dichotomised at median)
El interaction of expectancy and
instrumentality (El multiplied by 11)
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Table 12.2 summarises the predictive power of previous 
operationalisations of the multiplicative expectancy model. 
It is noteworthy that the statistic for our test compares 
favourably with those resulting from other empirical studies.
Table 12.2 
Model Specification: The Multiplicative Form - Comparison of
Test N
(Table 12.1) 0.1837 979
Schwab et al. 0.1369 29 published
tests
In a survey of the predictive power of multiplicative 
expectancy models, Schwab et al (1979) reported an average 
of 0.1369 for 29 published studies using, like us, effort 
self-reports as the dependent variable. This is broadly in 
line with the R^  of 0.1837 reported in table 12.1. Table 12.2 
confirms, therefore, that our measurement instruments perform 
as proxies for expectancy theory variables at least as well as 
those previously employed.
The fact that our instruments yield similar results to studies 
using different tools lends credence to the underlying 
validity of the expectancy approach: it is supported over a 
range of measurement instruments designed to test it. In 
addition, the conformity of our results with those of previous
1 7 7
tests lends confidence to the empirical proxies constructed in 
Chapter Ten and used in the above test.
However, in common with previous tests, our operationalisation 
of the expectancy model leaves a substantial proportion of 
variability in effort reports unaccounted for: over 82 per 
cent, as reported by table 12.1. While variation between 
people is to be expected in cross sectional analysis, it is 
nevertheless the case that the greater the predictive power of 
the model, the more confidence practitioners can have in its 
prescriptions for the design of pay systems.
12.4 Testing the Non-Multiplicative Specification
In their review of empirical tests of multiplicative 
expectancy models reported above, Schwab et al (1979) admitted 
to "a nagging suspicion that expectancy theory over- 
intellectualises the cognitive processes people go through 
when choosing between alternative actions." Chapter Eight 
advanced a rationale, based on behaviourial analysis of 
decision process, for departing from the strict global 
rationality underlying traditional expectancy theory. Can an 
expectancy-type model which departs from the strict 
multiplicative specification better explain effort in 
practice? Hypothesis H9 was advanced as an alternative to H8. 
H9 states:
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H9: Non-multiplicative combinations of expectancy
and instrumentality predict a greater 
proportion of effort . than does a 
multiplicative combination.
In place of equation 4, the particular functional form is left 
open, hence
W = f (E, 1) 5
is proposed.
12.5 Results: Non-Multiplicative Specification
Using the empirical proxies developed in Chapter Ten, the 
dependent variable EFFORT, and independent variables El, 11 
and El were subjected to a stepwise hierarchical OLS 
regression analysis with P(E)>.95 as the criterion for entry 
into the OLS equation. Table 12.3 summarises the results of 
this stepwise regression. El and 11 represent the expectancy 
and instrumentality proxies dichotomised into high and low 






step Independent Adjusted /S t
Variable'
1 El 0.2429 0.4936 17.75**
2 II 0.2898 0.2180 8.09**
Not Selected El 0.0641 1.36
N= 979
Table 12.3 shows that a non-multiplicative specification of 
the expectancy model fits the sample data better than a 
multiplicative specification. While both the expectancy and 
instrumentality variables entered the equation significantly 
(and were significant at more than 99 per cent confidence) , 
the interaction terms El did not attain a level of 
significance to justify its inclusion. The F-statistic of the 
equation after stage 2 of the stepwise analysis was 200.7, 
suggesting that we can reject with over 99 per cent confidence
Empirical proxies represent:
EFFORT employee effort
El expectancy (E dichotomised at median)
II instrumentality (I dichotomised at median)
El interaction of expectancy and
instrumentality (El multiplied by Ii;
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the proposition that the population Beta coefficients are 
equal to zero. The equation explains almost 3 0 per cent of 
the variance of the effort reports of 979 employees, an 
increase of over 10 per cent on the proportion explained by 
the multiplicative specification. This increase in predictive 
power is significant at the 99 per cent level.
Table 12.4 summarises the increase in associated with the 
non-multiplicative model.
Table 12.4





** significant at >99 per cent
Accordingly the evidence summarised in table 12.4 leads us to 
prefer hypothesis H9 to H8: a strictly multiplicative 
specification of the expectancy model circumscribes its 
predictive power.
12.6 Implications of results
That an additive model of effort and expectancy and
1 8 1
instrumentality has greater explanatory power than a 
multiplicative model has important implications. It reports 
that even when subjects feel that the link between performance 
and extrinsic rewards is tenuous, they will still tend to 
supply higher effort if they feel that they can influence 
their own performance by so doing. Conversely, a perception 
that affecting measured performance through personal effort is 
uncertain will not prevent a worker supplying high levels of 
effort if he feels that there is a pronounced relationship 
between performance and rewards.
These results argue against a narrowly rationalistic 
conception of human decision making, and resonate with 
behaviourial models discussed earlier. If assessing the 
interaction effects of expectancy and instrumentality is more 
mentally demanding than considering each variable in 
isolation, then the additive model found to fit best accords 
with Leibenstein's (1976) view that humans dislike the first 
mode of calculation and therefore avoid it. Similarly the 
findings accord with Simon's theory of bounded rationality, in 
which the full consequences of a decision on other variables 
(ie their interaction) are not consistently assessed.
Mitchell (1982, p3 59) concludes that "people do not compute 
probabilities and values, multiply them together, add the 
products, and base their choice on these computations. It is 
far too taxing and complex a process." This necessitated 
"questioning some basic theoretical assumptions inherent in
1 8 2
expected value formulations."
So much is not in doubt: the underlying assumptions of
Rational Economic Man are frequently departed from in 
practice. Chapter Six referred to the substantial theoretical 
literature establishing reasons for this. Nevertheless, the 
tenacity of the approaches founded on Rational Economic Man 
assumptions derives from its demonstrated usefulness in 
prediction. For it to be departed from an alternative must be 
advanced which improves the explanatory and predictive power 
of the models which incorporate it. Table 12.4 provides 
evidence, from a particularly large and broad sample, that 
this is the case in the context of effort and pay.
Previous attempts have been made to determine the 
appropriateness of the optimizing assumption of rational 
economic man reflected in the multiplicative form. However, 
as Schwab et al (197 0) point out, only a small number of 
direct comparisons of multiplicative and additive models have 
been made. Those which have^ report mixed findings, and none 
was made outside the United States. The increasing incidence 
of incentive pay in Britain in recent years makes it necessary 
to consider the applicability of its theoretical 
underpinnings. Evidence from our sample suggests that a non- 
multiplicative expectancy model has greater explanatory power 
than the orthodox interaction model.
 ^eg Schwab & Dyer (1973), Lawler & Suttle (1973), Behling 
et al (1978)
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12.7 Direction of Causality
Given that our sample in cross-sectional rather than time- 
series, the test results reported have a correlational rather 
than causal status. As such it could be argued that the 
causality which we hypothesise, running from expectancy and 
instrumentality perceptions to effort, does not hold: rather 
that reports of effort supplied form the basis of the 
subject's report of his expectancy and instrumentality 
perceptions.
As a cross-sectional study the possibility of such reversed 
causality cannot be completely refuted. However, confidence 
in the causality for which we argue is substantially supported 
by the results reported in table 12.2. Table 12.2 establishes 
a consistency between our findings and the body of previous 
evidence relating to expectancy models. Since this body of 
evidence includes time-series as well as cross-sectional 
tests, the causal role of expectancy and instrumentality in 
determining effort in our sample can be inferred.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN - RESULTS: BOUNDARY CONDITION (INDIVIDUALISM)
13.1 Introduction
Chapter Seven was concerned with the boundary conditions of 
neo-classical models of incentive pay. It argued that, being 
predicated on a value set of calculative individualism, the 
models would be powerful predictors of behaviour among people 
whose values corresponded to those implicitly assumed. Where 
such values did not apply substantial predictive power was not 
to be expected from the models. A set of hypotheses 
representing this argument was advanced: hypotheses which we 
subject to empirical scrutiny in this chapter.
The results which we report show that the power of our 
incentive model was significantly greater among relatively 
individualistic employees than among their collectivistic 
colleagues. In OLS regression specifications of the model,
37.1 per cent of variation in individualists' effort was 
explained by the model, compared with 17.9 per cent among 
collectivistic employees.
These findings were robust to situational influences, such as 
the employees' position in the company, age and level of 
education. The model was markedly more successful in 
predicting the effort supplied by individualistic managers, 
for example, than among collectivistic managers. The 
importance of values as a boundary condition seems not to be
1 8 5
a result of the construct being a covariate of other, 
situational variables. We therefore conclude that the values 
axis has an important role in delineating the power of our 
incentive model.
13.2 Consistent Values & Incentive Pay
Hypothesis HIO stated:
HIO: The predictive power of the model will be greater 
among employees of relatively individualistic value 
sets than among employees of relatively 
collectivistic value sets.
In the light of the findings of Chapters Eleven and Twelve, we 
test this hypothesis using the non-multiplicative structure of 
the model.
The most commonly used indicator of the predictive power of a 
model specified in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression form is R~, the Coefficient of Determination of the 
estimated form. R~ indicates the proportion of variance of the 
dependent variable in the sample which is explained by the 
model. To the extent that the sample is representative of the 
population, the R~ coefficient is an estimator of the model's 
ability to predict the value of the dependent variable in the
1 8 6
population. ‘
In order to distinguish members of the sample of relatively 
individualistic values (and therefore, after Etzioni (1975), 
relatively calculative values) from those of relatively 
collectivistic values, each case was allocated to one of two 
equal groups (each N=4 09) according to whether its COLLECT 
score was above the median (forming a group labelled 'high 
COLLECT') or below the median (to form a group labelled 'low 
COLLECT'). Separate regression equations were estimated for 
each group, and the structure and predictive power of the best 
fitting form were compared.^
13.3 Individualistic values: Results
Table 13.1 reports the results of estimating equation 5 as a 
stepwise, hierarchical regression equation among members of 
the sample classified as being of a relatively individualistic
‘ Since the best-fitting equation is estimated for the 
particular sample in question, the Coefficient of Determination 
is usually interpreted as indicating the maximum predictive power 
the model will have if applied to the population.
 ^ An apparently obvious method of determining the importance 
of collectivistic-individualistic values would be to include the 
empirical variable COLLECT as another independent variable in the 
regression equation, and assess its contribution by applying the 
equation to the whole sample. This method, however, would assess 
the effect of the collectivistic-individualistic value axis on 
EFFORT directly. It would not indicate the differences in the
predictive power of the model (which is advanced as being 
comprehensive and universal) between subjects of differing values 
sets. Since our purpose is to investigate a possible boundary 
condition of certain incentive models, the direct effects of 



















































Adjusted R- = 0.3712 F (4,390) = 59.14
[Ffo.ov (4,390) =  3.4]








expectancy ("E dichotomised at median) 
instrumentality (1 dichotomised at median) 
additional instrumentality associated with 
bonus
additional instrumentality associated with 
owning shares in company
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R- for subjects of individualistic values was 0.3719, 
indicating that the model explained nearly forty per cent of 
the variation in EFFORT for these employees. This figure is 
significantly higher than that for the whole sample 
undifferentiated by their value set: there the model explained 
only 28.9 per cent of EFFORT"*.
The results contained in Table 13.1 show that our incentive 
model explains a significant proportion of the effort of 
individualistic employees. For Hypothesis HIO to be supported 
we should expect that among relatively collectivistic 
employees, the explanatory power of the model will be lower, 
thus highlighting the importance of the assumed value set. 
Section 13.4 assesses the power of the model among relatively 
collectivistic employees.
13.4 Collectivistic Values: Results
Table 13.2 reports the results of estimating equation 5 as a 
stepwise, hierarchical regression equation among members of 
the sample classified as being of a relatively collectivistic 
value set.
Reported in table 12.3.
1 9 0
Table 13.2









































Adjusted R- = 0.1786
* significant at above 99 per cent
** significant at above 95 per cent
F(3,397) = 30.0
[F(O.Ol) (3,397) = 3.7;
The predictive power of the model applied to employees of 
relatively collectivistic values was considerably lower than 







expectancy (E dichotomised at median) 
instrumentality (1 dichotomised at median) 
additional instrumentality associated with 
owning shares in company
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values, and also for the sample as a whole. The Coefficient 
of Determination {R-) for the best-fitting equation indicated 
that the model explained 17.9 per cent of the EFFORT of 
collectivistic employees. This compared with 37.1 per cent 
for individualistic employees and 28.9 per cent for the sample 
as a whole.
13.5 Summary: The Boundary Condition and Predictive Power
Hypothesis HIO claimed that the predictive power of the model 
would be greater among individualistic subjects than among 
collectivistic employees. Using R-, the Coefficient of 
Determination of the regression equation, as an indicator of 
predictive power, table 13.3 and figure 13.1 summarise the 
evidence pertinent to testing HID.






Whole sample^ 979 0.2898
 ^ Missing values among one or more of the items in the scales 
account for the number in the two sub-samples not summing to the 
number of cases in the whole sample.
’ Results from table 13.2.
* Results from table 13.1.
’ Results from table 12.3.
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Table 13.3 and figure 13.1 show that the model explains over 
37 per cent of the variation in effort reports of employees of 
relatively individualistic value sets, compared with less than 
18 per cent for relatively collectivistic subjects. This 
constitutes striking evidence in support of hypothesis HIO. 
The model is considerably more successful in its predictive 
power for individualists than it is for collectivistic 
employees. In addition, a significant advance in the model's 
power is made by respecting the boundary condition of 
individualism rather than applying it without regard to 
values. Therefore we can say that models which are tested 
over undifferentiated samples risk mis-stating their true 
power: in certain circumstances the models are effective
frameworks in which to predict effort, in others they are
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considerably less powerful. Moreover these circumstances can 
be identified with the extent to which the values of subjects 
are consistent with the underlying assumptions concerning them 
which are made in expectancy theoretic, and other neo­
classical models.
13.6 Discussion: Structure
A comparison of tables 13.1 and 13.2 reveals a number of 
important differences in the structure of the best-fitting 
regression equations between the relatively collectivistic and 
individualistic groups.
While El, the expectancy that individual effort affects 
performance, is a significant determinant of effort supplied 
for both sub-samples, its influence is greatest amongst 
employees of individualistic values: its beta coefficient is 
0.52 compared with 0.38 for the collectivistic group. This 
implies that the relationship between individual effort and 
measured performance, one of the key dimensions of the 
expectancy model of incentive pay, and the neo-classical 
economic model (in representing potential for free-riding (cf 
Section 5.7), is more important in determining effort among 
individualistic than collectivistic employees.
The second principal difference in the structure of the two 
equations is that, while share ownership was significant in 
both sub-samples (with similar beta coefficients), the
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instrumentality of the cash bonus was a significant 
determinant of effort only for relatively individualistic 
employees. For this group it was more important in 
determining effort than the share-ownership instrumentality. 
On objective grounds the perception that the reward (share 
price growth or size of bonus) depends on performance should 
be lower for share ownership than for the cash bonus since the 
bonus always refers to a group smaller than that of the listed 
company. This is borne out in the individualistic sub-sample, 
but among collectivistic employees the role of the 
instrumentality of share ownership is significant in 
determining effort while that of the cash bonus is not. Thus, 
collectivistic subjects are motivated by the more collective 
benefits, while individualists recognise that free-riding is 
less a problem in the cash bonus than share-ownership.
13.7 Values and Situational Variables
A potentially important objection to our analysis is that the 
values variables which we have employed are no more than 
covariates of other, more important variables which we have 
omitted from our analysis. In consequence the results reflect 
not the role of values, but these other omitted variables.
In Chapter Seven we identified two sources of peoples' value 
orientations: innate dispositions, acquired either genetically 
or in the subjects formative years; and internalised social 
norms.
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It is consistent with this twin conception of values that 
other, situational variables may shape a subject's values and 
hence his behaviour. Managers may express themselves as 
individualists because their job requires individualistic 
behaviour. Shopfloor work may tend to be more team-based and 
mould a value set which is predominately collective. Years in 
education may have inculcated a set of individualistic values 
in some employees at the expense of a collectivistic 
orientation which may have resulted from starting work at the 
age of fifteen.
Since we have assumed that values may be shaped by the 
internalisation of social norms we concede, and indeed expect, 
that such factors as position in the work hierarchy will shape 
a person's values. Accordingly we need some criterion for 
judging whether it is not more useful to examine the influence 
of position in the company on behaviour directly rather than 
to do so through values. The criterion which we adopt is to 
retain the values discriminator if it contributes to 
predictive power over and above that conveyed by deferring to 
a set of situational variables thought to determine values.
Accordingly respondents' position in the organization, age, 
gender and level of education attained were examined in two 
ways.
Firstly, if the values axis were no more than a covariate of 
these situational variables, then segmenting the sample by
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these variables directly should be a more accurate means of 
specifying the model's boundary conditions that referring to 
values. Thus the model's predictive power should be more 
polarised if the sample were segmented by these situational 
variables. If, on the other hand, the values axis carries 
explanatory power over and above that given by situational 
variables, the polarisation of predictive power should be 
greater for these segmentation according to the presence of 
individualistic or collectivistic values.
Secondly, if situational variables convey the majority of 
information summarised in the values axis, then having 
segmented the sample by reference to these variables, the 
values dimension should contain little discriminatory power 
within the sub groups. Figures 13.2 to 13.5 assess these 
expectations
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13.7a Position in Company
Figure 13.2a Predictive power of Model 
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Figure 13.2a shows that limiting the ambit of the model to 
subjects of four occupational levels does not result in its 
predictive power attaining the level {R- = 0.37) achieved by 
segmenting the sample according to the collectivistic 
individualistic value dimension.
Figure 13.2b Difference in Associated with 
Individualistic/Collectivistic Values
S u p e r\'is o rs
OZi)
Clericol Workers Shopfloor Workers 
( I5J) (457>
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Figure 13.2b shows that the presence or absence of 
individualistic values has a powerful discriminating role in 
assessing the fit of the model. In each division of the 
sample, further restricting the domain to subjects of 
relatively individualistic value sets increases the above 
that which results when applying the model to the more 
collectivistic employees in the grouping.
13.7b Age
As figure 13.3a illustrates, the model's fit is not improved 
by restricting its application to employees of particular age 
groups, rather than of a particular value set.
Moreover, within each one of the five age groups, introducing 
the collective values dimension as a boundary condition 
continues to lead to sharp polarisations in the model's 
predictive power. In the 21 to 30 year old group, for 
example, the coefficient of determination is 0.3 3 when the 
model is estimated for relatively individualistic employees, 
and only 0.16 when applied to relatively individualistic 
employees.
1 9 9








<21 (76) 21-30 (278) 31-40 (204) 41-50 ( 191) 51+  ( 139)
Age Group
13.7c Educational Level
In order to assess the role of the level of education attained 
as a more powerful means of describing the boundary condition 
of the model, the questionnaire supplied us with the age at 
which respondents left full time education as the closest 
proxy. The sample was therefore divided into three groups: 
those leaving school below 17 years of age (as a proxy for 
employees educated up to secondary level); those leaving 
education between the ages of 17 and 19 inclusive 
(approximately to A-level or equivalent employees) ; and those 
leaving education at the age of twenty or above (approximately 
to higher or further educated workers).
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Figure 13.4a shows that dividing the sample in this way is not 
as successful in specifying employees for whom the model has 
greatest predictive power as referring to the individualistic 
values dimension. Further, figure 13.4b demonstrates that 
within each educational group, discriminating by individualism 
leads to substantial differences in the predictive power of 
the model.
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13.7d Gender
Dividing the sample into male and female groups (figure 13.5a) 
showed that the model was more powerful amongst male 
respondents than among women. Within both groups, however, 
predictive power could be polarised further by taking into 
account whether the respondent fell into the relatively 
individualistic or collectivistic category, (figure 13.3b)
Figure 13.5a Predictive power of the Model by Gender
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13.7e Conclusion
Figures 13.2 to 13.5 show very clearly that the 
appropriateness of the incentive model to relatively 
individualistic employees is not undercut by taking account of 
their gender, age, educational level or position in the 
company. Rather the values dimension emerges with its 
usefulness as a parsimonious and powerful discriminator 
confirmed. Within each situational group, taking account of 
the relative individualism of subjects allowed their behaviour 
to be predicted more accurately.
The results reported showed that the model fitted best 
employees who were male, completed secondary education only
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and were aged between 31 and 50. Among subjects who displayed 
all of these characteristics, the model explained 34 per cent 
of the variation in effort reports.
This is significantly less than the equivalent figure of 37 
per cent achieved among the employees selected according to 
only one criterion: their relative individualism. The values 
axis meets the criterion combining power with parsimony. 
While the individualistic collectivistic value set may be 
moulded by a host of factors it is clear that it constitutes 
an important axis of discrimination over and above particular 
situational effects.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN - RESULTS: CASH BONUS, SHARE OWNERSHIP &
VALUES
14.1 Introduction
We have argued that incentive-based payment systems tend to be 
advocated based on assumptions which do not universally hold. 
In particular we have demonstrated that the expectancy-view of 
motivated behaviour is a powerful predictive model against 
subjects of individualistic value sets, and much less powerful 
for relatively collectivistic employees.
It follows from this that incentive-based payment systems will 
be effective in increasing effort to the extent that they 
succeed in raising the expectancy/instrumentality perceptions 
of employees, and to the extent that employees are 
individualistic in their values.
Since cash bonuses and share ownership objectively enhance the 
contingency between performance and rewards, then insofar as 
the instrumentality perception reflects to some extent the 
objective situation, according to our incentive model cash 
bonuses and employee share-ownership will be associated with 
higher levels of effort among employees who are covered by 
these schemes than among those excluded. Because cash bonuses 
always refer to a smaller set of sharers than share ownership 
(so, after the economic analysis, the potential for free­
riding is lower), the objective instrumentality is higher for
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cash bonuses than share ownership. Accordingly we would 
expect the cash bonus to motivate higher effort levels than 
share ownership.
However, the previous results have given strong support to our 
hypothesis that the incentive model is most appropriately 
applied to employees of relatively individualistic value sets. 
In the light of these findings, we expect to find that cash 
bonuses and employee shareholdings will be associated with 
higher effort among individualistic members of the sample who 
are covered by the scheme than among similar employees not 
included. At the same time we expect to find no significant 
difference between the effort supplied by collectivistic 
subjects divided according to whether or not they are covered 
by an incentive scheme. Hypotheses H13 and H14 summarised 
this view:
H13: employees (i) covered by an incentive pay contract 
and (ii) who hold a relatively individualistic value 
set will supply relatively high levels of effort,
H14: employees (i) covered by an incentive pay contract 
and (ii) who hold a relatively collectivistic value 
set will supply no more effort than employees not 
covered by incentive pay.
Testing these hypotheses resulted in striking evidence which 
supported our proposition that individualism among employees
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is an important condition to be met if incentive pay is to 
motivate effort at work. Effort supplied by individualistic 
employees incentivated by a cash bonus was significantly 
greater than individualists without a cash incentive. In 
contrast there was no significant difference between the 
effort supplied by collectivistic people covered by a bonus 
and those without this supposed incentive. Equally, while 
individualists who owned shares in their company supplied 
significantly greater effort than employees of similar values 
without shareholdings. In contrast share-ownership made no 
significant difference to the effort supplied by relatively 
collectivistic employees.
These results suggest that incentive pay programmes should be 
restricted to individualistic employees if they are to result 
in significant increases in effort.
14.2 Results: Effects of cash bonus by values
To test these hypotheses the sample was, as in Chapter 
Thirteen, divided into relatively collectivistic and 
relatively individualistic groups by referring to whether a 
case lay above or below the median value of the COLLECT scale. 
This had the effect of controlling for the direct effects of 
the values set on effort supplied. Within each group the mean 
effort level was obtained for (i) employees covered by a cash 
bonus scheme (ii) employees not covered by a cash bonus scheme 
(iii) employees who own shares in Expamet and (iv) employees
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who do not own shares in Expamet.
For hypothesis H13 to be supported, we would expect that the 
incidence of an incentive scheme is associated with a 
significantly higher level of effort supplied among 
individualistic employees. For hypothesis H14 to be supported 
there should be no higher effort associated with the incidence 
of an incentive scheme among collectivistic subjects. In 
addition we would expect the effort associated with a cash 
bonus scheme among subjects of a congruent value set (ie 
individualistic) will be higher than that prevailing under 
share ownership, with its more diluted incentives.
Table 14.1 
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(i) no cash bonus 357






** significant at over 99 per cent
Table 14.1 reports the results of an analysis of the effect of 
cash bonuses on collectivistic and individualistic employees. 
Among individualistic employees the presence of the cash bonus
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scheme is associated with a substantially higher level of 
effort supplied. We can claim, with over 99 per cent 
confidence, that individualists under a cash bonus system work 
harder than similar employees not covered by this scheme. 
This results lends empirical support to hypothesis H13. 
Amongst collectivistic employees, however, the presence of a 
cash bonus incentive scheme is not associated with 
significantly higher effort than amongst similar employees who 
are not covered by the scheme. This result offers clear 
support for Hypothesis H14.
14.3 Results: Effects of share ownership by values
Table 14.2:
Employee share-ownership & Effort Reported
mean
Group N EFFORT (std dev)
INDIVIDUALISTIC
EMPLOYEES
(i) no shares 223 0.2206 (0.949)
(ii) share owners 194 0.5006 (0.932)
COLLECTIVISTIC
EMPLOYEES
(i) no shares 187 -0.4665 (0.929)
(ii) share owners 237 -0.2989 (0.948)
3.03**
1.82
* * significant at over 99 per cent
Table 14.2 tells a similar tale. Share ownership made no 
significant difference to the effort supplied by relatively 
collectivistic employees. However, we can be over 99 per cent 
confident that among individualists, owning shares in Expamet
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was associated with greater effort being supplied. These 
results further support hypotheses H13 and H14,
A comparison of tables 14.1 and 14.2 confirms that among 
individualistic employees being subject to a cash bonus scheme 
was associated with higher effort supplied than owning shares 
in the company. (EFFORT = 0.5161 for individualists with a 
cash bonus, compared with 0.5006 for individualists with 
shares). In addition the increase in effort associated with 
the presence of the bonus was greater than that associated 
with share ownership (0.3644, (t = 3.61) compared with 0.2800 
(t = 3.037).
Table 14.3:
Effort Reported & Cash bonus & Share Ownership
Group N
mean
EFFORT (std dev) t
INDIVIDUALISTIC
EMPLOYEES
(i) neither bonus 
nor shares











(i) neither bonus 
nor shares









** significant at over 99 per cent
Table 14.3 shows that the greater the incentive component in 
pay, the greater is the effort supplied by workers of an
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individualistic value set. Individualistic employees covered 
by both the bonus and share scheme tend to supply 
substantially more effort than those excluded from both 
schemes (t = 4.68). For collectivistic workers, however, an 
increasing incentive element in their pay contract is not 
associated with increases in effort supplied. Table 14.3 
provides, therefore, further support for hypothesis H13 and 
H14.
14.4 Incentive schemes and values: causality
In Section 7.4 we noted the hypothesis that changes in 
management practice in the last decade have brought about 
changes in workers' attitudes: specifically policies such as 
profit-sharing, aligning the interests of the employee and 
employer, would lead to a reduction in 'them and us' type 
attitudes. Applied to our analysis this hypothesis can be 
taken to imply that the introduction of a scheme which makes 
pay more incentive-based will engender amongst the workforce 
a value set of calculative individualism. In other words, 
incentive pay will create the conditions necessary for it to 
succeed. This was expressed as hypothesis H12i
H12: Employees covered by a greater incentive-based 
contract will display greater individualism than 
those not included.
The limitations of a cross-sectional research sample are such 
that we are unable to test this hypothesis rigorously by 
comparing the change in individualistic values (if any) which
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followed the introduction of a new incentive pay scheme. 
However, a less robust means of testing hypothesis H12 is
possible and may shed some useful light on the question. If
incentive-pay schemes brought about a more individualistic 
value set among the employees to whom they were applied, then 
hypothesis H12 would imply that any such employees will have 
significantly greater individualistic orientations than their 
counterparts who do not receive incentive pay.
14.4a Causality: values and share-ownership
Table 14.4 summarises the results of comparing the mean value 
of the individualism-collectivism scale (COLLECT) for two 
groups of employees: those who own shares in Expamet and those 
who do not.
Table 14.4:
Values and Share Ownership
mean
Group N COLLECT (std dev) t
Own shares 426 0.0796 (0.999)
2.13
No shares 412 -0.0669 (0.992)
* significant at 95 per cent level
Contrary to the prediction of hypothesis H12, employee 
shareholders are significantly more collectivistic than non­
shareholders .
A possible explanation for this result is that the two groups, 
shareholders and non-shareholders are not comparable. If
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shareholdings were not allocated at random across the 
workforce, independent factors may explain simultaneously 
their shareholding status and their values orientation.
Appendix Two, however, demonstrates that shares in Expamet 
were distributed in a particularly even handed way across the 
workforce. Shares were allocated free of charge to all 
employees of above two years' standing in the Group in all 
companies which made a profit in the previous financial year. 
Consequently distortions occasioned by differential wealth or 
position in the company, which characterise the pattern of 
employee shareholding in some companies, were less important 
in Expamet. This makes the shareholder and non-shareholder 
groups more comparable than is the typical case.
However, the two years tenure required to qualify for free 
shares is a source of bias between the two groups. Repeating 
the comparison of means of table 14.4 excluding employees of 
two years or below tenure controls for this. The results are 
depicted in table 14.5.
Table 14.5 












Table 14.5 shows that even excluding workers who have not been 
employed for long enough to qualify for free Expamet shares.
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shareholders are more collectivistic than non-shareholders: 
however, the difference in the mean value of COLLECT is no 
longer significant at the 95 per cent level.
Subject to the caveat that cross-sectional analysis may 
conceal other differences between the groups which explain 
their differential individualism, the evidence of tables 14.4 
and 14.5 does not support hypothesis H12. To the contrary, 
share-ownership is associated with a value set (collectivism) 
which is the opposite to that which it might have been 
expected to foster in employees.
An investigation of these results highlighted a possible 
explanation of the greater collectivism of employee- 
shareholders. Shareholding workers overwhelmingly felt that 
their status in the company should allow them a greater input 
in decisions which affected their work. Almost five times as 
many shareholding respondents agreed than disagreed with the 
statement that "employees who own shares in their own company 
should have a greater say in decisions which affect their 
work."* The Expamet scheme was not predicated on providing 
a means for employee-shareholders' voices to be heard.^ One 
interpretation of the evidence is that share-ownership raised 
employees' desire for involvement in the company: since this 
was not satisfied the scheme did not cement a community of 
interest between employees and the company. As a result
' 64.9 per cent strongly agreed or tended to agree. 13.4 per 
cent strongly disagreed or tended to disagree. 20.7 per cent 
expressed no opinion. N= 568.
- Over and above the outlet of the Annual General Meeting.
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values associated with sectional interests were strengthened. 
Over sixty per cent of employee shareholders disagreed that 
owning shares made them less interested in trade unions, and 
56 per cent disagreed that owning shares made them less likely 
to take industrial action.
While such an explanation is no more than a conjecture, it is 
consistent with the findings of previous time-series studies 
of employee share-ownership programmes. For example, the 
experience of Baxi Heat, one of the largest examples in 
Britain of a conversion to employee-ownership, demonstrated 
that employees whose attitudes were of contentment before the 
change, developed views which were highly critical of their 
company's management once they became shareholders, resulting 
in a heightened 'us and them' orientation among the workforce 
(Bradley (1988)).
14.4b Causality: values and cash bonus
While our data provides no clear evidence that employee 
shareholders are more likely than other workers to have a 
relatively calculative individualistic value set, comparing 
the recipients of a cash bonus with those not covered by a 
scheme yielded different results.
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Table 14.6















** significant at over 99 per cent
Table 14.6 shows that the mean value of the COLLECT index for 
employees in receipt of a cash bonus is significantly lower 
than that for workers not covered by this incentive. Subject 
always to the caveat that cross sectional analysis may conceal 
other explanatory factors which differ between the groups, 
table 14.6 offers some support for hypothesis H12.
The robustness of this finding is demonstrated to some extent 
by controlling for the level of the employee in the corporate 
hierarchy. Table 14.7 illustrates that while the typical 
manager is less collectivistic than the typical shop-floor 
worker, in both groups those who participate in a cash bonus 
incentive scheme are more individualistic than their peers who 
are not covered by a cash bonus system.
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Table 14.7


























The New Industrial Relations hypothesis specified as 
hypothesis H12 receives mixed support from our survey. While 
share-ownership seems to be associated with greater 
collectivism, the incidence of a cash bonus is strongly 
associated with individualistic values.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN - CONCLUSIONS
15.1 Introduction
In Chapter One we described two broad objectives for our 
study. The first was to illustrate the potential for research 
into incentive payment systems carried out by economists and 
social psychologists to be viewed as complementary rather than 
incommensurable. The second was to show that models of effort 
under incentive payment systems are not universal and 
ahistoric. Rather they are more powerful predictors of 
performance at some times and among some people than at 
others. The individualistic-collectivistic values axis was 
argued to describe one such boundary condition.
These objectives were to be pursued by means of a positivistic 
research methodology. Accordingly the arguments were 
developed and expressed as testable hypotheses. A sample of 
questionnaire data from 14 operating companies was specified 
and hypothesized as being sufficient to test the set of 
hypotheses advanced. Empirical proxies for the variables of 
the hypotheses were constructed and subjected to attempts at 
falsification by the data in our sample.
15.2 Summary of Findings
An analysis of neoclassical economic and expectancy theoretic 
models of effort under incentive pay revealed analogies in
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both their content and underlying assumptions. In particular, 
both traditions were built on assumptions of economic 
rationality. Taylor (1990, p. 234) identified the "axiomatic 
and individualist theory of rational action" held by economics 
as being a major obstacle to attempts to "integrate economic 
thinking with that of any other area of the social sciences". 
To find that the expectancy theory tradition of social 
psychology shares this set of assumptions is therefore to 
remove this obstacle to building an interdisciplinary 
approach. Accordingly the theory of motivation supplied by 
expectancy theory can be seen as compatible with economic 
models and indeed complementary by opening up the black box of 
causality. Hence, greater confidence may be placed in 
empirical tests of economic models if a chain of motivation is 
simultaneously supported empirically.
The empirical tests of our hypotheses provided useful 
evidence. Chapter Twelve demonstrated that an additive 
expectancy-type model of motivated behaviour was predictively 
more powerful than the traditional multiplicative 
specification. Since the additive form is more consistent 
with theories of limited economic rationality (such as Simon's 
concept of bounded rationality) this result supported our 
criticism of the usefulness of assumptions of economic 
rationality in models of incentive pay. After Popper, 
respecifying the structure of the model was found to be a 
useful step in enhancing its predictive power.
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Evidence was presented in Chapter Thirteen which showed that 
our expectancy-type model of motivated behaviour was 
significantly more powerful among employees of relatively 
individualistic value sets than among those of relatively 
collectivistic values. Over 37 per cent of variance in our 
effort measure was explained by our model among 
individualistic subjects. This figure fell to 17.8 per cent 
among collectivistic employees. The differential in
predictive power was shown to be robust to situational factors 
such as position in the company, age and level of education 
attained. This evidence supported our hypothesis that the 
individualism of employees is an important boundary condition 
for the applicability of models of incentive pay of this type.
Applying our tests specifically to the two formal incentive 
pay schemes practised in our sample, cash bonuses and employee 
shareholdings, we found that effort levels were significantly 
higher among individualistic employees who received a cash 
bonus or who owned shares in their company than among their 
fellow individualists who did not. However, no significant 
difference could be detected between the effort supplied by 
those collectivistic employees who owned shares in their 
company or received a cash bonus, and those who did not. This 
set of results supported our hypothesis that incentive pay, in 
keeping with the boundary conditions identified, would 
motivate higher effort among individualistic subjects, but 
would not be successful among those characterised by 
collectivist values. In keeping with the model, cash bonuses.
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(where the objective performance-extrinsic reward contingency 
was more pronounced than that for share ownership) tended to 
be more successful in motivating higher effort than did 
employee share ownership. Once again, these results were not 
undermined by differences in the composition of the compared 
groups in terms of situational and demographic 
characteristics.
Finally, in Chapter Fourteen we investigated the possibility 
that the presence of a formal incentive payment system would 
be associated with a greater incidence of calculative 
individualism than among those employees not covered by one of 
the schemes. That is, can incentive pay bring about the 
conditions necessary for its own success? Results in this 
case were ambiguous. Employee shareholders were found to be 
more collectivistic in their orientation than their non-share 
owning colleagues. Contextual factors were advanced as a 
possible explanation of this finding. On the other hand 
employees who were covered by a cash bonus scheme in their 
company were significantly more individualistic in their 
values than their counterparts who were not covered by a bonus 
scheme. This difference was robust to the influence of 
situational factors such as position in the corporate 
hierarchy. We felt unable from our evidence to conclude 
decisively that incentive pay systems bred greater 
individualism among those exposed to them - a key facet of the 
New Industrial Relations debate that new management practices 
will change deep-set worker attributes.
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15.3 Implications for Practice
The results of these empirical tests carry important 
implications for both theory and practice.
For practitioners - firms designing their pay systems to 
promote greatest effort from their workforce - the results 
suggest that incentive pay policies will not be universally 
successful. Among some employees - those characterised by 
individualistic value sets - incentive pay can be an effective 
way of increasing effort. Among collectivistic workforces the 
resources invested into the establishment and operation of an 
incentive pay scheme could be largely fruitless. Firms will 
be well advised to ascertain whether their workforce tends to 
individualism or collectivism in its prevailing values, before 
deciding to introduce an incentive pay system.
This is not to say that in workplaces characterised by 
relatively collectivistic values incentive pay schemes can 
never be introduced. It may be possible for firms to reshape 
employees' values first, by emphasising individualistic 
policies and moving away from collectivism. Our results 
constitute a call for more attention to be paid to design in 
payment systems. Incentive pay may be successful in certain, 
individualistic parts of the organization; amongst other 
workers attention should be paid to devising a more 
appropriate framework for compensation. Equally as values 
vary between regions and nations, national and multinational
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corporations should recognise the costs of applying a uniform 
payment system across all of their operations.
In Chapter Two we pointed out that among trends in British 
industrial relations in the last decade can be discerned a 
rise in individualistic values and practices at the expense of 
those associated with collectivism. If this trend continues, 
then the implication of our results is that incentive models 
of pay will be properly applicable to an increasing section of 
the workforce. In planning for the future, therefore, 
managers responsible for remuneration can expect a growing 
constituency for effective incentive pay innovations.
15.4 Implications for Theory
The empirical tests of our hypotheses have important 
repercussions for the progress of the theoretical debate on 
payment systems.
Both economic and social psychological models of incentive pay 
have been undercut by ambiguous empirical results supplied by 
tests of their implications. We have demonstrated a common 
ground between economic and expectancy theoretic models which 
can be a basis for greater confidence in the effects of 
incentive pay. Thus if an incentive pay scheme is associated 
with positive objective performance (for example high 
productivity), these may be a result of superior management or 
other variables rather than evidence of a causal power
2 2 3
attributable to incentive pay. If, simultaneously, subjective 
perceptions are obtained and confirm that the incentive scheme 
worked by increasing the components of the complementary 
motivational process, then the role of incentive pay has been 
isolated. For example, Richardson and Nejad (1986) found that 
profit-sharing companies' share price performance was superior 
to that of non profit-sharing companies. Had they
simultaneously tested a motivational process and found that 
expectancies and instrumentalities were higher among profit- 
sharing companies, greater confidence could be placed in the 
effects of incentive pay. If expectancies and
instrumentalities were no different between profit-sharing and 
non profit-sharing companies then the superior share price 
performance of the former group could more confidently be 
ascribed to factors other than the incentive regime. Thus an 
interdisciplinary approach, making use of objective and 
subjective data, can move debates in incentive pay closer to 
resolution.
A second implication for theory from our empirical results is 
that theories of incentive pay must pay more explicit 
attention to their own assumptions, particularly when they are 
cited in a form which is likely to influence practice. That 
is, they should attempt to define the boundary conditions 
within which their ambit runs and their implications are 
meaningful. Our results show that incentive pay models should 
not be advanced as universal or ahistoric: the assumptions on 
which they are based are not always met.
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This implication of our analysis goes beyond the universalism 
of models of incentive pay. As the approach of neoclassical 
economics is extended to the analysis of more and more aspects 
of society*, it is important to make known the limits of the 
models by specifying the boundary conditions which follow from 
their underlying assumptions. To fail to do so risks seeing 
mutable, analytical assumptions evolving, by default, into 
unquestionable truths. As our analysis has shown, this would 
be an acceptance of dogma at the expense of models' predictive 
power.
A third implication for theory is concerned with rising 
individualism in industrial relations. If we have correctly 
identified this phenomenon and it continues in the future it 
implies a qualification of research evidence to date. If 
incentive pay systems are most effective among people of 
individualistic value sets, and the proportion of such people 
in the workforce is increasing then we must expect future 
tests of the incentive effects to be more supportive of its 
motivating effects than past tests. Hence the mild or 
inconclusive results which characterise the body of empirical 
evidence to date should not be taken to mitigate the expected 
effects of incentive pay in the future.
' From voting decisions to the decision to marry, 
(Becker (1976), Downs (1957)).
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15.5 Suggestions for Further Work
The evidence which we have reported, while striking, must be 
considered as being an exercise in basic research in that it 
constituted a first attempt to formulate and test empirically 
an important theoretical issue. While the conclusions 
justified our investigation the issues which we have covered 
should ideally be taken further in a particular way: the
external validity of our analysis and conclusions should be 
probed. That is to say, the opportunity should be taken to 
apply our hypotheses using empirical proxies which have a 
context of previous refinement and development. Replicating 
our study using, for example, Hofstede's (1980) IDV index of 
individualism in the place of our COLLECT index of 
individualism will indicate how dependent our results are on 
the particular proxy for individualism which we used. Since 
Hofstede's IDV has been demonstrated to be highly correlated 
with other indices of individualism such a replication could 
confirm the external validity of our concept and hence our 
conclusions. Similarly, established indices of expectancy and 
instrumentality could be substituted for the scales which we 
have derived and used: further work can refine the measures 
used and make them commensurable with other empirical work.
The research strategy which we adopted - the secondary 
analysis of a large dataset - was shown in Chapter Nine to 
have the advantage of being broad in its scope, covering 
fourteen companies operating around the country, and all
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positions within those companies. Because of the dataset 
used, we can have greater confidence in claiming generality 
for our results than would be possible in the context of a 
simple case study. However, the companies surveyed cannot be 
argued to be wholly representative of British firms: they
contained a preponderance of manufacturing companies and 
employed relatively few female workers (22 per cent of those 
surveyed) , for example. More studies of this type in a 
diversity of different companies would indicate how 
generalisable our results are.
Another opportunity for further research is provided by the 
fact that our dataset applied only to employees in England and 
Wales. We have, nevertheless, formulated a clear hypothesis 
that incentive pay systems work best among individualistic 
employees, and that, after Hofstede, individualism is a key 
axis of differentiation between the people of different 
countries. Accordingly a comprehensive evaluation of whether 
incentive pay motivates more effort among employees in 
countries characterised by individualism (eg, US, Canada 
according to Hofstede) than among those of more collectivist 
workforces (eg, Austria, Spain), is open to future research.
More generally, the greater the number and the more 
comprehensive are the empirical tests which our hypotheses 
survive, the more confident we can be in the results of our 
analysis, and the implications which we have drawn from them. 
Replicating our analysis in different settings, using time
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series as well as cross-sectional data will all assist in 
turning basic research conclusions into established ones.
The analysis which we have brought to models of incentive pay 
has an applicability outside this particular set of policies. 
We have argued that neo-classical economic models, and others 
which share their methodological assumptions, are subject to 
a boundary condition of individualistic values characterising 
those to whom the models are hypothesized to apply. In the 
light of our discussion, future research could usefully 
investigate whether respecting this boundary condition does 
increase the predictive power of such models applied in other 
areas. For example, the economic analysis of voting behaviour 
should, after our argument, be predictively a more accurate 
model of the behaviour of individualistic electors than those 
of strong community-oriented values. Performing such analyses 
would advance research by making use of models predictive 
power while not foreclosing alternative analyses in areas in 
which the standard assumptions are not met.
2 2 8
APPENDIX 1: POTENTIALLY RELEVANT QUESTIONS IN THE SURVEY
Are you: Male
Female
How long have you worked for your company?
Are you:
Is your job:
Less than 1 year 
Less than 2 years 
Less than 3 years 
Less than 4 years 
Less than 5 years 
Less than 10 years 
Less than 15 years 
15 years or more
20 years or under 
Between 21 and 30 
Between 31 and 40 
Between 41 and 50 
51 years or over
Full time 
Part time
At what age did you leave full time education?








13. Would you describe yourself as:
a manager 
a supervisor 
a clerical worker 
other
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26. When I do a good 










28. I am well paid 
for what I do
29. I am satisfied
with my basic pay
40. Do you receive an annual cash bonus 
from your company? Yes
No











43. My annual cash bonus from my 
company is a large amount of 
money to me 1
45. The amount of the annual cash
bonus depends a lot on how much 
effort employees put into their 
work 1
56. The value of a share in Expamet 
depends a lot in the work effort 
of employees 1
60. Do you participate in Expamet’s 
profit sharing scheme? Yes
No
1




64. In how many different companies, 
including Expamet do you own 
shares? 1 2
Neither Agree Tend to
nor Disagree Disagree
Strongly
65. The number of shares I own in 
Expamet is a  1
69. Owning shares is not for the likes 
of me 1
87. As an individual, I can really make a 
difference to the success of my work 
team 1 2
91. The success of my workplace depends on 
a special effort from its
employees 1 2
96. I help and encourage fellow workers in






Neither Agree Tend to
nor Disagree Disagree
Stangly
97. It is none of my business if workers in
my work team sometimes take it easy on 
the job 1 2
100. It is important for employees to do all 
they can to increase company 
profits 1 2
102. The way I do my job is very important for 
the quality of the work done in my 
work team 1 2
125. There is a ’them’ and ’us’ relationship
between department managers and all other 
levels of employees 1 2
128. It is none of my business if workers in my
department sometimes take it easy on the 
job 1 2
134. As an individual I can really make a
difference to the success of 
my department 1 2
137. My company has an effective system to 
identify people for
promotion 1 2
147. In my company there is a ’them’ and ’us’ 
relationship between very senior managers 
and other levels of
employees 1 2
195. Training should lead to an increase 
in wages 1
198. When new equipment is introduced workers’ 
basic pay should be
increased 1 2
216. My company should increase the 












231. I am not willing to put myself out
just to help my company 1
233. In my job I like to feel I am making 
some effort, not just for myself but 
for the company as well 1
235. Should your company have a trade
union : 1
236. Are you a member of a trade union? Yes
No
1










248. In general unions and their
representatives should have more 
more say in decisions affecting the 
company as a whole 1
250. Local trade unions should have more 
power and influence in my 
company 1
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APPENDIX 2 - EXPAMET'S INCENTIVE PAY SCHEMES
The fourteen companies belonging to Expamet pic operate two 
formal incentive pay schemes, employee share ownership and 
cash bonuses. The incidence of each of these policies was 
recorded in the questionnaire survey.
Employee Shareownership
At the time of the survey in November 1988 Expamet had 
operated an employee share ownership programme for four years. 
This was a profit-sharing scheme approved under the Finance 
Act 1978 which enabled companies to distribute free shares to 
all employees of over four years employment. Under the Act, 
employees are unable to deal in the shares during the two year 
period after allocation. In years 3 and 4 the shares may be 
sold but the proceeds are taxable at the employee's marginal 
rate. In year five, 25 per cent of the shares' value may be 
disposed of tax free, and at the end of the fifth year the 
employee has no tax liability for his shareholding.
Expamet made allocations available to all UK employees of only 
two years standing or above, in 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988.
Allocations were salary-related. An employee with a salary of 
£10,000 per annum who participated in all four distributions 
and had not sold his shares would own Expamet shares to the 
value of around £800 at the time of the survey; about eight 
per cent of his salary.
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Employees at Cash and Security Equipment Ltd and C&R Security 
Systems Ltd joined the Group too late to have participated in 
the scheme by the time of the survey. Of employees who 
received allocations in 1985 and 1986, 20 per cent and 13 per 
cent respectively, had disposed of their holdings at the time 
of the survey. The survey reported that 48.3 per cent of 
respondents owned shares in Expamet.
The Board of Expamet introduced the scheme in 1984 with the 
stated intention of "increasing employee commitment to 
achieving increasing profitability and growth." ‘
Cash Bonuses
Twenty five per cent of respondents were covered by a cash 
bonus scheme. These were performance-based systems devised 
and operated autonomously by the companies surveyed. Because 
of the variety of schemes practised their incidence was 
recorded in the survey under the umbrella term cash bonus. 
The two constituent and principal characteristics of incentive 
pay which differentiated it from the share ownership scheme 
was that rewards were in cash, and always referred to the 
performance of a group smaller than Expamet pic. Twenty per 
cent of those receiving a cash bonus were identified as 
managers, 13 per cent as clerical workers, 15 per cent 
supervisors and 4 0 per cent shopfloor and other workers.
' Internal memo, 26 June 1988.
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